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INTRODUCTION: DOCTRINES AND DILEMMAS
A New Liability
The so-called automobile "crashworthiness,"1 "second coli-
* Member, New York Bar; Author, Products Liability column, a regular feature of the
New York Law Journal; B.A., Queens College; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law.
I "Crashworthiness" is defined in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act
as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against personal
injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) (1976). For a
number of judicial definitions of the term, see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489
F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974). The term crashworthiness, often used interchangeably
with the phrases second collision and enhanced injury, denotes the broad spectrum of cases
in which the complaint alleges that the vehicle performed defectively during a crash, as
distinguished from cases where defects are alleged to have caused the accident itself. This
term includes complaints about a vehicle's frame or structural design, e.g., Dawson v.
Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1418 (1981) (side
frame); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1068 (4th Cir. 1974) (front
structure); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (roof
structure), its interior components, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976)
(head restraint); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 204, 321 A.2d 737, 739
(1974) (front seat); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 236, 166 S.E.2d 173, 184 (1969) (gear
shift lever knob); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 199, 205 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1973)
(seat belt), or its exterior design, e.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (car's exterior lamp injuring motorcyclist); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,
454 F.2d 1270, 1272 (8th Cir. 1972) (car's ornamental wheel cover injuring motorcyclist);
Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 714, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747 (Ct. App. 1976)
(car's exterior colliding with pedestrian). There is a semantic problem in using the term
second collision to describe the broad spectrum of crashworthiness cases because some of
these claims do not involve a collision between the occupant and the car's interior. Claims
for fire injuries, for example, may impugn the car's crashworthiness qualities yet not place
in issue any culpability for non-burn second collision injuries. E.g., Buehler v. Whalen, 70
Ill. 2d 51, 54, 374 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1978) (parties stipulated plaintiff's injuries caused en-
tirely by burns). Similarly, a motorcyclist's leg impact with a passing car's wheel cover
might be only the first collision. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1273
(8th Cir. 1972). Conversely, a claimant's injury might result from a multiple collision acci-
dent where his injurious contact with the interior or exterior of the car is not a second
collision but a fourth or fifth collision. Since this appears to be a question of semantics and
because the terms crashworthiness, second collision, and enhanced injury often are used
interchangeably, this article generally will treat the phrases as functional equivalents. The
practitioner is advised, however, to exercise caution in using the terms crashworthiness and
second collision synonymously when multiple impacts are involved and the liability of a
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sion, ' '2 or "enhanced injury"3 claim is a relatively recent and dra-matic phenomenon in products liability law.4 Notably, the novel
defendant concerns only one phase of the occurrence.
2 The term second collision usually refers to the impact between a passenger and an
interior part of the vehicle following primary impact. Nevertheless, it also has been applied
to ejection cases where the occupant exits the vehicle and strikes something exterior to the
car. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981). Second collisions
stem from crash dynamics. When a car collides with another object, kinetic energy is dissi-
pated by vehicle deformation and motion. What happens to the car and its structure is
popularly called the first collision. Depending upon the circumstances, unrestrained occu-
pants continue to move until they are stopped by the interior of the car. This is known as
the second collision. See generally Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy"
Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 44-51 (1974). When
occupants are restrained, by seatbelts, for example, they experience a "ride-down" effect in
that the motorist's deceleration conforms more closely with that of the vehicle. Id. at 46-47.
This necessarily reduces the occupant's impact speed relative to the car, slowing him down
for the second collision. Id. at 47.
' The term "enhanced injury" refers to the degree collision injuries are aggravated by
reason of an alleged defect over and above that which would otherwise have been sustained.
The extent to which injuries are enhanced is the limit of a manufacturer's liability. Higgen-
botham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). Accordingly, proof of what injuries would have
resulted if an alternative design had been used is required. In other words, the claimant
must establish the extent to which his injuries actually are attributable to the defective
design. Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981); Caiazzo v. Volks-
wagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38
(3d Cir. 1976). Implicit in the concept of enhancement limitation is the fact that crash inju-
ries are an inevitable byproduct of car accidents. Some collisions "would obviously be so
violent that the vehicle's crashworthiness would be irrelevant." Higginbotham v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 540 F.2d at 766 n.4. For example, "any 'head-on' collision at a speed of 40 miles an
hour or more will result in severe injuries to the occupants of a vehicle." Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1076 (4th Cir. 1974). Thus, it must be shown how
and to what degree the defective design actually increased the injuries normally expected
from a similar impact in a vehicle without the defect. To a great extent, the laws of physics
and practical injury tolerance levels dominate the scene. Indeed, the energy that will be
absorbed or dissipated in a collision greatly depends upon the masses and speeds involved.
The rigidity of objects struck, the angles of impact, the amount of energy absorbed by mo-
tion, and localized crush properties play an influential role. See generally Hoenig & Goetz,
supra note 2, at 44-48. In addition, human bones, organs, muscle, and skin have only certain
tolerances against impact. When these tolerances are surpassed, injuries are sustained. Id. at
48-50. A study by the Department of Transportation revealed, for example, that in frontal
collisions, 50% of deaths occur at an equivalent barrier test of 33 miles per hour and 50% of
injuries occur at a barrier test speed of 26 miles per hour. Id. at 29-30 (discussing findings in
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PASSIVE PROTECTION AT 50 MILES PER HOUR 1-2 (1972)); see
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d at 1076 (mean velocity for fatalities only 33
miles per hour).
" The seminal case announcing the basic version of crashworthiness liability was de-
cided in 1968. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-06 (8th Cir. 1968). For a
discussion of Larsen, see notes 11-17 infra. This area of tort law has received much atten-
tion in recent years. See generally Digges, The Impact of Liability For Enhanced Injury, 5
U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1975); Donnelly, Aircraft Crashworthiness-Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 42 J.
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crashworthiness claim permits the imposition of multimillion dol-
lar liability5 even though the car's design or construction was abso-
lutely blameless regarding the cause of the accident.6 Whereas
traditional automotive products liability had focused upon defects
that caused accidents,7 the inquiry in crashworthiness claims fo-
Am L. & Com. 57 (1976); Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Colli-
sion" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600 (1977); Galerstein, A Review of
Crashworthiness, 45 J. Am L. & Com. 187 (1979); Hoenig, Understanding "Second Colli-
sion" Cases in New York, 20 N.Y.L.F. 29 (1974); Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2; Hoenig &
Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness" an Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578
(1971); Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REV. 645
(1967); National Transportation Safety Board, The Status of General Aviation Aircraft
Crashworthiness, 3 LPBA J. 28 (1981); Pawlak, Manufacturer's Design Liability: The Ex-
panding Frontiers of the Law, 19 DEF. L.J. 143 (1970); Roda, Products Liability-The "En-
hanced Injury Case" Revisited, 8 FORUM 643 (1973); Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability:
The Need for Uniformity, 4 SErON HALL L. REV. 499 (1973); Whitehead, Some Comments
on Aircraft Crashworthiness, 42 J. AIR L. & Com. 73 (1976); Note, Manufacturer's Liability
for an "Uncrashworthy" Automobile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1967); Note, Application of
Nebraska Law in Second Collision, Design-Defect Cases, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 198 (1976);
Recent Decision, Products Liability-Second Collision-Enhanced Injuries- Apportion-
ment of Damages, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 733 (1977); Note, The Crashworthiness Doctrine and the
Allocation of Risks in Commercial Aviation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1979); Note, Appor-
tionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475 (1977); Comment,
Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 299 (1969); Epstein, Crashworthy Vehicles: Ax the Quiet, But Complete Revolution in
Products Liability Law (1977) (statement to the Joint Committee on Tort Liability of the
California Legislature on Behalf of the American Insurance Association, San Diego, July 18,
1977).
5 E.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 955 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981) (judgment exceeding $2.5 million); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d
395, 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (jury award for compensatory damages of $150,000 and punitive
damages of $10 million; punitive award reversed on appeal); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726,
731 (3d Cir. 1976) (jury verdict exceeding $2 million reversed on appeal).
' Although the crashworthy claim is a separate, distinct cause of action having its own
legal rules, including burdens of proof and statutes of limitation, see generally notes 1-3
supra, it occasionally is filed in conjunction with a claim that a defect caused the accident.
See, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 835 (3d Cir. 1981); Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1068 (4th Cir. 1974). If a claimant prevails on the
accident-causation claim he is entitled to recover for all damages caused in the action and
not just the enhanced injuries. See, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d at 850
(Adams, J., dissenting). The distinction between the two theories, however, must be main-
tained not only because different rules apply, but also because an accident-causation verdict
may be set aside after post-trial motions or reversed on appeal. See, e.g., id. at 835. Thus,
the crashworthy claim is a separate theory of liability which succeeds or fails on its own
merits. See id. at 850 (Adams, J., dissenting). If the claimant prevails on a crashworthy
theory alone he is entitled to recover only for those enhanced injuries which occurred due to
the vehicle's defective performance. See note 1 supra.
7 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269-71 (5th Cir. 1963) (defective
headlights); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310, 310-12 (6th Cir. 1930) (defective steer-
ing mechanism); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 384-85, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051
1981]
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cuses, instead, upon how well or how poorly the vehicle performed
in minimizing the claimant's accident-related injury. Thus, the
questions in crashworthiness claims are whether and to what
extent the vehicle or its allegedly defective characteristic unrea-
sonably "enhanced" or "aggravated" injuries." Invariably, the
crashworthiness claimant9 contends that the automobile or its al-
legedly offending feature should have been made safer or stronger
so as to mitigate the injuries sustained in the particular accident. 10
The seminal case of Larsen v. General Motors Corp.," illus-
trates the nature of crashworthiness claims and the rationale for
imposing a common-law duty to "minimize" injuries in accidents.
In Larsen, the plaintiff-driver sustained severe injuries in a frontal
collision when the vehicle's steering mechanism allegedly thrust
rearward striking him in the head. The plaintiff contended that
the rearward displacement of the steering shaft on impact was
greater than in cars which had been designed to protect against
such occurrences. Thus, it was alleged that the steering assembly
design proximately caused injuries which otherwise would not have
been sustained or that the design unreasonably exacerbated the se-
verity of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant-manufacturer ar-
gued that liability did not lie because the law imposed no duty of
care upon the manufacturer to design an automobile which would
be safe to occupy in the event of a collision.
(1916) (defective wheel); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651, 653-55 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) (defective brakes); McKinney v. Frodsham, 57 Wash. 2d 126, 131-33, 356 P.2d
100, 103-05 (1960) (defective door latch). See Philo, Automobile Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 4 DUQ. L. REv. 181, 181 (1965).
" See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981); Hig-
ginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.N.J. 1973); Digges,
supra note 4, at 17; Foland, supra note 4, at 608; Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 21.
' The crashworthiness claimant typically is an injured occupant of a vehicle which has
been involved in an accident. Enhancement claims, however, also have been instituted on
behalf of nonoccupants including pedestrians or motorcyclists. E.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor
Co., 546 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (motorcyclist); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App.
3d 710, 714, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747 (Ct. App. 1976) (pedestrian); see Note, The Automobile
Manufacturer's Liability to Pedestrians for Exterior Design: New Dimensions in
"Crashworthiness," 71 MICH. L. Rev. 1654, 1654 (1973).
'0 E.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1974). In
Dreisonstok, the plaintiff's experts testified that a snub-nosed, multipurpose van should
have been built like a standard Ford passenger car. Id. at 1074-75. Similarly, in Dawson v.
Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), the plaintiff's
experts opined that the vehicle should have had a continuous side frame and an additional
crossmember. Id. at 958.
" 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 55:633
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the plaintiff's allegations stated a cause of action. Noting that
"automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each
other," the Larsen court nevertheless recognized that collisions are
a "frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile
use."12 Consequently, the court reasoned, since collisions and re-
sulting injuries are "readily foreseeable as an incident to the nor-
mal and expected use of an automobile," the manufacturer should
be under a duty "to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle
to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the
event of a collision." 13 Indeed, the statistical inevitability of colli-
sions, according to the court, compelled a common-law duty of care
to design a vehicle so as to minimize the effects of accidents. 14 The
Larsen court, however, spoke only in terms of unreasonable risks
of enhanced injury.1 5 Accordingly, it disclaimed any duty "to de-
sign an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats
on water.""6 Necessarily, therefore, the scope of the newly minted
liability was limited to only those injuries which were actually en-
hanced by the defect:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufac-
turer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury
caused by the defective design over and above the damage or in-
jury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact
or collision absent the defective design.'7
In announcing a crashworthiness duty, the Eighth Circuit dis-
agreed with the earlier Seventh Circuit decision in Evans v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.'s which had held that such claims were not ac-
tionable as a matter of law. The plaintiff in Evans alleged that his
12 Id. at 502.
12 Id.
11 Id. at 502-03. The Larsen court noted that between one-fourth and two-thirds of all
cars are involved in accidents producing death or injury at some point during their use. Id.
at 502.
15 Id. at 502-06.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 503. The Larsen court noted that a crashproof vehicle could not be designed
under the present state of the art. Id. In crashworthy cases, however, the design should be
examined on the basis of the technology practicably available at the time the car was manu-
factured, not at the time of the accident. In Larsen, the car in question was a 1963 Corvair,
a relatively late model at the time of the collision in 1964.
18 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
1981]
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vehicle's frame design provided inadequate protection against side-
impact. The Evans court concluded that the nature of the manu-
facturer's common-law duty was merely to ensure that the product
was reasonably fit for its intended purpose.19 Recognizing that the
intended purpose of a vehicle does not include its involvement in
collisions, the Seventh Circuit viewed the requirement to construct
collision-safe automobiles as more properly a legislative function. 0
In the years immediately following the Larsen decision, a "tug
of war" emerged among courts considering the question-some fol-
lowing the Evans approach and others finding the Larsen rationale
more persuasive. 21 In this struggle, the federal courts seemed to
play an important role as they hazarded "Erie-educated guesses, '22
regarding the approach state courts would adopt if faced with the
11 Id. at 825. The concept of equating legal duty with foreseeability or treating them
coextensively may properly be criticized because many factors other than foreseeability de-
termine the existence and scope of a duty. See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1961); Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 22-26; Hoenig &
Werber, supra note 4, at 587-90. One court has noted, for example, that it certainly is fore-
seeable that cars will fall into bodies of water or water-filled ditches. See text accompanying
note 16 supra. Yet, "Larsen recognized that there is no duty or burden upon the manufac-
turer as yet to design an automobile that floats upon the water. If the vehicle must be
'crashworthy,' then why not include safety on the water?" Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Similarly, although it is foreseeable that a car
may collide at high speed with a large truck, such an occurrence could not reasonably give
rise to liability merely because the car collapsed. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.
Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974) (no liability despite foreseeabllty of 40 mile per hour collision
with pole); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973) (discussion of the limited
role of foreseeability in formulating duty rules).
'o Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836 (1966).
" For a collection of earlier cases following Evans' and Larsen's rationale, see Digges,
supra note 4, at 1; Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 4-6; Hoenig & Werber, supra note 4, at
571; Roda, supra note 4, at 643; Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972). Occasionally, courts have
attempted to tabulate lists of cases said to follow the differing viewpoints. See Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1977).
"' Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts deciding diversity
cases must apply the law of the state in which they sit and not any "federal common law."
Id. at 78. Although the Erie doctrine does not permit a federal court to announce the state
law which it might prefer, it does allow a federal court to predict what a state court would
do if presented with the problem. See McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 240 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973). It is the duty of the federal court "to ascertain from
all the available data what the state law is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different
rule, however superior it may appear from the viewpoint of 'general law'." West v. AT & T,
311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). Of the 33 cases listed in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d at
110-11, which followed Larsen or Evans, 14 cases were decided by federal courts. Indeed,
Evans and Larsen were decided by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, respectively.
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threshold legal issue.2 s Nevertheless, since a court opting to follow
Larsen will be markedly extending products liability, the Erie task
has been viewed with discomfort.24
An Open-Ended Liability?
Shifting the focus to an amorphous standard of injury minimi-
zation, at first glance, may not seem to be a major extension of
liability frontiers. Closer consideration, however, reveals the mag-
nitude of the change.
Obviously cars cannot be redesigned from accident to acci-
dent. A manufacturer needs to know in advance of production
what features to build into its automobiles.2 5 When the standard of
23 It appears that the task required by Erie is not a simple matter. Indeed, one some-
times can discern a lack of incisive reasons for a federal court's adoption of a particular
approach. In Huff v. White Motor Corp., for example, the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana
law, overruled Evans, reasoning that the state's adoption of strict tort liability reflected a
"trend" that justified following the lead of other jurisdictions which had endorsed Larsen.
565 F.2d at 109. The reasoning of the Huff panel, however, was criticized by some of the
Seventh Circuit judges in regular active service. 565 F.2d at 109 n.7. Two judges joined in a
statement that the overruling of Evans was made "without any really persuasive basis in
case law from the Indiana courts." Id. They also opined that the court had decided Huff "on
what it thinks the law should be rather than, as we should, what the current law is." Id. Still
another judge filed a statement noting that, if he were a panel member, he would have voted
to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court "in view of the length of the time
Evans has stood unabrogated by the Indiana courts." Id. Thus, it is evident that Huff was a
controversial determination among the Seventh Circuit judges.
Considerable difficulty also may arise when different circuits disagree concerning the
law of a particular state. Compare Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th Cir.
1981) (per curiam) (holding North Carolina law does not permit crashworthiness claims)
with Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 849 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding North Caro-
lina law would permit such claims). It has been unclear whether a federal court sitting
outside the state whose law is to be applied should defer to the prediction of the federal
court whose jurisdiction includes the state whose law governs the issue. A recent Second
Circuit decision, however, held that such deference is required. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981). If federal courts throughout the country freely
interpret state law irrespective of the determination by federal courts sitting within the
particular jurisdiction whose law is to be applied, chaos could result. For example, the Sev-
enth Circuit's holding in Huff that Indiana law now follows Larsen instead of Evans, 565
F.2d at 109, might be rejected by a federal district judge sitting elsewhere on the ground
that the opinion was "poorly reasoned." Cf. Van Tine v. Nissan Motor Co., 463 F. Supp.
1274, 1276-77 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (district court in Pennsylvania construed West Virginia law
contrary to earlier Fourth Circuit opinion but avoided conflict by holding that Pennsylvania
law applied).
1, E.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1976); Anton v. Ford Motor Co.,
400 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
25 Obviously, if an accident occurs years after a product was designed and a suit, in
turn, is commenced years after the collision occurred, the outcome of a particular jury's
verdict cannot affect the older design or those designs released in the intervening years.
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care revolves around accident causation, the manufacturer has a
readily cognizable task. It knows that it must simply make cars
that do not unreasonably cause accidents. If, however, the legal
standard is a general, open-ended duty to minimize injuries when-
ever accidents occur, very difficult problems inevitably arise. What
degree of design safety and how many injury-minimization features
are enough? In what collisions and at what speeds?26 For example,
if a large truck collides with a subcompact automobile at high
speed, would or should liability be excused?27 If not, what level of
injury would or should the law tolerate? Would multiple fractures,
paralysis, or death be unreasonable to expect in such an acci-
dent?28 Should the small car have been built up in anticipation of
foreseeable impacts with larger, heavier structures? Would such a
course not compete with a national policy to encourage the manu-
facture of lighter, fuel-efficient vehicles? 29 Is it wise to emphasize
Since trial results are frequently appealed, further delay is built into the system. Addition-
ally, commentators agree that specialized agencies or standard-setting bodies are better
equipped than the courts to weigh the myriad of factors governing design safety or crash
performance. See J. O'CoNNsLL & A. MEYERS, SAFETY LAST 188-89 (1966); O'Connell, Tam-
ing the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 375 (1963); Noel, Products Defective Because of
Inadequate Directions on Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 258 (1969); see generally O'Donnell,
Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON
L. REv. 627, 645-46 (1978); Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New
Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 249, 258-61 (1977); Note, Reforming the Law
of Consumer Recovery and Enterprise Liability through the Uniform Commercial Code, 60
VA. L. REv. 1013, 1013-14 (1974).
26 See Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 26-28, 42-43, 67-69.
27 At least one court has suggested that when a high speed collision occurs between
vehicles of highly divergent weights liability could not reasonably be imposed. Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
"s See note 3 supra. At borderline collision speeds many variables may influence life or
death. See Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 48-51. For example, although a young, healthy
crash victim may survive a given trauma, an aged, infirm car occupant may not. A restrained
occupant may survive a second collision injury while an unrestrained occupant will die
under the same circumstances. The hazards for unrestrained occupants are quite severe and
have led the federal government to require various forms of "active" and "passive" re-
straints. See generally Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338,
1339-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979) (dealing with air bag controversy).
Since cars cannot be redesigned after each accident and the applicable legal standard
requires only protection against unreasonable risks of injury, there appears no justification
in the crashworthiness area for invoking the negligence doctrine sometimes expressed as
"taking the plaintiff as one finds him." For example, a reasonably crashworthy car does not
become defective because a hemophiliac sustains a laceration and dies from bleeding. Simi-
larly, when a rear end collision would normally produce merely a "whiplash" injury, the fact
that a driver develops a phobia because of his psychological idiosyncracies should not per-
mit a claim for consequential damages for mental illness.
9 See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 247 n.12 (2d Cir. 1981); Dawson
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that the smaller car be built up, rather than having the larger
truck built down to make it more compatible in crashes with
smaller vehicles? 30 If a car is built up, might it not become more
aggressive to other vehicles, cyclists, or pedestrians?",
v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
'0 The primary onus of crashworthy liability has been thrust upon the maker of the
vehicle which fares second best in the crash. In many respects, this constitutes an irrational
burden. The damage sustained by a vehicle can depend upon the composition of the other
car and a myriad of other circumstances. The aggressiveness of the collision partner, for
example, is at least as logical a cause of a particular car's coming off second best as the
alleged vulnerability of the vehicle. Indeed, it takes little imagination to conjure up a notion
of who must yield when a 300 pound football player collides with a 150 pound football
player. Which player, however, is responsible for the result? The characteristics of a particu-
lar collision partner and the speed or angle with which impact is made simply are not fac-
tors within the manufacturer's control.
31 A 1976 technical report by Columbia University's School of Engineering and Applied
Science furnished an illustration of the hazards inherent in beefing up automobiles. See
Tien & Testa, Critical Assessment of Social and Economic Implications of Safety Cars
(August 1974). The authors analyzed the safety benefits and social implications of Experi-
mental Safety Vehicles (ESV), which were experimental prototype safety cars conceived
pursuant to a program of the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration
(NHTSA). The NHTSA guidelines for crash performance required that an ESV protect re-
strained occupants from death or serious injury in crashes equivalent to a head-on barrier
crash at 50 miles per hour, side pole impact at 15 miles per hour, and rollover up to 70 miles
per hour. In addition, the vehicle was required to meet stringent technical features which
would help avoid crashes. "The principal objective of the ESV program is to demonstrate
feasibility of this total safety concept, the results of which are to be used as criteria for the
enforced design of all vehicles to be sold in the United States in the 1980's." Tien & Testa,
supra, at 3. The authors concluded that if these vehicles were introduced into the market as
standard items, they probably would be heavier and more aggressive, thus benefiting ESV
occupants. The authors noted, however, that notwithstanding the safety features the vehi-
cles would actually increase the nation's death toll for several years. Thus, even experimen-
tal vehicles designed exclusively for crash safety may not enhance the overall picture.
Moreover, the authors recognized the problem of introducing complementary crash
designs, even of these "safety vehicles:"
The average weight of today's car is approximately 3,000 lbs. There are over
100 million such cars. In contrast, the lightest of the American ESV's weighs 4,900
lbs. If we introduce 10 million ESV's a year, we would need approximately ten
years to replace all the conventional cars. During those ten years, what effect will
the ESV's have on ordinary cars? A disasterous [sic] effect is not inconceivable.
Even when all conventional cars are replaced by safety vehicles, the question
of aggressiveness remains. Will a 1,500 lb. SV (Production Safety Vehicle) survive
a crash with a 4,700 lb. SV? It is clear that such a question cannot be answered
immediately unless design for crashworthiness has also considered compatability.
Tien & Testa, supra, at 28. The report also analyzes the impact of such heavier safety cars
upon energy needs: "From the energy viewpoint, it is apparent that the safety vehicle is out
of line with current national needs. The already severe petroleum shortage in the U.S. would
be greatly aggravated by manufacturing and operating 5,000+ lb. vehicles." Tien & Testa,
supra, at 97.
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Manifestly, collisions occur between every type of vehicle and
an incalculable number of objects of different shapes and sizes at a
myriad of angles and speeds. Although such occurrences, in the
abstract, are readily foreseeable, 2 is the general duty to minimize
injury readily quantifiable such that the manufacturer may avoid
liability before accidents occur? 3 If it is not, have we merely
created a system of claim resolution that inevitably permits sec-
ond-guessing the car's design by hindsight whenever a serious in-
jury occurs? 34
32 One court has stated that "[n]early every accident situation [involving an automo-
bile], no matter how bizarre, is 'foreseeable' if only because in the last fifty years drivers
have discovered just about every conceivable way of wrecking an automobile." Dreisonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); accord,
Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973).
31 One court has suggested that "the prospect of product liability for injuries resulting
from misuse and abuse keeps the manufacturer on his toes and thereby serves a socially
useful purpose." Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(Ct. App. 1974). How can the manufacturer stay "on his toes" and avoid liability if the
performance levels that absolve him from culpability are not defined, quantified, or made
known in advance but only appear via ad hoc determinations of juries applying retrospective
tests derived from their own judgments?
" Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Ct. App. 1974), is
a good example of the dilemma posed by allowing juries the unrestricted opportunity to
second-guess designs. In Self, a 1963 Chrysler collided with a 1962 Chevrolet station wagon
which had stopped on the highway shoulder because of a flat tire. Id. at 5, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
577. The station wagon was "knocked into a gully, its fuel tank ruptured, and the vehicle
caught fire." Id. The impact speed was between 65 and 85 miles per hour. Id. at 4, 116 Cal.
Rptr. at 577. The plaintiff contended that the vehicle's tank location was a product of faulty
design. Id. at 5, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The court conceded that "prosecution of a lawsuit is a
poor way to design a motor vehicle, for the suit will almost invariably emphasize a single
aspect of design to the total exclusion of all others." Id. at 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579. It'also
conceded that crashworthy claims can and do focus upon all sides of a vehicle and "like an
army in battle the vehicle can't be uniformly strong at all points and under all conditions."
Id. at 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Nevertheless, the presentation of conflicting evidence enabled
the jury to "draw its own conclusions." Id. at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578. The court reasoned
that "legislatures and courts will develop techniques for summary disposition of extravagant
claims of defective design so that the good in product protection against injuries resulting
from abuse and misuse is not drowned in a sea of unmeritorious demands for payment of
the wages of recklessness and folly." Id. at 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. Fortunately for the
manufacturer, a new trial was granted on other grounds. Id. at 14, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
Asserting that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was appropriate, the dissenting judge
reasoned that, in each case, "the involvement of the gas tank will depend on the circum-
stances of the particular crash," id. at 15, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (Compton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), but "the fortuitous circumstances of a particular mishap should
not be the controlling factor." Id. at 16, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (Compton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In this case, there was "no practical or reasonable way that an
automobile [could have been] constructed so that its fuel tank [would have remained] intact
against an impact from all directions at a speed of 65 to 85 miles per hour." Id. at 17, 116
Cal. Rptr. at 586 (Compton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Given current litigation practices, it would not be too difficult
for experts to testify that a particular feature could have been
made better or safer for the specific accident.35 If a car were made
to reasonably withstand a 30-mile-per-hour collision, some would
suggest that the designed crash speed should have been 35, 50, or
70 miles per hour. 6 If padding is provided to cushion the impact,
some would argue that there should have been more. Whether
windshields should "pop out" in a crash is another point of conten-
tion. 7 Some will find fault with seats that rigidly remain anchored
in a collision while some will blame seats that give way.3 8 The po-
35 According to a research study sponsored by the National Science Foundation, "the
posture of proof. . . routinely employed by experts in products litigation has been narrow
in focus." Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 Tax. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (1974). The authors stated that "the too-
frequent surfacing of the ,ubiquitous journeyman expert who will fashion his credentials as
well as his conclusions 'to fit the crime' is lamentably predictive of a superficial conclusion."
Id. at 1311-12.
Under the Federal R~ules of Evidence an expert may render an opinion on the ultimate
issue to be decided by the jury. FED. R. EvID. 704. He may do so without prior disclosure of
the data on which the opinion is based, FED. R. EvrD. 705, and can base his opinion on facts
which are not admissible in evidence. FED. R. EvID. 703. The mere opinion of a paid expert
may permit a jury to formulate crash safety standards that conflict with those promulgated
by expert agencies after years of research and testing. Unsupported expert opinions appear
to be tolerated by some trial courts no matter how qualitatively thin they may be. For ex-
ample, in Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 1978), the appel-
late court stated that a jury question may be presented concerning crash performance stan-
dards even upon the "thin testimony" of experts "in a field in which they had little
knowledge, as they very nearly admitted." Id. Moreover, the trial judge excluded evidence
that the subject vehicle had complied with federal motor vehicle safety standards, an evi-
dentiary error reversed on appeal. Id. at 156-57. For analytical discussions regarding the
multifaceted problems created by disregarding state of the art evidence simply because an
expert testifies that a product should have been made better or safer, see O'Donnell, note 25
supra; Raleigh, note 25 supra.
so Cf. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1974) (de-
fective design claimed not to withstand 40 mile-per-hour frontal impact with pole); Self v.
General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4-5, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1974) (defec-
tive design claimed not to withstand rear impact at 65 to 85 miles per hour).
37 Compare Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110, 111 (8th Cir. 1970) (claim that
windshield should be designed to "pop out" in an accident) with Seese v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 835 (3d Cir. 1981) (claim that windshield should be designed to be re-
tained in high-speed upset).
3' Compare Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Talbert, [1970-1973] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH)
1 6550 (Wash. 1970) and Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 752,
522 P.2d 829, 830 (1974) (en banc) (vehicles claimed to be uncrashworthy because seats
remained rigidly anchored during collision and failed to yield) with Walton v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568, 569 (Miss. 1969) and Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young,
272 Md. 201, 205, 321 A.2d 737, 739 (1974) (claims that designs were uncrashworthy because
seats gave way in collision).
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:633
tential variations for product redesign by hindsight are virtually
endless because collisions occur under countless variable condi-
tions. Each injurious collision could generate a potential lawsuit
alleging that some feature should have been made differently. Such
an open-ended system thrusts the manufacturer into the role of an
insurer against injury whenever accidents occur.3 8
The serious problems posed by the inherent inability of the
judicial process to formulate appropriate safety standards regard-
ing a manufacturer's conscious design choices are not new. Profes-
sor Henderson has forcefully discerned the distinction between
courts and juries formulating safety standards on their own, as op-
posed to merely applying standards which have been created extra-
judicially.40 Courts are well-suited for the latter task but are inher-
ently ill-suited for the former.41 In the crashworthiness area, the
39 See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981) (current law imposes on industry "responsibility of insuring vast numbers of
persons involved in automobile accidents").
40 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1531-34 (1973); Henderson, Design Defect
Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542-57 (1976); Henderson, Renewed Judicial
Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Con-
sensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 774 (1979). Professor Henderson's thesis is discussed in Bow-
man v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241-42 & n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (court agreed
with Henderson's "excellent analysis" that design trade-off inquiry "complicates the process
of products liability adjudication" but disagreed "that conscious design choice cases are be-
yond the competence of the Courts"). See also McMullen v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
274 Or. 83, 87-88, 545 P.2d 117, 120 (1976) (Henderson's thesis to unburden courts of stan-
dard-fixing task found "tempting" but rejected). For an appellate opinion strongly influ-
enced by Professor Henderson's thesis, see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App.
74, 79-80, 268 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 1978) (adjudication must necessarily play a limited
role in setting design standards which should be "extrajudicially established").
4' Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Lim-
its of Adjudication, supra note 40, at 1534, 1558 ("judicial coin-flipping" and decisions by
jury "whim" threaten confidence in judicial process); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Contro-
versy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus,
supra note 40, at 779-80. Professor Henderson states:
The adjudicatory process is inadequate as a method of resolving, on a case-by-case
basis, the vague question of whether or not risks presented by a particular product
are unreasonable. When forced to make such decisions, courts must resolve com-
plex and often times highly technical issues of design alternatives equipped only
with legal principle reduced to its most basic degree of generalization: a balancing
test. In effect, the courts are forced to second-guess the designers; they are forced
to redesign the product themselves. The result is to push the adjudicatory process
to the brink of arbitrariness.
Id. Paying deference to Professor Henderson's excellent and probing analysis of the prob-
lem, this writer previously has urged that as long as courts adjudicate the merits of count-
less design choices in all manner of products, they should abandon their unjustified fascina-
tion with strict tort liability and resolve cases under negligence principles. See, e.g., Hoenig,
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design resolution problem is further exacerbated by shifting the fo-
cus of the litigation inquiry from accident causation to an open-
ended standard of "injury-minimization. '42 An additional compli-
cation is the predisposition of many courts to employ the theory of
so-called strict tort liability.43 Under strict liability, traditional
tests of reasonable care are theoretically bypassed, restricted, or
modified. 4 Indeed, a jury might receive an instruction that the
Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv.
109, 137 (1976). The reasonable conduct inquiry under negligence would more clearly permit
jury consideration of all relevant factors. Id. at 122. This is extremely important in the
complex area of automobile crashworthiness. Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 38-40. A
system of crediting a manufacturer's compliance with applicable crash safety standards,
coupled with the application of a reasonableness inquiry could minimize uncontrolled jury
second-guessing of established collision design standards. See Hoenig, Products Liability
Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L.J. 213, 233-34.
42 If the traditional causation claim presents difficult policy problems, expanding the
scope of the inquiry to include the manner in which designs might somehow minimize inju-
ries in a given accident obviously magnifies the difficulty. Indeed, the jury then is saddled
with the additional task of formulating design standards dealing with the way in which a
particular design might have affected the severity of the injuries.
43 E.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 956 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981) (applying New Jersey law); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 106-07
(7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana law); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 218-19 (7th
Cir. 1974) (applying Illinois law); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d
1153, 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 438 (1972) (en banc); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. 1979); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 519 (1973);
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 758-59, 522 P.2d 829, 833-34
(1974) (en banc). Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio used the theory of strict liability in
adjudicating a crashworthiness claim. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d
456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 575 (1981). The Leichtamer dissent, however, urged that in an en-
hancement case based upon defective design, "the manufacturer should be held liable only
when the plaintiff is able to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in adopting his cho-
sen design." 424 N.E.2d at 583 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The dissenting judges emphasized
that: (1) standards for imposition of strict liability provide insufficient guidance to the jury;
(2) courts have had difficulty in defining section 402A liability and have exhibited a lack of
understanding of the key phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"; and (3)
courts, lawyers, and jurors are more familiar with negligence concepts which are applied
uniformly. Id. at 584 (Holmes, J., dissenting). There is precedent for rejecting strict liability
in enhanced injury design cases and applying negligence theory instead. See Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974); Bom v. Triumph
Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 157-58, 305 N.E.2d 769, 772-73, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973) (stan-
dards for imposing liability for unreasonably dangerous design defects are general negli-
gence principles). Indeed, the Larsen case was based upon negligence principles. Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-06 (8th Cir. 1968). An argument also can be made,
on the basis of the commentary to section 402A, that crashworthiness liability in certain
cases was not contemplated in the Restatement. See Hoenig & Werber, supra note 4, at 590-
92.
", Although many courts and commentators refer to strict tort liability, much depends
upon the particular standard or test being articulated. Because so many variations have
been published, one may state confidently that no uniform test exists. Although full exposi-
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manufacturer may be held liable for a defective product notwith-
standing the defendant's exercise of all possible care in the manu-
facture of that product.45 Ostensibly, strict liability directs the jury
towards a result-oriented inquiry-how well did the product per-
tion of the various tests, glosses, nuances, and variations is beyond the scope of this article,
discussions of these concepts are contained in: RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965); Department of Commerce Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. 'REv. 593, 597-643 (1980); Epstein, Products
Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 648-58 (1978); Fischer,
Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 339-58 (1974); Green,
Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV.
1185, 1202-11 (1976); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, supra note 40, at 773-804;
Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, supra note 40, at 625-27; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is
There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109, 112-22 (1976); Keeton, Product Liability
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 30-39 (1973); Montgomery & Owen, Re-
flections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products,
27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 808-24 (1976); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in
Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 102-21 (1977); Schwartz, The Uniform Product
Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579, 584-87 (1980); Twerski & Weinstein,
A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV.
221, 223-43 (1979); von Holsen, Design Liability and State of the Art: The United States
and Europe at a Crossroads, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 450, 464-73 (1981); Wade, On the Na-
ture of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 828-34 (1973); Wade, On Prod-
uct "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 551-75 (1980);
Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods, 44 J. Am L.
& COM. 705, 713-44 (1978).
Key definitions, formulations, applications, or discussions of various forms of strict lia-
bility can be found in the following recent cases: Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
422, 573 P.2d 443, 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1978) (two-pronged test for defective design
includes "consumer expectation" test or "risk-utility" test); Aller v. Rogers Mach. Mfg. Co.,
268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978) ("unreasonably dangerous" test where proof of unreasona-
bleness involves risk-utility balancing process); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 640,
378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978) ("implied warranty" test coextensive with section 402A stan-
dard); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979)
(plaintiff must prove product design "improper" or "not reasonably suitable and safe and
fails to perform contrary to user's reasonable expectation of safety"); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-93, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (en banc) ("reasonably prudent
manufacturer" test); Azarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027
(1978) (unreasonably dangerous test eliminated); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979) ("risk-utility" test); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975) (en banc) ("consumer expectations" test cou-
pled with "risk-utility" factors). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965) (defective condition unreasonably dangerous).
15 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965). This provision states that
strict liability is imposed upon one who sells a product in a "defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous" despite the fact that the "seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product.Y' Id.
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form in this accident-rather than towards the reasonableness
of design choices under all the relevant circumstances. Such a
limited perspective amplifies the other problems associated with
"crashworthiness" design litigation.8
The potential for open-ended liability engendered by the
sweeping scope of Larsen's open-ended duty of injury-minimiza-
tion may not be immediately evident. Upon a cursory reading, Lar-
sen appears to be applicable only to the automotive industry. A
critical reading, however, reveals that the duty is one of general
application to all products.41 If Larsen is extended to its logical
extreme, all products would be subject to litigation when it is al-
leged that some feature could have been made safer or better so as
to minimize injuries. 8 Indeed, variations on the theme are endless
if a general duty to minimize injuries to some unspecified extent is
to be the governing standard. Although the full breadth of Lar-
sen's policy implications for other products seems to be underesti-
mated at the present time, it is clear that in automobile cases the
Larsen doctrine is being applied extensively with very serious
consequences. 9
Troubling Policy Dilemmas?
More than a dozen years after Larsen's announcement of in-
4' For other problems associated with the application of strict liability to crashworthi-
ness claims, see notes 92-151 and accompanying text infra.
47 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968).
48 See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1976); Trust
Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1094 (D. Mont. 1981); McGee
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1007, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 695 (Ct. App. 1978)
(aircraft); cf. Bayamon Thorn McAn, Inc. v. Miranda, 409 F.2d 968, 973 (1st Cir. 1969)
(rejecting duty to equip motor-driven hobby horse with straps, seatbelts, or surrounding
rugs or cushions); Zoerner v. Eisner Grocery Co., 111 Ill. App. 2d 342, 344, 250 N.E.2d 156,
157 (Ct. App. 1969) (directed verdict affirmed for shopping cart manufacturer where cart
not equipped with seat belts or other restraint devices). See also Stueve v. American Honda
Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 743-44 (D. Kan. 1978) (motorcycles); Howard v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 437 F. Supp. 883, 884 (S.D. Miss. 1977), aff'd mem., 584 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1978)
(exploding freezer); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 395-96 (Mass. 1980) (util-
ity pole); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 634-35, 378 N.E.2d 964, 967 (1978) (motor
home).
'9 See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11, 106 n.1 (7th Cir. 1977) and
cases cited therein. Not all jurisdictions have decided to allow crashworthy claims, and some
courts have explicitly rejected the doctrine. E.g., Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960,
960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (North Carolina law); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d
240, 240 (4th Cir. 1973) (West Virginia law); Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 445, 447 (M.D. N.C. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1978) (North Carolina law).
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jury enhancement liability, some serious strains are surfacing con-
cerning the adjudication of such claims. Perhaps the most explicit
statement of a court's uneasiness with the current system may be
found in the Third Circuit's recent decision of Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp.5 0 In Dawson, a police car went out of control and struck an
unyielding steel pole broadside at a forty-five degree angle. As a
result of the force of the collision, the vehicle "literally wrapped
itself around the pole. '51 The pole had ripped through the car
body and allegedly crushed the driver between the seat and the
"header" area of the roof above the windshield. The plaintiff, a
quadriplegic, sued the manufacturer contending that the existing
frame of the patrol car was unable to withstand side impacts at
relatively low speeds, thereby permitting the pole to intrude the
passenger area. Furthermore, the plaintiff's experts testified that
their proposed improvements in the frame design would have been
feasible and would have prevented the plaintiff from being seri-
ously injured. Their technical theory was that a continuous side
frame and crossmember would have deflected the car away from
the pole after a minimal intrusion.5 2 Conversely, the defendant's
experts vigorously asserted that the vehicle complied with all fed-
eral vehicle safety standards and that deformation of the vehicle
body is desirable in most collisions because it absorbs the impact
of the crash and decreases the rate of deceleration of the vehicle's
occupants. The defense experts asserted, therefore, that for most
types of accidents the design offered by the plaintiff's experts
would be less safe than the existing design. The defense also estab-
lished that the plaintiff's proposed design would add between 200
and 500 pounds to the vehicle's weight and approximately $300 to
the price of the car. Moreover, the defense experts testified that
the vehicle's "unibody" construction was stronger than comparable
competitive models.58 Nevertheless, the jury awarded the plaintiff
'0 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 954.
52 Id. A design analyst, a mechanical engineer, and a biochemical engineer testified as
experts on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 958. According to these experts, had the vehicle
been designed with a full, continuous steel side-door frame and a crossmember running
through the floor boards, the car would have "bounced" off the pole and "Dawson would
have been able 'to walk away from the accident' with but a bruised shoulder." Id.
11 Id. at 954. Chrysler had defended on two theories. First, Chrysler contended that it
had no duty to manufacture a "crashworthy" vehicle to protect the occupant under the
circumstances of this violent accident. Id. Second, it asserted that "in any event," the vehi-
cle in question was not defective. Id.
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more than $2 million in damages.
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered a variety of issues
dealing with duty, causation, evidence, and damages. Reluctantly,
the circuit court affirmed the judgment, noting its "uneasiness re-
garding the consequences of [the] decision" and similar decisions
"of other courts throughout the country."" Indeed, the Dawson
court expressed the "troubling public policy dilemma":
[I]ndividual juries in the various states are permitted, in effect, to
establish national automobile safety standards. The result of such
an arrangement, predictably, is not only incoherence in the safety
requirements set by disparate juries, but also the possibility that
a standard established by a jury in a particular case will conflict
with other policies regarding the economics of the automobile in-
dustry as well as energy conservation programs. 5
Elaborating upon the problem of jury-formulated standards,
the court stated:
[W]hile the jury found Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid
enough vehicular frame, a factfinder in another case might well
hold the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is too
rigid. Yet, as pointed out at trial, in certain types of acci-
dents-head-on collisions-it is desirable to have a car designed
to collapse upon impact because the deformation would absorb
much of the shock of the collision, and divert the force of deceler-
ation away from the vehicle's passengers. In effect, this permits
individual juries applying varying laws in different jurisdictions to
set nationwide automobile safety standards and to impose on au-
tomobile manufacturers conflicting requirements. It would be dif-
ficult for members of the industry to alter their design and pro-
duction behavior in response to jury verdicts in such cases,
because their response might well be at variance with what some
other jury decides is a defective design. Under these circum-
stances, the law imposes on the industry the responsibility of
insuring vast numbers of persons involved in automobile
" Id. at 962. The Dawson court indicated that although the legal questions in the case,
as governed by New Jersey law, were "relatively straight-forward," the public policy issues it
faced were complex and involved economic and social issues on a national scale. Id. at 953.
5 Id. The Dawson court cited the very case it was deciding as an example of the jury's
power to determine national standards. While the New Jersey Supreme Court had estab-
lished a strict liability standard by defining a defective product as any product which is not
"reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended use," it was left to the jury to decide in
each case whether the product met that standard. Id. In doing so, the jury had to formulate
its own version of acceptable crash safety standards.
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accidents."
The impact of a case-by-case method of establishing automobile
safety requirements upon "other national social and economic
goals" was deemed "equally serious" by the court.57 Moreover, the
Third Circuit noted that notwithstanding the energy crisis and se-
vere competition with foreign automobile markets, the present sys-
tem of regulation "by ad hoc adjudications" still permits juries to
hold manufacturers culpable for not producing a car that is heavier
and likely to be less fuel-efficient.5 1
Viewing the public policy questions as being "beyond the com-
petence" of the court, the Third Circuit stopped short of judicially
resolving this "important conflict that implicates broad national
concerns. ' ' 9 Instead, the court noted that these concerns are ones
with which Congress, rather than the courts, "ultimately must
grapple. '60 Accordingly, the court was content merely to "bring the
problem to the attention of the legislative branch.""1 Although the
Dawson court may have been too hasty in assessing the situation
as one beyond judicial correction, 2 its recognition of a major defi-
" Id. at 962. For the statements of other courts decrying the role of the manufacturer
as an insurer, see note 70 infra.
57 630 F.2d at 962.
58 Id. at 963.
59 Id. at 953.
60 Id.
11 Id. at 963.
62 Apparently, the court in Dawson was influenced by the existence of a provision in
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act), providing that compliance
with a federal motor vehicle safety standard does not exempt any person from common law
liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976). The court seemed to view this provision as authorizing
the states to create freely varied liability standards regarding automotive designs and struc-
tures, and to delegate to juries the power to determine a manufacturer's conformity to such
standards. 630 F.2d at 962. Such an arrangement, the court stated, effectively permitted
"individual juries applying varying laws in different jurisdictions to set nationwide automo-
bile safety standards and to impose on automobile manufacturers conflicting requirements."
Id. Thus, the court concluded, since Congress designed this system of "regulation by ad hoc
adjudications," Congress is "best suited" to change that system. Id. at 963.
The arrangement by which juries set national standards, however, was not created by
Congress. On the contrary, Congress expressly prohibited any state from establishing motor
vehicle safety standards which are not "identical" to the federal standards. 15 U.S.C. §
1392(d) (1976). The use of the jury system to set standards for crashworthiness liability
plainly emanates from and is tolerated by the courts themselves. The Larsen doctrine itself
is a creation of judges and is based upon common law, rather than a statutory development.
Thus, it is arguably appropriate that the courts should solve a problem that they created.
Indeed, in 1966, when Congress enacted the Act, crashworthiness lawsuits were not yet per-
mitted by the courts. See Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966). The Act was passed well
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ciency with jury-formulated crash standards and its clarion call for
relief6" is a courageous step forward in developing a system that
more fairly and efficiently harmonizes policy objectives. e4
In the approximately 15 years of ferment concerning the
crashworthiness issue, courts seem to have come virtually full cir-
cle. Earlier, the Evans court stated that crash performance stan-
dards were more properly a legislative function, thereby precluding
common-law liability. 5 More recently, the court in Dawson sug-
gested the same thing, but nonetheless upheld multimillion dollar
liability. In the interim, numerous courts grappled with the enor-
mous problems and conflicting considerations associated with
crashworthiness liability.6 6 Many of the reported cases, however,
before the Larsen case first allowed such claims. Thus, Congress could not have contem-
plated that juries would be permitted to set and impose indiscriminate crash standards
which conflict with carefully researched federal standards. The resulting tension between
jury-imposed crash standards and federal requirements poses some fairly classic constitu-
tional problems. See notes 315-402 and accompanying text infra.
63The congressional relief called for by the Dawson court presumably could take the
form of an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) which now reads: "[c]ompliance with any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976). Language could
be added to make it clear that compliance with crash standards precludes crashworthiness
liability regarding performance covered by the standard.
Judge Adams, who authored the Third Circuit's opinion in Dawson, later took up the
same theme in a dissenting opinion. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 855-
56 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams viewed the complex problems
presented in Seese as underscoring the perception made by the Dawson court that the pre-
sent compensation system, which permits "individual juries under different state systems to
arrive at discrepant outcomes that impose conflicting standards on manufacturers, is far
from efficient or fair." Id. at 855 (Adams, J., dissenting). Moreover, he noted that the "irra-
tionalities in the existing system" allow jury verdicts to reach beyond federal safety stan-
dards and impose "conflicting requirements on producers attempting to satisfy a nationwide
market." Id. (Adams, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Adams concluded, the public is left "far
from the goal of reducing and fairly distributing the sum of accident costs as well as the
costs of reducing the number of future collisions." Id. (Adams, J., dissenting).
65 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966); see note 20 and
accompanying text supra.
" In Self v. General Motors Corp., the court conceded that the "prosecution of a law-
suit is a poor way to design a motor vehicle," 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(Ct. App. 1974), and wistfully adverted to some future day when "legislatures and courts
will develop techniques for summary disposition of extravagant claims of defective design."
42 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Polk v. Ford
Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976), also illus-
trates the judicial struggle in this context. In Polk, a 1970 vehicle traveling 45 to 50 miles
per hour was struck in the rear by a vehicle traveling about 100 miles per hour. After the
impact, the slower car jumped a 9-inch curb, struck a concrete retaining wall, overturned,
and slid on its roof 100 feet before coming to rest. The roof supports collapsed and the car
caught fire. Id. at 263. A major issue on appeal was whether Missouri would allow enhanced
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merely have involved the threshold issues of whether a duty exists
and whether an expansion to mere injury-minimization liability
should be permitted as a matter of policy. 7 Practical and difficult
questions concerning the actual litigation of crashworthiness suits
and the reasonable limits of liability under such claims have not
yet been settled. 8 Indeed, the problems may prove to be insoluble
via common-law development. Furthermore, it is predictable that
the ferment and uneasiness indicated by the Dawson court will
continue to grow if courts do not recognize that they have created
a doctrinal form of open-ended and unlimited liability that makes
the manufacturer a virtual insurer against collision-related injuries.
Such enormous pressure cannot be tolerated indefinitely, and
eventually relief must come, perhaps as it has by legislation in
some areas of general products liability." Mere lip service that a
injury liability in such circumstances. Id. at 264. Initially, a three judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for the
defense because Missouri law could not permit such liability. See [1974] PROD. LiAB. REF.
(CCH) 1 7305, at 13,351 (8th Cir.). The concurring judge in Polk, without resort to legal
doctrines, found the facts sufficient to preclude liability. He stated:
The Ford was propelled for 100 feet on its roof after structural damage from the
impact at some 50 miles an hour. Countless hypothetical cases can be envisioned
such as a car driving by a construction site at a moment when a steel girder falls,
demolishing the car roof. A car at rest might be struck from the rear at a low
speed, causing a passenger to sustain a whiplash neck injury. Query: whether com-
mon sense would require the manufacturers of cars to build roofs to cope with
falling girders or cars fully protected against whiplash injuries. Even military
tanks are not impervious to destruction and burning if struck by sufficient force.
[1974] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 7305, at 13,353 (Moore, J., concurring).
A dissenting judge, however, believed that Missouri law would allow crashworthiness
liability and that a jury question was presented. He noted that "[tihe division in this panel
is substantial." Id. at 13,354. Following a rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit overturned
the prior panel opinion, affirming the district court's judgment. See 529 F.2d at 264. For
another example of this judicial struggle, see Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 107-
08 (7th Cir. 1977). See generally note 23 supra.
67 E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 1968); Anton v.
Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201, 203-04, 321 A.2d 737, 740 (1974).
Is The diversity of judicial approaches is illustrated in Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
648 F.2d 833, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir.
1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (Ct.
App. 1974); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 575-
76 (1981).
11 Many states have enacted legislation to correct perceived abuses in products liability
litigation. These remedial measures have included, for example, statutes of "repose" under
which the periods of limitations run from the time of manufacture or sale of the product,
irrespective of the date of injury. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981) (6
years from delivery to first purchaser); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) (6 years after first
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manufacturer need not build an accidentproof or crashproof car or
that a manufacturer is not an insurer,70 cannot mask forever the
fact that the cumulative burden actually being imposed is to re-
quire a virtually crashproof car or, in the alternative, to require
manufacturers to insure occupants against injuries. 1
purchase or 10 years after date of manufacture). In addition, some states have adopted stat-
utory measures creating defenses such as misuse of the product, patent danger, product
alteration, state of the art, and compliance with standards. For examples of statutes estab-
lishing a defense based on the plaintiff's misuse of the product, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-683(3) (Supp. 1980-1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.320(3) (Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
99B-4(3) (1979). For instances of state laws which permit a defense or recognize a rebuttable
presumption based on the product's conforming to the prevailing state of the art, see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1980-1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Burns
Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979). Statutes which enable a manufacturer to
defend on the grounds that the product has been altered include, Ky. REV. STAT. §
411.320(2) (Supp. 1980), TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-108 (1980), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-
5 (1977). For statutes which establish a defense based on the manufacturer's compliance
with existing standards, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977).
For discussions of various state statutory reforms, see MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABIL-
rr ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979); Friedman, State Product Liability Legis-
lation, in 1980 SMU PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSTITUTE: UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT 15-1
to 15-23 (1980); Hoenig, New Statutes May Govern, N.Y.L.J., May 31, 1978, at 1, col. 1;
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From
Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 347, 351 nn.9-10, 352 n.11 (1980).
70 Numerous courts at least have acknowledged vague, outer limits on crashworthiness
liability. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968), the Eighth
Circuit conceded that a manufacturer is not obligated to build an "accident-proof' or "fool-
proof' vehicle. Other courts have made similar pronouncements. See, e.g., Polk v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 269 (8th Cir.) (manufacturers are not "absolute insurers"), cert. de-
nied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa.
1969) (no obligation to manufacture a crashproof vehicle); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d 268, 274 (1973) (no duty owed to manufac-
ture a crashproof vehicle); Friedrich v. Anderson, [1974] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 7184, at
12,882 (Neb. 1974) ('automobile manufacturer is not an insurer that its product is, from a
design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury"); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225
N.W.2d 57, 62 (N.D. 1974) (no duty to make an accidentproof or foolproof automobile);
Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Corp., 503 S.W.2d 516, 519 (1973) (duty "does not require con-
struction and design of an [absolutely safe] automobile"); Baumgardner v. American Motors
Corp., 83 Wash. 751, 756, 522 P.2d 829, 832 (1974) (en banc) ("manufacturer is not expected
to produce an accident free product, it is not an insurer of the users of its product and it
need not adopt every possible safety device"). All of these statements reflect correct legal
principles.
71 See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980). In Dawson, the court
explicitly stated that the current system of crashworthiness law "imposes on the industry
the responsibility of insuring vast numbers of persons involved in automobile accidents." Id.
When the focus is shifted from individual cases to the broader body of crashworthiness
litigation as a whole, one can readily discern that the cumulative burden being imposed is a
judicial mandate to produce a virtually "crashproof" vehicle. The claimed crashworthy per-
formance in the body of cases has involved an array of collision speeds in a countless variety
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CAN THE PROCESS OF CLAIM RESOLUTION BE IMPROVED?
Should courts continue to adjudicate in the crashworthiness
area, it is evident that the applicable concepts of claims resolution
cannot subsist as a form of "judicial coin flipping" constituting a
threat to the integrity of the judicial process.7 2 The courts must
responsibly exercise control over the proceedings so that the jury
appropriately considers the reasonableness of the design choice in
light of all relevant circumstances and decides the liability issues
without sympathy, speculation, or conjecture.
A qualitative inquiry into the nature of the claim initially
should disclose whether it is one that falls within more established,
nonspeculative, or tolerable categories which permit courts to adju-
dicate without threatening the integrity of the judicial process.7 3
For example, claims of enhanced injuries resulting from noncom-
pliance with applicable crash safety standards74 is one category
which inherently minimizes speculative or conjectural tendencies
because the factfinder can refer to a specific, objective performance
level dictated by an applicable government standard. Thus, a uni-
form result is engendered when the jury has an extrajudicially es-
tablished standard to refer to, understand, and apply to the facts.7 5
Notwithstanding the technical complexity of the subject matter,
the jury's inquiry is relatively simple. Was there noncompliance
with certain applicable standards? Did such noncompliance cause
injuries over and above those that otherwise would have been sus-
tained had the vehicle complied with the standard? To what ex-
of accidents. Indeed, it seems evident from a general review of the cases that the only real
limitation upon filing claims in this area is the willingness, resourcefulness, and imagination
of the claimants' counsel. Under such open-ended circumstances, the cumulative burden is
potentially one of "crashproofness."
72 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Lim-
its of Adjudication, supra note 40, at 1534, 1558.
71 See generally Hoenig, Understanding "Second Collision" Cases in New York, supra
note 4, at 50-55; Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 83-86.
7, If a standard-setting agency promulgates specifications for a particular vehicle, a
manufacturer's noncompliance may give rise to an action for enhanced injury. The crash-
worthy cases, however, do not reveal many claims falling into this category. Cf. General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-61 (Tex. 1977) (safety glass). There is, how-
ever, ample support for the proposition that violation of an applicable government standard
or regulation is actionable. See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident
Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95, 96-97 (1950); Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures
in Negligence Actions, 28 TEx. L. REV. 143, 143 (1949).
71 See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, supra note 40, at 1534; note 41 supra.
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tent were the claimant's injuries enhanced? In such a case, the jury
is not required to second guess what the design should have been,
to make judgments that conflict with other policies, or to speculate
about what would have been better or stronger for the particular
accident under consideration.
Another type of claim tolerable to the law is one which alleges
that an express promise of a specific level of crash performance
has not been fulfilled. If the manufacturer expressly warrants that
the vehicle possesses a certain safety feature or characteristic of
crash performance, the user may be entitled to rely upon such a
promise. 6 For example, when a manufacturer expressly warrants
the roof of a car to be a seamless steel roof and the car overturns,
an occupant cut by a jagged edge of a welded point running across
the roof of the automobile may sue for the enhanced injuries.7
Similarly, when automobile glass is expressly warranted as shatter-
proof but unreasonably breaks in an accident, an action can be
maintained for the injuries aggravated by the breaking glass.78 In
such cases, when a feature fails to perform as claimed, a suit for
enhanced injuiries may be appropriate.79
78 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978 version). See generally Note, Reforming the Law of Consumer
Recovery and Enterprise Liability through the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 25,
at 1013-14; see also id. § 2-315.
7 See Bahiman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 686, 288 N.W. 309, 311
(1939).
71 See Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590, 591 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 463-64, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932).
79 A representation or express warranty made by the manufacturer or dealer must
clearly relate to some aspect of crash performance. For example, a representation that a car
has "unibody construction" does not warrant any aspect of "second collision" safety. Simi-
larly, a representation that a car's bumpers are "energy absorbing" does not suggest that
bumpers will protect against "second collision" injuries in severe accidents. Fact patterns,
however, can be articulated which present closer questions. Not long ago, a manufacturer
advertised by showing films of its sedans, equipped with instrumented dummy devices, im-
pacting against a rigid crash barrier. The advertising spoke of a "rigid body cell" protecting
the occupant in crashes. If a purchaser demonstrably relied upon such representations and
they proved false, there might be cause for suit. It is established law, however, that the user
may not recover for relying upon that which a reasonably prudent person had no right to
believe. The advertisements or representations require a "fair reading of the language" and
not mere subjective "impressions." See Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d
597, 599 (2d Cir. 1938) (safety glass represented as providing "the greatest available protec-
tion" not properly construable as "exemption from injury from broken glass"). Under sec-
tion 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a strict liability action for misrepresenta-
tion requires justifiable reliance. Comment g to section 402B excludes from liability mere
"puffing" as, for example, a statement that an automobile "is the best on the market for the
price." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B, Comment g (1965). Thus, if a salesman
touts a subcompact car as being "so sturdy it will withstand a 100 mile per hour collision
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Another class of potentially acceptable crashworthy claims are
those in which enhanced injuries result from a safety device's fail-
ure to perform as designed because of a defect in materials, con-
struction, or assembly. In these cases, the noncompliance of the
safety device with the manufacturer's specifications renders it unfit
to perform the particular task for which it was designed. An illus-
trative case is Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,80 where a bread deliv-
ery salesman was propelled through the windshield of his truck fol-
lowing a collision. An aluminum safety hasp designed to keep
bread trays in place broke on impact causing the loaded trays to
move forward, strike the claimant in the back, and hurl him
through the windshield. The plaintiff's expert testified that the
safety hasp had metallurgical flaws which significantly lowered its
tolerance to force below that of a normal hasp. Moreover, it was
demonstrated that had the device not been porous it would have
withstood the impact, thereby restraining the trays. The court up-
held liability because the defect in materials prevented perform-
ance of the specifically intended function of the safety hasp and
they proximately caused the plaintiff's enhanced injuries. This case
presents an actionable circumstance because the safety device
failed to perform as the manufacturer had intended. More impor-
tantly, uniformity in result may be achieved and jury speculation
avoided because the jury has a definable performance standard as
a frame of reference in which to adjudicate defectiveness.
The previous example should be distinguished from those
suits which merely amount to a generalized claim that a safety de-
vice should prevent all injuries. The decision in Hurt v. General
Motors Corp.,81 exemplifies such a claim. 2 In Hurt, the plaintiff, a
passenger riding in the front of a sedan, was wearing her seatbelt
but not her shoulder harness. The car in which she was travelling
was struck from the left by another vehicle, and as a result of the
collision, the plaintiff's body "submarined" underneath the seat-
belt. Subsequently, her physicians discovered a ruptured colon, re-
with a Mack truck," the purchaser seemingly would have no rational basis upon which to
believe such puffing. The test of reasonable reliance is an objective one not based upon
subjective gullibility.
80 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
81 553 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1977).
62 In Hurt, the verdict in favor of the defendant-manufacturer was affirmed because the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' case "utterly lacked merit." 553 F.2d at 1185.
Indeed, it was noted that "it would have been incumbent for the district court to have set




Suing for her ruptured colon and related damages, the plain-
tiff proffered federal safety standards which required a seatbelt to
provide pelvic restraint.83 The standards mandated the manufac-
turer to set seatbelts at an angle within an allowable range of 200
to 750.84 Although the seatbelt's angle had been 450, the plaintiff
claimed that her pelvis had not been restrained in the accident.
The experts agreed that the plaintiff had "submarined," but dis-
agreed as to the desirable seatbelt angle. To prevent submarining
upon a frontal impact, one expert opined, the angle should be 90* .
This proposal, however, would mean that a vehicle so equipped
could not be sold because it would violate federal standards. An-
other of the plaintiffs experts testified that the angle should have
been closer to the maximum, thereby providing "more" pelvic
support. 5
The appellate court correctly discerned that the expert testi-
mony amounted to nothing more than an opinion "that in this par-
ticular accident . . . the seat belt did not prevent complete pelvic
novement in'a front end collision."86 Since the federal standard
had been satisfied, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recovery. Moreover, the court emphasized:
The standards do not require a guarantee that the pelvis, which is
restrained by the seat belt, will not move at all upon impact. That
the 450 seat belt did not prevent the injury in this case is not
sufficient to establish a jury issue that the product was defective.
The seat belt did not fail. [Plaintiff] testified that after impact
she remained tightly restrained, although her body had shifted itsposition .87
The evidence simply did not indicate the existence of a "defect."
Although a different seatbelt angle might have prevented the
plaintiff's particular injury in this accident, the seatbelt could not
be characterized as "defective in the general context of motor vehi-
cle accidents." 88
When the crashworthy claim is based upon noncompliance
with an applicable safety standard, the breach of a manufacturer's
ss Id. at 1182-83.
s' Id. at 1183.
SId.
sId. (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 1184.
"Id.
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express promise, or upon the failure of a safety device to perform
as designed,89 the jury can refer to definitive, specific, and nonjudi-
cial standards of safety performance. Thus, the jury need not spec-
ulate or second-guess the manufacturer's design, or be called upon
to formulate ad hoc safety standards. Rather, there would exist an
identifiable frame of reference or objective standard against which
the jury could measure the vehicle's accident performance. Indeed,
these identifiable bases of liability sharply differ from the genera-
lized claim that the vehicle should have been made better, safer, or
stronger for the particular accident.9" The very nature of the latter
inquiry thrusts the jury into the standard-setting process itself. It
is in this untenable context that the courts must guard against a
trial charade in which complex state of the art standards are re-
written by little more than jury whim91 in order to compensate a
sympathetic claimant.
It may be apparent from the preceding discussion that courts
presently are at a crossroads. The dilemma the courts face is one
which they created by rapidly expanding liability frontiers. If
courts and juries are ill-suited to redesign cars from accident to
accident with regard to collision performance, should crash design
be immune from litigation in the courts? Conversely, if all poten-
tial crashworthiness design claims are to be litigated whenever the
opinion of an expert or the severity of an injury creates a factual
issue, will not courts and juries endlessly have to formulate their
own ad hoc crash performance standards in derogation of other im-
portant policies? It is submitted that courts can continue to play a
constructive role in the resolution of crashworthiness claims if they
(1) apply concepts of legal responsibility clearly based upon rea-
sonableness; (2) give due deference to crash safety standards
11 See notes 72-79 and accompanying text supra.
90 The fact that a crashworthy suit involves an allegedly defective safety device does
not mean that the claim is one falling into the tolerable category. If the gravamen of the
claim is that the device did not do its intended job, the jury's inquiry would not involve the
formulation of its own standards. If the crux of the claim, however, is that the safety device
should have been designed better, or stronger, the jury is being asked to create the standard.
See, e.g., Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181, 1185 (8th Cir. 1977). In Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), the plaintiff's experts found fault with the head re-
straint's design because, they claimed, the metal was not sufficiently deformable and the
area of potential head impact was unnecessarily restricted. In other words, they attacked
the manufacturer's design choice itself. Such attacks are generalized crashworthiness claims
that merely happen to focus upon a crash safety device.
" See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, supra note 40, at 1558.
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promulgated by the expert agency charged with the task or to the
state of the art; (3) establish qualitative criteria of proof required
from claimants before injury-minimization claims are sent to the
jury; and (4) responsibly guard the process of claims resolution
from being influenced by sympathy or decided upon speculation.
To avoid a haphazard adjudication system, courts will have to an-
nounce requirements that clearly hold claimants accountable for
qualitative, high-level degrees of proof. Fortunately, there are signs
that the courts may be moving in this direction, albeit somewhat
slowly. Apart from the substantive legal rules surrounding
crashworthiness, however, there are lingering constitutional ques-
tions which, surprisingly, have not yet been fully treated by the
courts. The following discussion focuses upon these subjects as well
as the emerging requisites of proof in these cases.
THE ROLE OF REASONABLENESS IN MEASURING DESIGN
RESPONSIBILITY
Negligence or Strict Liability
The courts' recent fascination with strict tort liability92 in the
design defect area is perplexing since the appropriate predicate for
liability is fault. Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement
section which first announced strict tort liability,93 noted that any
analysis of a design defect "rests primarily upon a departure from
proper standards of care," and, therefore, concluded that "the tort
is essentially a matter of negligence" premised upon a "duty to use
reasonable care to design a product that is reasonably safe for its
intended use, and for other uses which are foreseeably probable. '1 4
Similarly, other noted commentators who have spoken in terms of
strict tort liability employ risk-utility analyses which are clearly
based upon negligence criteria. 5 Moreover, the commentary to the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act96 states that although some
92 See notes 40-45 supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For an informative account of the
history underlying the establishment of the Restatement's section on strict tort liability, see
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, supra note 44, at 830-31. See
also Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1964).
"' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 641, 644-45 (4th ed. 1971),
quoted in, Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 463, 525 P.2d 125, 128 (1974).
92 See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, supra note 45, at 37-38;
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, supra note 44, at 834-35.
11 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,714-50 (1979). The proposed Model Act followed a massive
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courts have indicated strict liability should be applied to design
cases, "it is difficult to find an adequate rationale to support that
result.1917 In design cases, "a firmer liability foundation is needed"
because "application of uncertain strict liability principles" im-
pugns the whole product lineY8 Thus, the commentary concluded,
"[i]n terms of creating incentives for loss prevention, the approach
of applying strict liability principles to design . . . cases represents
an 'overkill'; a fault system will provide the needed incentive." '99 A
number of commentators have urged persuasively that misleading,
uncertain, and confusing tests of strict liability should be aban-
doned with regard to product design claims in favor of an open,
unequivocal reliance upon negligence principles. 100 Indeed, Dean
Leon Green has stated that for design cases the negligence action
would "better serve the law, the litigants and the community." 101
When one carefully considers the manner in which some
courts interpret and apply strict liability, it becomes evident that,
in actuality, negligence principles are being employed. An illustra-
tive case is Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,'02 a precedent often
cited to support the proposition that strict liability differs from
negligence because the former imputes to a manufacturer knowl-
edge of the product's harmful character.10 3 Although Phillips does
18-month interagency "Task Force" study on the topic of products liability which included
consideration of the views of consumer and product seller groups, reviews of congressional
hearings, and independent contractors' studies. It also included "a thorough review" of "all
major case law and law review literature that had been published since the time of the Task
Force's 'Legal Study.'" 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,714. Among the purposes of the Model Act was
"to ensure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe products receive reasonable com-
pensation for their injuries." Id.
97 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
98 Id.
I /d.
100 Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, supra note 44, at 649. Professor Birnbaum has noted that
while it may seem harmless for courts and scholars to use the term strict liability when, in
actuality, a negligence standard will be applied, such "sophistry" leaves the jury to "formu-
late random and unpredictable judgments." Id. at 649. Rather than place such a strain on
our system of adjudicating tort claims, Professor Birnbaum concludes, "it is time for courts
to adopt, unequivocally and forthrightly, a pure negligence/risk-utility test in design defect
cases." Id. See also Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better
Approach?, supra note 44, at 134.
'' Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation,
supra note 44, at 1213.
102 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
103 See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABIrITY § 16A [4][f][iv][B], at 3B-136.2(h)-
(j) (1981); Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 618.
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make this doctrinal distinction, the essential core of the primary
inquiry remains, according to the court, "whether the seller would
be negligent" if he marketed the product knowing of the risk in-
volved. 10 4 The test announced, therefore, is that of a "reasonably
prudent manufacturer," a liability standard obviously akin to neg-
ligence except for the additional factor of imputed knowledge.105 In
applying the concept of strict liability, the Phillips court even pre-
ferred using negligence terminology to describe defectiveness be-
cause it preserves the familiar terms and thought process with
which courts, lawyers, and jurors customarily deal.106 Despite the
court's essential focus upon negligence theory, the added factor of
imputed knowledge, intended to give substance to strict liability in
design cases, adds little to traditional standards of negligence. 10 7
Indeed, as it relates to design cases, the doctrinal distinction drawn
by the court is essentially academic.
Under negligence principles, the manufacturer is held to the
standard of an expert in the field, and therefore is chargeable with
knowing all that the circumstances reasonably dictate. Accord-
ingly, there can be no significant difference between negligence and
strict liability unless manufacturers are to be held liable for failing
to design against risks that were unforeseeable when the product
was marketed.108 Few, if any, courts would allow the imposition
of liability for unknowable or unforeseeable risks.109 Necessarily,
104 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (em-
phasis in original) (footnote omitted).
105 Id. It is interesting to compare the Phillips court's textual statement with its later
references to a "reasonable person," "a seller acting reasonably," a "manufacturer who
would be negligent," a manufacturer "not acting reasonably," and a "reasonably prudent
manufacturer," all of which reflect a negligence standard. Id. at 492-94, 501 n.16, 525 P.2d
at 1036-37, 1038-39, 1040 n.16.
100 Id. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1037. The court's recommended jury instruction expressly
refers to a "reasonably prudent manufacturer"-unmistakably a negligence standard. Id. at
501 n.16, 525 P.2d at 1040 n.16.
'o7 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 659 & nn.72 -73 (4th ed. 1971).
'01 One author interprets the Phillips case as imputing only knowable risks. Vetri,
Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REV. 293, 299
(1975). Limiting imputation to knowable risks at the time of marketing can be viewed as
"tantamount to maintaining the burden on plaintiff to prove that the risk was reasonably
foreseeable"-a negligence test. Id. at 301. If this is the case, then there is no practical
difference between negligence and strict liability in design cases.
o ' See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977) ("since colli-
sions ... are foreseeable events, the scope of liability should be commensurate with the
scope of the foreseeable risks."); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1088 (5th Cir. 1973) ("requirement that the danger be reasonably foreseeable, or scientifi-
cally discoverable, is an important limitation of the seller's liability."), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1981]
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therefore, culpability is determined by analyzing the knowledge or
foreseeability existing at the time of manufacture. 110 No court con-
sidering a crashworthiness question has held a manufacturer liable
for unforeseeable or unknowable risks."" Thus, the Phillips strict
liability test amounts to little more than a negligence standard.
Similar comments are applicable to other announced tests of
strict tort liability whose kinship to negligence cannot be ignored.
For example, under the risk-utility balancing test 12 the jury is
asked to balance the utility of the product against the risk of its
use. This analysis involves "making trade-offs that take into ac-
count design or performance requirements, the effects of those re-
quirements on reducing hazards, the utility and cost of the prod-
uct, and technological capabilities." 113 Commentators seeking to
clarify, illustrate, or interpret the creature known as strict liability
attempt to identify specific factors that bear upon risk-utility anal-
ysis by compiling lists of considerations which are helpful but not
uniform." 4 Risk-utility balancing, however, is not a new concept.
Weighing risk against utility is nothing more than a traditional ap-
869 (1974).
110 E.g. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABrIIY ACT § 104(B)(1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,721 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA] (time of manufacture). See also UPLA
§ 104(B), Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723-24 (balancing risk-utility factors
"existing at the time of manufacture"). Under the UPLA, "probative" evidence in the de-
sign inquiry includes "the technological and practical feasibility" of preventing the claim-
ant's harm. Id. at 62,721. Obviously, if a risk is unknowable or unforeseeable, there is no
practical feasibility in designing against it.
" Id. at 62,723. The Larsen decision itself is heavily predicated upon "readily foresee-
able" collision risks. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
See also Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977); Leichtamer v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., PROD. SAFETY & LiAB. REP. (BNA) 1 653, 655-56 (Ohio 1981).
112 Not all "risk-utility" tests are identical. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 44, at
593; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 69, at 354-57 & nn.19-24. The au-
thors of the latter article stated that there is an "overwhelming consensus among courts
deciding design defect cases ... that risk/utility analysis should be used as either an exclu-
sive or an alternate ground of liability." Id. at 355.
"' Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 69, at 356.
114 Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, supra note 44, at 359 (15 fac-
tors); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, supra note 44, at 818 (four factors). The provision on de-
sign responsibility in the UPLA sets forth five factors which represent "evidence that is
especially probative" in evaluating design safety. See UPLA § 104(B)(2), reprinted in 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 and Analysis, at 62,723 (1979); Shapo, A Representational Theory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappoint-
ment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974) (13 factors); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, supra note 69, at 356-57 & n.23 (14 factors); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, supra note 44, at 837-38 (seven factors or considerations).
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proach to determining design safety under a negligence theory. In-
deed, nearly 20 years ago, Professor Noel, in his classic paper on
design negligence, observed:
The manufacturer does not have to make a product which is "ac-
cident-proof" or "fool-proof." Liability is imposed only when an
unreasonable danger is created. Whether or not this has occurred
should be determined by general negligence principles, which in-
volve "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of
harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which
would be effective to avoid the harm."'115
Thus, risk-utility balancing not only stems from "basic negli-
gence principles" '116 but, more significantly, was specifically bor-
rowed to explain what the parameters should be for strict tort lia-
bility.11 If, however, strict liability must rely upon negligence
15 Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71
YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1962) (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.4, at 1542 (1956)); See
Birnbaum supra note 44, at 649. Professor Birnbaum states that "the risk-utility balancing
test is but a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus." Id. (citing
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).
"I Noel, supra note 115, at 818.
M The tortuous development of strict tort liability in California illustrates how the
bench, bar, and litigants have been frustrated by uncertainty in interpreting and under-
standing strict liability. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 602-10; Hoenig, Product
Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There A Better Approach?, supra note 44, at 116-18.
Initially, the California Supreme Court postulated that liability exists when a product
"proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). In Greenman, the
court seemed to link the notion of defectiveness with negligence by stating that the
"[p]laintiff introduced substantial evidence that his injuries were caused by defective design
and construction of the [product]. . . .The jury could therefore reasonably conclude that
the manufacturer negligently constructed the product." Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 699 (emphasis in original). Shortly after Greenman, section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts established liability for a "defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer." The California court, however, later repudiated the Restate-
ment test of strict liability because the words "unreasonably dangerous" supposedly
connoted negligence and "burdened the injured plaintiff" with proof of the element of un-
reasonable danger. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-
62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972). Under Cronin, the term defect was to be the prevailing
test. This development was sharply criticized. See Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 603; Hoenig,
Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There A Better Approach?, supra note 44, at
116-17. Subsequently, the California court adopted a two-pronged test in Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978), which
employs either the consumer expectation test or risk-utility weighing. In the latter case, if a
plaintiff proves that the design caused the injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design. See id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Professor Birnbaum correctly -
suggested that the Barker test, relying as it does upon a risk-utility analysis, "betrays the
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criteria to have content and to be understood, why abandon negli-
gence in the first place? Why not openly admit that when risk-
utility balancing forces juries to consider the propriety of a manu-
facturer's design decisions in terms of benefits, risks, design alter-
natives, and trade-offs, the jury is really determining whether the
manufacturer acted reasonably?118
Strict Liability Label But Negligence Content?
The negligence orientation of the more popular strict liability
tests also is apparent in crashworthiness cases.119 Three recent de-
cisions, however, illustrate the essentially negligence complexion of
the basic inquiry as well as the doctrinal tension resulting from
this position.
In Turner v. General Motors Corp.,1 20 the plaintiff claimed
that an automobile which had overturned was uncrashworthy be-
cause enhanced injuries were sustained when the roof caved in dur-
ing the accident. The Supreme Court of Texas, ruled that
crashworthiness design cases are subject to rules of strict liability
and that the appropriate test for strict liability was "risk/utility
balancing. 1 21 The Turner court formulated a model jury instruc-
underlying negligence calculus" inherent in the balancing test. Birnbaum, supra note 44, at
609. Developments in California, therefore, appear to have proceeded in a circular pattern
during a relatively brief period. These wide policy swings have caused confusion, uncer-
tainty, and frustration. While it appears that strict products liability can be explained only
by reference to negligence principles, the California court has attempted to distinguish neg-
ligence concepts by declaring that in strict liability cases the jury's focus must shift from
conduct to the product. In reality, however, the jury must consider the manufacturer's con-
duct when it balances risk-utility factors. "Conceptually and analytically, this approach be-
speaks negligence." Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 609-10. The shift in focus is "nothing more
than semantic artifice." Id. at 648.
1" Professor Birnbaum has succinctly stated:
The ineluctable conclusion is that the competing factors to be weighed under a
risk-utility balancing test invite the trier of fact to consider the alternatives and
risks faced by the manufacturer and to determine whether in light of these he
exercised reasonable care in making the design choices he did. Instructing a jury
that weighing factors concerning conduct and judgment must yield a conclusion
that does not describe conduct is confusing at best.
Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 648; see Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is
There A Better Approach?, supra note 44, at 121 ("In design cases much more than the
product is impugned. The designer's conduct is impugned as well, for the allegations neces-
sarily question the manufacturer's balancing of the harm against the utility of the product
in the light of industry standards.").
'1 See, e.g., note 43 supra, and cases cited therein.
120 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
121 Id. at 847. The Turner court stated, without further explanation, that the applica-
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tion that defines a defectively designed product as one that is "un-
reasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the
utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. ' 122 Consider-
ing the negligence origins of risk-utility balancing previously dis-
cussed, 123 did the Texas court adopt a negligence-oriented test dis-
guised as strict liability? Some members of the court thought so.
Two dissenting judges in Turner asserted that the majority opin-
ion "merges strict liability into negligence liability, and for all
practical purposes abolishes strict liability in tort as to defective
design."1 24 The dissent perceived that a jury's consideration
tion of strict liability principles to crashworthiness cases was a "logical extension of the
rationale" of its prior decisions. Id. at 848; see Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87,
92-94 (Tex. 1974); Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546, 547-49
(Tex. 1969). Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the court concluded that "[t]here is no rational
basis for limiting the manufacturer's liability to those instances where a structural defect
has caused the collision and resulting injury." 584 S.W.2d at 848 (quoting Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977)).
122 584 S.W.2d at 847 n.1. The court fashioned the following instruction to be given to
the jury in strict liability cases based on design defects:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the [prod-
uct] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the [product] was defec-
tively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a product
that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility
of the product and the risk involved in its use.
Id. The court announced that the jury was to be directed in general terms to consider the
utility of the product and the risks involved in its use. Id. at 847. In declaring this general
instruction, the court eliminated the bifurcated consumer expectation/prudent manufac-
turer test which was created in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974)
and General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977). The Turner court
held that "henceforth in the trial of strict liability cases involving design defects the issue
and accompanying instruction will not include either the element of the ordinary consumer
or of the prudent manufacturer; to the extent of any conflict in such respects, Henderson
and Hopkins are overruled." 584 S.W.2d at 847. The court was persuaded "by the inconclu-
siveness of the idea that jurors would know what ordinary consumers would expect in the
consumption or use of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or test
outside that of their own experience and expectations." Id. at 851. See generally Casenote,
Products Liability-"Crashworthiness," Strict Liability and the Demise of the Henderson
Bifurcated Test in Design Defect Cases-Special Issues Will No Longer Define "Unrea-
sonably Dangerous" But Will Require Balancing of Utility and Risk, Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 884 (1979), 11 TEx. TEcH. L. REV. 953, 956-58, 966-70 (1980).
123 See notes 115-118 and accompanying text supra.
124 584 S.W.2d at 853 (Campbell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissenting judges preferred the Restatement's consumer expectation test since it focused
solely upon the consumer's contemplation of the danger and not upon what the reasonable
manufacturer contemplates. Id. at 854 (Campbell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). They considered the consumer expectation inquiry a true strict liability formulation.
Id. (Campbell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This view was rejected by the
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whether a product is unreasonably dangerous involves a determi-
nation whether the manufacturer acted prudently-a negligence
inquiry.125 The doctrinal tensions reflected in the Texas court's
struggle to define strict liability lead to striking functional results.
The Turner majority's decision to adopt a negligence-oriented test,
albeit disguised as strict liability, to resolve design cases funda-
mentally was correct. The court's insistence on labeling the theory
"strict liability," however, was unfortunate because confusion re-
garding the real nature of the inquiry is likely to be further perpet-
uated. At the same time, the dissent correctly identified the neg-
ligence flavor of the majority's test, but incorrectly chose to reject
it in favor of a form of liability intolerable to the law.
A second recent case, Ford Motor Co. v. Hill,1 26 reflects a
court's candor in recognizing the propriety of a negligence analysis
in crash design cases. Despite such intellectual honesty, the Hill
court adopted a strict liability formulation. The court held that in
all design cases, including second collision design cases, a claimant
may sue under both strict liability and negligence theories. None-
theless, the court frankly conceded the fundamental negligence fo-
cus of crashworthiness design inquiries: "[i]t appears that analysis
of whether a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user involves a negligence analysis in a 'design defect'
case, unlike the analysis ordinarily required in a 'manufacturing
flaw' situation."'' 27 The court concluded, however, that "this does
Supreme Court of Oregon in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d
1033, 1037 (1974), on the ground that the two tests are virtually identical. The Phillips
court reasoned that "the two standards are the same because a seller acting reasonably
would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing."
Id.
:5 584 S.W.2d at 854 (Campbell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126 [1981] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 9026 (Fla. 1981). In Hill, a truck traveling on a wet
highway with bald tires was overloaded with over 4,000 pounds of gasoline and oil. The
truck skidded and spun around backwards onto the median strip of the highway. The heavy
tank part of the trunk was torn loose when the rear wheels dug into the soft median. The
tank became embedded deeply in the median and had stopped when the still moving cab
slammed into the tank, causing the release of two latch hooks. In "whiplike" fashion the
hihged cab snapped open and then shut again. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249, 250
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, [1981] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9026 (Fla. 1981). The
plaintiff alleged that the design of the latching hooks which secured the hinged cab was
defective. [1981] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) V 9026, at 20,862. The allegations of design defect
centered on the two parallel lever rods which secured the latch hooks of the cab. The plain-
tiff contended that the latch hooks should have been connected to the lever rods in opposite
directions. The plaintiff alleged that if this had been the design, only one hook would have
been released. Id.
127 Id. at 20,863.
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not mean it is erroneous to apply the doctrine of strict liability to
design defect cases. '128 Apparently, the court, despite its candid
concession about "negligence analysis," was motivated by a desire
not to differentiate between design and manufacturing defects. 12
The Hill court, however, concluded that the pattern jury instruc-
tion on products liability required improvement to cover the inade-
quacies of the charge on design responsibilities. 130
The Hill case, in effect, signifies that "negligence analysis" is
really the appropriate core inquiry in crashworthiness design
claims notwithstanding that Florida law will continue to refer to
the legal theory as "strict liability." While the court's candor is
refreshing, its choice of label is somewhat unfortunate. Trial
judges, lawyers, and litigants will continue to be uncertain whether
a distinction between the two theories exists. Moreover, this nebu-
lous dichotomy may be confusing to jurors who receive double
charges when both negligence and strict liability theories are as-
serted. Hopefully, upon closer scrutiny, such ambiguity can be dis-
pelled, and the true negligence complexion of the design inquiry
will prevail.
In the third case, Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,131
the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted a form of strict liability based
upon the "consumer expectations" test contained in section 402A
of the Restatement. 3 2 In Leichtamer, a jeep occupied by four "off-
road" enthusiasts was upended in a "pitch-over" accident. The ve-
hicle landed upside down causing two injuries and two deaths. The
128 Id. The court felt that it would be a "better rule" to apply strict product liability
principles to "all manufactured products" regardless of whether a design or manufacturing
defect is in issue. Id. at 20,864.
M9 See note 128 supra. The Hill court quoted with approval a portion of the opinion in
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977), in which the Seventh Circuit
refused to distinguish accident causation and second collision liability. [1981] PROD. LIAB.
REx. (CCH) $ 9026, at 20,863. Similarly, the court quoted a Nebraska case that refused to
differentiate design and manufacturing defects. Id. at 20,864. One could conclude, therefore,
that the court simply wanted one test to apply to both design and manufacturing defects.
Indeed, this would explain the court's mandate to draft a new jury instruction which suffi-
ciently charges on design issues.
'0 [1981] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9026, at 20,864 n.4.
121 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
22 Section 402A of the Restatement imposes strict liability where a product is in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the user. The Restatement commentary
specifies that for a product to be unreasonably dangerous, "the article sold must be danger-
ous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge to the community as to its characteristics." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
1981]
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plaintiffs sued the manufacturer for enhanced injuries contending
that the vehicle's rollbar had collapsed because of weakness of the
sheet metal housing to which it was attached. The manufacturer
asserted that the rollbar was an optional device provided solely for
protection in siderolls and not pitchovers. 13
The Leichtamer court, in a divided opinion, rejected the de-
fendant's contention that strict liability should not be used to re-
solve a crashworthiness design claim.134 The court, however, was
troubled by the "cloud of doubt" raised by Dean Prosser concern-
ing section 402A's inapplicability to design cases. 35 The noted
torts scholar had observed that product design liability, "though it
may occasionally be called strict, appears to rest primarily upon a
departure from proper standards of care, so that the tort is essen-
tially a matter of negligence."' 3' Nevertheless, the majority over-
came this significant conceptual problem by noting that the "vast
weight of authority" supports both strict liability and negligence
suits for design defects. 137 Indeed, a spirited rationale was offered
by the court in favor of the consumer expectations test,138 a stan-
dard, however, which has been sharply criticized elsewhere. 139
133 424 N.E.2d at 571-72. The Leichtamer court rejected the defendant's argument that
the rollbar was provided solely for a sideroll. The court charged the defendant with knowl-
edge that pitchovers were foreseeable, and declared that "[a] roll bar should be more than
mere ornamentation," id. at 576, even though the manufacturer is "under no obligation to
design a 'crash proof' vehicle," id. at 575-76.
'34 See id. at 575. The Leichtamer court felt that permitting a distinction between mis-
manufacture and design defect cases "would only provoke needless questions of defect clas-
sification." Id. In this case, where the manufacturer had produced a vehicle for a certain use,
it was more in line with the policy underlying strict products liability to place the primary
responsibility on the manufacturer. Id.
135 Id. It is significant that Dean Prosser was the reporter for the Restatement (Second)
of Torts whose test the Ohio court intended to adopt.
130 [1981] PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 655 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 644 (4th ed. 1971)).
137 424 N.E.2d at 575.
138 Id. at 576-77. The Leichtamer court reasoned that the concept of unreasonable dan-
ger is an essential element of the strict liability claim since a product cannot be considered
defective simply because it can produce injury. The core proposition behind the test
adopted by the court is that "'a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.'" Id. at 576 (quoting
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978)). The court also stated that the consumer expectation test recognizes the legitimacy
of a fundamental concept in tort law-the protection of the individuality of persons. 424
N.E.2d at 577.
139 See, e.g., UPLA § 104(B), and Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724
(1979) (consumer expectations test too subjective); Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 611-18; von
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By defining "defective" in terms of the expectations of an or-
dinary consumer, the Ohio court adopted a pure test of consumer
expectations, differing somewhat from the combined tests adopted
by other courts employing the unreasonably dangerous or reasona-
ble expectations measures of liability. For example, the Supreme
Court of Washington has indicated that the determination of the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer involves risk-
utility balancing. 140 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however,
formulated a standard that combines a "not reasonably suitable
and safe" criterion with the notion of failure "to perform ... to
the user's reasonable expectation" of safety.14 1 In contrast, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon simply equates the consumer expectations
test with the reasonably prudent manufacturer standard. 42 In-
deed, most jurisdictions combine the expectations rationale with
negligence-oriented risk-utility balancing, thereby giving some neg-
ligence content to the strict liability formulation. Although the
connection with negligence may not be explicit, even a pure version
of the consumer expectations standard inevitably must rely upon
negligence-based concepts of reasonableness. In fact, the consumer
expectations rationale is merely the manner chosen by the drafters
of the Restatement to explain section 402A's reference to an unrea-
sonably dangerous product. Obviously, the notion of unreasonable
danger traces its heritage to the law of negligence. This inescapable
nexus with negligence apparently motivated the drafters to clarify
section 402A's intent by providing that the seller may be held lia-
ble despite his exercise of all possible care, a standard which is
preposterous when applied to design cases. Little wonder, then,
that the Ohio court, in Leichtamer, was troubled by Dean Pros-
Hfilsen, supra note 44, at 467-69 (consumer expectations test questions objectivity and
poses danger of hindsight jury evaluations); Wade, supra note 44, at 829 (in many situations
consumers would not know what to expect).
10 Seattle-First Nat'1 Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975)
(en banc). In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer the Su-
preme Court of Washington considered the "relative cost of the product, the gravity of the
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or mini-
mizing the risk." Id.; see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
141 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140,
150 (1979).
142 See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974)
(en banc) ("a manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product, consider-
ing its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable ex-
pectations of consumers who purchase it").
19811
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ser's explicit observation that design torts are essentially a matter
of negligence. 4 '
The dissenting judges in Leichtamer appear to have perceived
these problems, and therefore criticized strict liability as a theory
for resolving crashworthiness cases. Negligence or reasonable care
tests, the dissenters asserted, furnished the proper measure of lia-
bility. Indeed, it was noted that "courts have seemingly had a diffi-
cult time defining what Section 402A means. 1 44 Given the numer-
ous variations of strict liability adopted by the courts, a major
problem is "the lack of uniformity and understanding" of section
402A's descriptive term, "defective condition, unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user." Courts, lawyers and jurors, on the other hand,
"are familiar with concepts of negligence" and, such concepts are
also "uniformly applied."14 Another incisive point made by the
dissenters is that manufacturers "cannot reasonably be required to
design a car to withstand all collisions under any and all circum-
stances.' 46 A reasonable care standard more clearly effectuates the
principle that reasonable safety is what governs and better pro-
tects against the imposition of legal requirements which approach
"accident-proofness."
The three cases discussed, each of which adopted strict tort
liability as an applicable theory for crashworthiness design claims,
clearly illustrate that strict liability has neither a common defini-
tion, nor a uniform application. Moreover, the cases indicate that
negligence-oriented reasonableness criteria must be applied in
crash design cases regardless of the strict liability label. It is unfor-
tunate that much confusion and uncertainty has resulted from the
judiciary's effort to retain a theory which poorly fits design cases
when the perfectly sound and manageable theory of negligence ex-
ists, which would accommodate all interests. 47 Whether strict lia-
bility for design cases is viewed as a form of overkill 148 or as a form
of liability which is really not so strict,149 some courts seem unal-
M Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 575
(1981).
144 424 N.E.2d at 584 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 583-84.
14,7 See notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra.
148 See UPLA § 104, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg., 62,714, 62,724 (1979).
149 Both the reasonably prudent manufacturer and the risk-utility balancing tests obvi-
ously involve basic negligence concepts. See notes 112-118 and accompanying text supra. To
the extent that the consumer expectation test is combined with or defined by risk-utility
(Vol. 55:633
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terably disposed to retain the concept. If they continue to do so, it
should at least be conceded openly that the core inquiry must
hinge upon reasonableness factors. Such judicial candor would alle-
viate the creation of "obfuscatory tests that can only confuse jurors
and deny litigants a consistently fair and just result."150 In any
event, the courts should strongly disavow the application of any
form of design strict liability that imposes crashworthiness culpa-
bility despite the seller's exercise of all possible care.151 Such an
absolute and illogical measure of design responsibility has no place
in a rational legal system premised upon fault. Indeed, it is
counter-productive from a policy standpoint because it nullifies the
manufacturer's incentive to exercise a high degree of care. If a
manufacturer is going to be held liable under strict liability despite
exercising all possible care, why make the effort? The law simply
cannot penalize the highly prudent manufacturer by saddling him
with multimillion dollar liabilities without making him an insurer
or abandoning fault and creating a compensation system. Thus,
the Restatement's formulation imposing liability notwithstanding
the exercise of all possible care is absurd when literally applied to
design cases. Reasonable prudence ought to be rewarded-not
penalized.
Reasonableness Criteria Illustrated
Fortunately, many courts deciding crashworthiness design
cases seem to be applying reasonableness criteria regardless of
weighing, it also involves negligence criteria. Moreover, the pure "consumer expectations"
standard is tantamount to the reasonably prudent seller test "because a seller acting reason-
ably would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchas-
ing." Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974). See also
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 659-60 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, "a manufacturer
who would be negligent in marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessa-
rily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who
purchase it. The foreseeable uses to which a product could be put would be the same in the
minds of both the seller and the buyer unless one of the parties was not acting reasonably."
269 Or. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037. Minimally, an expectations test obviously entails notions of
reasonableness and practical limitations like state of the art. This is no doubt why the Re-
statement's expectations standard is expressed merely as an explanation for section 402A's
term "unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment i
(1965). Under a consumer expectations test, design guilt inevitably must focus upon such
reasonableness factors as state of the art because "logically, an ordinary consumer cannot
expect more safety than was technically and economically feasible at the time when the
product was marketed." von Hillsen, supra note 44, at 468.
11o Birnbaum, supra note 44, at 649.
'" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
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whether the theory involved is negligence or strict tort liability.
Several cases illustrate this desirable trend which is consistent
with legal realities. In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,' 52 a
1968 van-type vehicle having a snub-nosed front end collided with
a utility pole at 40 miles per hour. The injured passenger sued the
manufacturer and importer contending that the defendants were
negligent because of the "want of crashworthiness of its vehicle.M53
The trial judge concluded that the manufacturer was negligent be-
cause the vehicle's design did not provide "sufficient energy-ab-
sorbing materials or devices" or "crush space" to protect "the in-
tegrity of the passenger compartment" in front-end impacts at 40
miles per hour.154
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, re-
versed and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of
defendants. 155 The Fourth Circuit commented upon the essential
policy considerations in enhanced injury cases. Assuming crash-
worthiness claims to be actionable, the court stated that the mere
frequency or feasibility of collisions is not sufficient in and of itself
to create a duty on the part of a manufacturer to design its cars to
withstand such collisions under any circumstances.156 Moreover,
152 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
153 Id. at 1068. The trial court's dismissal of a claim that the allegedly negligent design
of the gearshift location caused the accident was not an issue on appeal.
154 Id. at 1068-69. The trial court found that there were injuries over and above those
which the plaintiff might have incurred absent the defect. For the purposes of this discus-
sion, the fact that Dreisonstok was decided under negligence theory is of no significance.
The court indicated that negligence has been recognized as a "correct basis" in design cases
and, in any event, "it makes little or no real difference whether liability is asserted on
grounds of negligence, warranty or strict liability; the applicable principles are roughly the
same in any case." Id. at 1068 n.2. Moreover, recognizing the universality of the court's
analytical approach, many courts confronting crashworthiness issues under strict tort liabil-
ity cite and quote the Dreisonstok opinion with approval. E.g., Curtis v. General Motors
Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1981) (construing Dreisonstok as a bastion against the
threat that consumer choice in the market will be diminished by the exclusion of all but the
safest designs); Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting that use of
a particular design to create a unique feature and attract buyers is reasonable manufacturer
conduct); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 747, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 393 (1978) (citing Dreisonstok's recognition that a product must be considered as
an "integrated whole").
:55 489 F.2d at 1076.
56 Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original). The Dreisonstok court emphasized the well-
settled distinction between foreseeability and duty, id. at 1070 n.9, and further asserted:
Were foreseeability of collision the absolute litmus test for establishing a duty on
the part of the car manufacturer, the obligation of the manufacturer to design a
crash-proof car would be absolute, a result that Larsen itself specifically repudi-
ates. After all, "[N]early every accident situation, [involving an automobile] no
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the panel asserted that foreseeability is not to be equated with
duty because the manufacturer would be required to build cars
which are crashproof. The Dreisonstok court indicated that a pri-
mary consideration in crashworthiness cases is the element of un-
reasonable risk because it would be patently unreasonable to re-
quire a manufacturer to provide for every conceivable use or
misuse of a vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded, liability may
be imposed "only when an unreasonable danger is created. 1
57
The determination of whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous, according to the court, involves a balancing of the likeli-
hood of harm and the gravity of potential harm "against the bur-
den of the precautions which would be effective to avoid the
harm."' -58 The Fourth Circuit noted that among the several factors
involved in this test is the inverse correlation between the likeli-
hood of harm and the obviousness of the danger. Harm, whether
latent or patent, becomes more unlikely as the danger becomes
more obvious to the user.1 59 Thus, the court reasoned, when the
risk is one that anyone immediately would recognize and avoid, the
manufacturer's design rationally cannot be considered "unreasona-
bly dangerous."1 60 Also important, stated the court, is a considera-
tion of the purposes and intended use of the article since it is well
known that "utility of design and attractiveness of the style of the
car are elements which car manufacturers seek after and by which
buyers are influenced in their selections."1'' Thus, the court pos-
ited that in every case "the utility and purpose of the particular
type of vehicle will govern, in varying degree, the standards of
safety to be observed in its design.' 61 2 Another significant factor
matter how bizarre, is 'foreseeable' if only because in the last fifty years drivers
have discovered just about every conceivable way of wrecking an automobile."
Id. at 1070.
157 Id. (quoting Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, supra note 115, at 818). Whether or not an unreasonable danger has been created
is determined by a risk-utility balancing approach. The Dreisonstok court quoted the lan-
guage of general negligence principles to define the inquiry as a "balancing of the likelihood
of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precautions which
would be effective to avoid the harm." 489 F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted).
1 489 F.2d at 1071.
159 Id.
160 Id. (quoting Noel, supra note 115, at 836).
161 Id. at 1071-72.
62 Id. at 1072. The court noted the express recognition of different types of vehicles in
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976).
The Act directs the Secretary of Transportation, in establishing federal motor vehicle safety
standards, to "consider whether any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:633
identified by the court is the price of the vehicle. In this regard,
the court observed that it would be unreasonable and impractical
for courts to require the adoption of a change in design that would
"take an article out of the price range of the market to which it
was intended to appeal."'163 Finally, the court added that the par-
ticular circumstances of the accident must be considered. A high-
speed collision with a large truck, for example, could not present a
reasonable basis for liability when the smaller vehicle collapses.'"
Having considered all of the foregoing factors, the Dreisonstok
court found no violation of reasonable care in the .design of the
vehicle. The nature of the vehicle's design was unique and utilita-
rian and the front end characteristics were apparent. 65 Moreover,
the court stated that the collision at 40 miles per hour was beyond
the pale of the manufacturer's duty because the dangers inherent
in such high-speed collisions are not risks against which the manu-
facturer must protect the occupant. 6 '
In Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,16 7 the plaintiff alleged that
a defective roof design caused enhanced injuries when the car over-
turned. Although the court deemed the pleadings to state a
crashworthiness cause of action, it indicated that not every such
appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for
which it is prescribed." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3) (1976).
163 489 F.2d at 1072-73.
1" Id. at 1073. The Fourth Circuit agreed with an earlier federal decision, Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See notes 167-170 and accompa-
nying text infra. In Dyson, the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding overturned. The
plaintiff claimed enhanced injuries because the roof allegedly failed to support, even par-
tially, the weight of the overturned car. Although it denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, the court stated unequivocally that "it could not reasonably be argued that a car man-
ufacturer should be held liable because its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on
collision with a large truck, at high speed." 298 F. Supp. at 1073; cf. Polk v. Ford Motor Co.,
529 F.2d 259, 269 (8th Cir.) (manufacturer not liable for car "which will not withstand a fall
from a cliff"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272
Md. 201, 217, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (1974) (no design liability for auto which cannot withstand
high-speed, head-on collision with truck). This, however, may raise the question of what
constitutes a high-speed collision. The Department of Transportation formulates a statistic
known as the "equivalent barrier test speed distribution," which sets forth the mean speed
at which 50% of deaths and injuries occur in frontal collisions. The mean barrier speed for
fatalities is 33 miles per hour, and for serious injuries such speed is 26 miles per hour. See
Hoenig, Understanding "Second Collision" Cases in New York, 20 N.Y.L.F. 29, 66-68
(1974). See generally note 3 supra; see also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1076 (4th Cir. 1974) (mean fatality velocity only 33 miles per hour).
161 Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1974).
166 Id. at 1075-76.
117 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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claim should be submitted to a jury.""' Additionally, the Dyson
court properly recognized that in crash design cases, consideration
must be accorded to the particular character of vehicle involved.
Design defect claims should not be viewed in a vacuum but in the
light of conditions which exist in other vehicles of the same class
or configuration. It is imperative that a court "differentiate be-
tween various models of automobiles and recognize the inherent
characteristics of each." 169 As stated by the Dyson court:
The manufacturer cannot be expected to provide a convertible
which is as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard four-door se-
dan with center posts and full-door frames. But the manufacturer
can be expected to provide a convertible which is as safe as it
reasonably can be made, and which is not appreciably less safe
than other convertibles. So, too, in the present case, the manufac-
turer was not necessarily under an obligation to provide a hard-
top model which would be as resistant to roll-over damage as a
four-door sedan; but the defendant was required, in my view, to
provide a hardtop automobile which was a reasonably safe version
of such model, and which was not substantially less safe than
other hardtop models.170
The court, therefore, must give full recognition to the size,
weight, and other important characteristics of the vehicle involved
and must judge the vehicle against comparable vehicles. This rea-
sonableness factor does not depend upon the legal theory em-
ployed or the particular strict liability test adopted. It is implicit
in the very nature of the crash design inquiry.
In Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert,17 1 the Supreme
Court of Washington observed that even under a consumer expec-
tations theory of strict liability, the trier of fact is "to take into
account the intrinsic nature of the product." Thus, for example,
"[t]he purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the
same degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expen-
sive Cadillac. 1' 7  The Washington court stated that a determina-
168 Id. at 1073.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1073-74.
86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
1 Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779. Remarkably similar is the statement by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975) that "since the
ordinary consumer would expect a Volkswagen to be less safe in an accident than, say, a
Cadillac, the smallness of the car with the attendant danger would not per se render it
inherently dangerous. Rather it must contain a dangerous defect whose presence an ordi-
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tion of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer in-
volves consideration of a number of factors relating to risk-utility
balancing. Accordingly, the following factors may be relevant: "the
relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk. '173 Additionally, the nature of the product or
the nature of the claimed defect "may make other factors relevant
on the issue. '174 It is clear, then, that numerous reasonableness
considerations are very much at the core of a crashworthy design
case.
In Daly v. General Motors Corp.,7 5 a car driven by a person
under the influence of alcohol collided with a highway fence and
overturned, thereby ejecting its occupant. The car had been pro-
vided with seatbelts which were not worn and with door locks
which were not used, despite exhortations to do so in the owner's
manual. Although the primary issue before the Supreme Court of
California was whether to adopt the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, it also considered a very important crashworthiness ques-
tion: was it proper to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's failure to
use the safety devices provided by the manufacturer? The plaintiff
contended that in a strict liability case the jury should focus only
upon the precise malfunctioning component claimed to be defec-
tive. The California court disagreed and upheld the instruction ad-
vising the jury to "'consider all of the equipment on the vehicle
including any features intended for the safety of the driver.' ,,171
The court noted that the vehicle's overall design, including safety
features, may make it crashworthy, thereby rendering it nondefec-
nary consumer would not reasonably expect." Id. at 557, 225 N.W.2d at 435 (discussing
"consumer expectations" test under section 402A). Using the example of the Volkswagen,
the Wisconsin court also linked the consumer expectations test with the obviousness or
latency of the danger claimed. Thus, "where a plaintiff sues the manufacturer of a
Volkswagen and complains that the car was designed too small to be safe . . . [sluch a
defect could hardly be said to be hidden." Id. Under a consumer expectations test, obvious
conditions may well preclude liability. Thus, in Vineland v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz.
App. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1978), the operator of an earthmoving machine could not
maintain an action against the manufacturer based upon the absence of a protective rollover
bar and seat belts because these conditions were not beyond the ordinary consumer's con-
templation. Id. at 505, 581 P.2d at 1155. See also Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141,
148-49, 275 N.E.2d 632, 637 (Ct. App. 1971) (no duty to passenger for obviously unpadded
dashboard).
173 Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975).
174 Id.
-75 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
176 Id. at 746, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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tive. Thus, it was concluded, the issue of defective design is to be
determined "with respect to the product as a whole. '177
Although strict liability rules were involved, the court stated:
Product designs do not evolve in a vacuum, but must reflect the
realities of the market place, kitchen, highway, and shop. Simi-
larly, a product's components are not developed in isolation, but
as part of an integrated and interrelated whole. Recognizing that
finished products must incorporate and balance safety, utility,
competitive merit, and practicality under a multitude of intended
and foreseeable uses, courts have struggled to evolve realistic
tests for defective design which give weight to this necessary
balancing. Thus, a number of California cases have recognized the
need to "weigh" competing considerations in an overall product
design, in order to determine whether the design was
"defective.' 178
The court emphasized the dangers of "piecemeal consideration of
isolated components" and noted that "a design rendered safe in
one situation may become more dangerous in others.' 79 These fac-
tors necessarily compelled consideration of the product "as an in-
tegrated whole."18 0 As demonstrated by the foregoing cases, a host
of potential reasonableness factors should govern the resolution of
crashworthiness claims. Phrased somewhat differently, "'unrea-
sonableness' is an essential element of the plaintiffs case."'181
177 Id.
178 Id. at 746, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
179 Id. at 747, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393. In Knippen v. Ford Motor Co.,
546 F.2d 993, 999 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court observed that "safety objectives themselves
may be at cross purposes." For example, noted the court, occupant protection might dictate
that "automobiles must have hard outer shells, but when such a vehicle collides with a pe-
destrian at high speed injury is unavoidable." Id. The Knippen court also observed that
safety is not the exclusive consideration in designing an automobile. The designer must con-
sider the "'utility and purpose of the particular type of vehicle'" and the "'price range of
the market to which it is intended to appeal.' "Id. (quoting Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974)).
,80 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 747, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 393 (1978).
181 Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Knippen, the
court stated:
Under the Larsen rule manufacturers are not held to the standard of insurers
but only to a standard of reasonable care. Manufacturers are not required to elim-
inate all risks or to produce a crash-proof vehicle. They are required to eliminate
unreasonable risks and to take reasonable steps to apply common sense factors to
minimize the injurious effects of collisions. This rule is fair to manufacturers. If a
manufacturer has acted reasonably it will not be liable under the duty established
by Larsen.
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The role of reasonableness is also well illustrated in Bowman
v. General Motors Corp.18 2 In Bowman, a battle of experts ensued
over the crashworthiness design of a 1966 passenger car that had
burst into flames when struck in the rear by another vehicle. The
jury found in favor of the manufacturer and the plaintiff filed post-
trial motions for relief. At this juncture, the court had to consider
whether the jury instructions on design liability were correct. This
resulted in an evaluation of the role of the words "unreasonably
dangerous" found in section 402A of the Restatement's version of
strict liability. Did the words so "ring of negligence" that they un-
dermined policies of strict liability?"sa The court's answer was in
the negative.
In a design case, the Bowman court noted, the defect question
"should be defined in terms of unreasonableness of danger."184 The
concept of defect or defective condition standing alone is inappro-
priate, has no independent meaning, and "is apt to prove mislead-
ing." ' The unreasonably dangerous concept, properly formulated,
therefore, "posits a risk-utility balancing test pursuant to which
the jury makes a judgment as to the social acceptability of the con-
scious design choice trade-off."186 After all, the jury's ultimate task
is to decide whether the manufacturer provided "a reasonably safe
compartment for transportation of occupants of motor vehicles;
that is, one designed not to be crashproof or to provide absolute
safety against all risks of the road, but to provide reasonable safety
against the foreseeable risks of the road. 1 87 The Bowman court
held that appropriate instructions will direct the jury to consider
and balance a number of traditional factors inherent in risk-utility
Id.; e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974).
The same basic principles of reasonableness apply when the action is based upon an implied
warranty. In such cases, liability is based upon the fact that the product is "not reasonably
fit for its intended, anticipated or reasonably foreseeable use." Elsasser v. American Motors
Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 384, 265 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Ct. App. 1978). A similar analytical
approach is employed under strict liability. In Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225
N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974), the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted strict tort liability under
section 402A, but nonetheless discussed crashworthiness responsibilities under principles of
"reasonableness" and "reasonable care." 225 N.W.2d at 62-66.
182 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
193 Id. at 241.
164 Id. at 242.
185 Id.
206 Id.
107 Id. at 244.
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weighing.18 Such instructions, stressed the court, will also inform
the jury that there is no duty to produce a crashproof automobile
such as a car "built like a tank so that a passenger would escape
injury even if the car were hit by a fast moving locomotive." 18 9
Thus, it was concluded in Bowman that the unreasonably danger-
ous concept is and "properly should remain" a part of strict liabil-
ity law.19 0
Consideration of reasonableness will often involve evidence of
state of the art.1"1 Larsen, itself, spoke of state of the art as a rea-
sonableness factor when describing the duty to furnish, under gen-
eral negligence principles, a reasonably crashworthy vehicle. 92 It is
obvious that the crashworthiness design claim raises a question
about the reasonableness of the defendant's design strategies s
which, in turn, involves the issue whether, under the applicable
state of the art, the car design unreasonably increased the risks of
collision injury.9 ' Indeed, state of the art is a relevant considera-
tion under all major products liability theories. 195 Thus, in Bruce v.
16s Id. at 243-45. The Bowman court stated, "[w]e concede that the ratio decidendi of a
case thus submitted to the jury may be similar to that of the same case submitted on a
negligence theory, and that it may be forcefully argued that some of the ingredients in the
balancing formula are akin to considerations involved in negligence cases." Id. at 245 (foot-
note omitted). The court reasoned that although the balancing test "posited under § 402A is
quite similar to the test ordinarily applied in negligence," the focus is different because the
jury charge emphasizes the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct. Id. at 245 n.19.
189 Id. at 243 n.16. The Bowman court noted that the manufacturer "had no obligation
to use any particular design or the safest design which could be conceived of under the state
of the art at the time, i.e., what was known." Id.
190 Id. at 246. See also Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd
mem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979).
191 See generally O'Donnell, supra note 25, at 630-61; Raleigh, supra note 25, at 253-68;
von Htilsen, supra note 44, at 464-72.
192 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). The duty of
reasonable care in design "should be viewed in light of the risk." Id. at 503. All risks cannot
be eliminated "nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present state of the art."
Id.
193 E.g., Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979). See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066,
1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 243 n.16 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
19, Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 918 (1979).
195 See von Htilsen, supra note 44, at 464-77. Dr. von Hiilsen refers to "state of the art"
as the "technical and scientific knowledge available to the manufacturer at the time of man-
ufacture, to be applied, however, only in light of a balance between practical safety and
economic considerations." Id. at 464 n.33. In Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (Ct. App. 1972), the court stated that "[s]trict liability
for deficient design ... is premised on a finding that the product was unreasonably danger-
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Martin-Marietta Corp.,"' a grant of summary judgment to the
manufacturer was affirmed by the appellate court where the plain-
tiffs alleged that an airplane manufacturer failed to design a crash-
worthy aircraft made in 1952. The defendant made an uncontra-
dicted showing that the claimed defect could not have been
corrected within the then existing state of the art and that, when
made, the plane had complied with all the applicable regulations.
The court held, under the consumer expectations test, that the
plaintiffs could not prove that a reasonable consumer "would ex-
pect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made
in 1970."' ' Perhaps in recognition of the practical fact that
claimed crashworthiness defects are virtually worthless at trial un-
less the jury is presented with substantial evidence that the prod-
uct's design fell below the state of the art, claimants often try to
show that vehicles made by others possessed superior features
which should have mitigated the enhanced injury." 8 Where such
evidence is weak, illogical, or unsubstantiated, the claimant may
lose at trial or find his claim dismissed for want of proof of defec-
tive design. 9
ous for its intended use, and in turn, the unreasonableness of the danger must necessarily be
derived from the state of the art at the time of design." Id. at 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
'" 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
197 Id. at 447.
198 In claims involving the design of door latch mechanisms, plaintiffs have introduced
expert testimony to show that latch designs of other manufacturers would have prevented
the door from opening in the accident. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 804
(8th Cir. 1976); Bair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1973); Walker v.
International Harvester Co., 294 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (W.D. Okla. 1969). Expert testimony
tending to show that other manufacturers' designs were safer in a specific type of accident
also has been used in side frame design cases. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d
950, 958 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). Sometimes the plaintiff's evidence
about other cars possessing superior designs focuses on noncomparable models. In these
cases the evidence is flawed and may result in a judgment for the defendant. In Dreisonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974), the court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that a snub-nosed van should have the front structure of a passenger car sedan. Id. at
1075-76. Other cases have stressed that the plaintiff must employ similar models when using
design comparisons to show the "state of the art." See Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298
F. Supp. 1064, 1073-74 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (hardtop model must be compared with other hard-
top models); Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(Letts, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs improperly used luxury car designs to show "state of the
art" although car involved was economy model).
199 E.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 1974)
(comparison of van design with passenger car design legally insufficient); Jeng v. Witters,
452 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff
failed to show that a safer alternative design was in use by others); Olson v. Arctic Enter-
prises, 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D. 1972) (proposed modifications for snowmobile were
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State of the art criteria are reflected in the crashworthiness
proof requirement that the plaintiff must show a feasible and prac-
ticable alternative design which would have avoided the injury
claimed. 00 Increasingly, the state of the art factor, like other judi-
cially created products liability rules, is becoming a subject of stat-
utory governance.2 1 An Arizona statute, for example, precludes li-
ability if a defendant proves that the allegedly defective design
conformed to recognized design and manufacturing techniques
complying with the state of the art at the time the product was
sold.202 Statutorily defined, state of the art is not couched solely in
terms of existing "technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge"
but also in terms of what was "reasonably feasible for use at the
time of manufacture."20 3 Thus, reasonableness is inherent in the
concept of the feasibility of an alternative design.
In Nebraska, the manufacturer has available a state of the art
defense measured by what was "generally recognized and prevail-
ing" in the industry at the time the product was sold.2 04 Tennes-
see's20 5 and Indiana's20 6 defenses similarly relate to an industry
standard. New Hampshire's defense pertains to "risks complained
of by plaintiff" which were "not discoverable using prevailing re-
search and scientific techniques under the state of the art" or using
government regulatory procedures.0 Some states provide that
conformity with the state of the art or compliance with govern-
ment regulations creates a rebuttable presumption that the prod-
uct was not defective. Both Colorado2 8 and KentuckyW 9 have such
unconvincing).
200 See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F.
Supp. 1349, 1359, 1361 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Baker v.
Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1976). For a more
complete discussion of the alternative design proof requirement, see notes 220-252 and ac-
companying text infra.
201 See note 69 supra.
202 ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1980-1981). According to the Arizona stat-
ute, a manufacturer is not strictly liable if:
[t]he plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufac-
turing, inspecting, testing and labeling... conform with the state of the art at
the time the product was first sold by the defendant.
Id.
203 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(6) (Supp. 1980-1981).
2" NEi. REv. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979).
205 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105 (1980).
200 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4 (Burns Supp. 1981).
207 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979).
208 COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1980).
209 Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.310(2) (Supp. 1980).
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:633
provisions. Tennessee law provides a presumption that a product
complying with government regulations at the time of manufacture
is not unreasonably dangerous.21 0 Under these provisions, even if
an occasional court creates so strict a form of strict liability that
state of the art criteria are deemed irrelevant,21' the statute never-
theless would assure their consideration by the factfinder.
In the automobile crashworthiness area, state of the art or
compliance with standards defenses will inevitably be very impor-
tant factors because comprehensive federal motor vehicle safety
standards affecting crash safety have been promulgated since
1968.212 Unless specifically exempted, automobile manufacturers
must comply with the applicable national standards. Thus, a man-
ufacturer's compliance with standards will frequently be admissi-
ble in a given case to show reasonable care or reasonable design213
and, pursuant to state statutes like the ones mentioned above,
such compliance might even be dispositive of the litigation.
Even without statutes, however, there is some well-reasoned
precedent suggesting that a manufacturer's compliance with stan-
dards adopted by an expert governmental agency should not be
easily discounted by expert testimony.21 4 Indeed, there is inherent
21* TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980).
211 In Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 367, 551 P.2d 398, 402, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 82 (1976), the court appeared to disregard the state of the art concept. It rejected
the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had failed to show the product design varied
from the state of the art. Id. One commentator, however, suggested that the court's holding
was merely "luxuriant dicta" because the defense expert had conceded that the alternative
design proposed by the plaintiff was feasible and would not have significantly affected the
product's cost. O'Donnell, supra note 25, at 640.
212 See 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1980). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
has issued many safety standards that are relevant factors when determining an automo-
bile's "crashworthiness." For example, Standard No. 201 deals with occupant protection
against "interior impacts." 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (1980). Standard No. 202 specifies require-
ments for head restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injuries. 49 C.F.R.
§ 571.202 (1980). Standard No. 203 provides requirements to minimize chest, neck, and fa-
cial injuries which may result from an impact with the steering control mechanism. 49
C.F.R. § 571.203 (1980). Many additional standards govern other crashworthiness features.
21 See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1978).
214 In McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976), the
claimant sued a drug manufacturer for injuries resulting from a drug which was claimed to
be defective. Id. at 196, 241 N.W.2d at 824. The plaintiff's experts testified that a defect
existed and that the warnings accompanying the drug were inadequate and incomplete. Id.
at 199, 241 N.W.2d at 827. Defense experts testified to the contrary. Id. at 199, 241 N.W.2d
at 828. The drug and warnings, however, had been approved by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration. Id. at 199-200, 241 N.W.2d at 828. Affirming the judgment and the trial court's
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illogic in permitting expert agency decisions, reached after careful
research or testing, to be neutralized in the courtroom by thin tes-
timony of glib experts focusing on a particular accident. 15 One
commentator succinctly states the dilemma:
It is patently absurd that the machinery of governmental stan-
dard setting should be observed through vigorous procedures, and
that designers should be required to meet the mark of that stan-
dard, only to have their designs second guessed and their respon-
sibility expanded case by case, perhaps inconsistently, in court-
rooms by jurors with little or no expertise and in emotional
settings affected too often by pitiful injuries and heartrending
human suffering.2 16
One partial solution, as suggested by a Nebraska case,21 7 is to
preclude an action in strict liability where there is compliance with
refusal to submit the case to the jury on a strict liability theory, the McDaniel court stated:
While approval by the Food and Drug Administration is not necessarily conclu-
sive, its determinations, based upon the opinions and judgment of its own experts,
should not be subject to challenge in a product liability case simply because some
other experts may differ in their opinions as to whether a particular drug is rea-
sonably safe, unless there is some proof of fraud or nondisclosure of relevant infor-
mation by the manufacturer at the time of obtaining or retaining such federal
approval.
Id. at 200, 241 N.W.2d at 828. Moreover, the court noted that the "issue was presented to
the Food and Drug Administration in 1968. Its determination is persuasive and controlling
in the absence of evidence that the determination was based upon inaccurate, incomplete,
misleading or fraudulent information." Id. at 201, 241 N.W.2d at 828. In Jones v. Hittle
Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976), the court asserted that the personal opinion
of an expert, "qualified though he might be in the general field, cannot be considered 'sub-
stantial' evidence of a deficiency in the standard" where there is compliance with a substan-
tial legislative standard. Id. at 633, 549 P.2d at 1391. See also Bruce v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs' expert testimony conflicted with CAA
regulations which were relied on by the court to affirm summary judgment in favor of air-
plane manufacturer).
One commentator illustrated the same principles in the automobile area regarding the
airbag. Raleigh, supra note 25, at 261. He noted that if the airbag is not required:
[P]laintiffs may be expected to claim that manufacturers should have made it
standard equipment anyway, and if the airbag is mandated, they may be expected
to attempt to prove that manufacturers should have provided them last year, or
last week, or five minutes before their client purchased his car.
Id.
215 See, e.g., Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1978).
See also note 35 supra.
I Raleigh, supra note 25, at 261 (footnote omitted). See also Henderson, Judicial Re-
view of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, supra note
40, at 1531-34; text accompanying notes 50-64 supra.
21, McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 200-01, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828
(1976). For a discussion of McDaniel, see note 214 supra.
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mandatory government standards. If the claim is that, notwith-
standing compliance with the government standard, something
more should have been done, the claimant, in effect, calls into
question the manufacturer's conduct. Thus, the allegation is actu-
ally that it was negligent not to do more. When the agency stan-
dard is challenged, the claimant is really impugning the decisions
or conduct not only of the defendant-manufacturer but also the
government, the expert agency, and perhaps the entire industry.
Under these circumstances, the essence of the claim is the failure
to exercise reasonable care. Thus, strict liability counts should be
dismissed.21 8
It should be apparent from the preceding cases that the same
reasonableness factors normally found in negligence cases also ap-
pear in many strict liability cases. Strict liability, however, lacks
uniformity, confuses trial judges, attorneys, litigants, and jurors,
and possibly impresses upon the public the belief that negligence
criteria are improper in a design claim based upon strict liabil-
ity.21" In reality, negligence criteria are quite good for design con-
218 See Hoenig, Compliance With Government Standards, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1977, at
2, col. 3. The preclusion of strict liability when there is compliance with a standard does not
conflict with the venerable pronouncement of Judge Learned Hand that "a whole calling
may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices." The T.J. Hooper, 60
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). This statement, made in a negligence case, simply means that a
finding that a defendant has been negligent is not precluded by the fact that others in the
industry also may have violated the standard of reasonable care. A claimant nevertheless
might be permitted to prove that the defendant, as well as the industry, was negligent be-
cause reasonable care required greater precautions than were taken.
219 An example of a court's aversion to negligence criteria in strict liability cases can be
found in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60 n.12, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 n.12
(1978). In Azzarello, the court suggested that the jury should be instructed that the supplier
of a product "is the guarantor of its safety." Moreover, the court posited that the product
should "be provided with every element necessary to make it safe" and "without any condi-
tion that makes it unsafe." Id. The Azzarello court has been sharply criticized because it
took the "unreasonably dangerous" determination away from the jury. See, e.g., Birnbaum,
supra note 44, at 636-39 (decision is troubling because it precludes consideration by the jury
of reasonableness); Henderson, Products Liability, 2 CoRP. L. REV. 246, 248 (1979) (test
proposed is absurd and unworkable). Another example of a court's reluctance to apply gen-
eral negligence principles is Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978), where the court held that once a plaintiff shows that the design, not the
defect, caused the injury, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the de-
sign's advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 440, 143 Cal. Rptr.
at 238. Barker has been criticized because it did not require the plaintiff to prove an alter-
native design which could meet the "risk-utility" test. In addition, it has been said that the
court violated the canon that a party should not have the burden of proving a negative. See
Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 468 (1979).
Another commentator suggests that Barker represents all that is unwise in design defect
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troversies because they allow the factfinder to consider all relevant
circumstances under a test familiar to all. They also provide the
manufacturer with an incentive to exercise reasonable care. If
courts remain unwilling to shed strict liability for design cases,
they should at least strengthen the role of reasonableness criteria
under the strict liability label they prefer. Fortunately, there are
some signs that this is happening in crashworthiness cases.
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF
IN THE CRASHWORTHINESS SUIT
Proof of a "Safer" Practicable Alternative Design
To keep the defective design inquiry from becoming a mere
"roll of the dice" or "coin-flipping" exercise, the courts increas-
ingly are imposing meaningful requirements of proof~regarding the
defect and enhancement issues. A claim of "defect" which lacks
dignified evidentiary content should not be submitted to a jury.
Therefore, the rule has emerged that plaintiffs must present quali-
tative evidence of a safer alternative design. The proposed alterna-
tive must not only be possible but practicably feasible or reason-
ably achievable. A major crashworthiness case, Huddell v. Levin,22 °
illustrates this point.
In Huddell, an action was instituted against a manufacturer
on behalf of a driver who was killed when his vehicle was struck in
the rear at high speed. The plaintiff claimed that the decedent suf-
fered a fractured skull due to impact against the seat's head
restraint. At trial, the plaintiff's experts testified that the head re-
straint was defective because its unyielding metal edge concen-
trated excessive force against the rear of the skull. Specifically, it
was contended that a flat surface would have distributed the forces
of the impact more evenly than the thin metal contained within
the headrest.2 21 The defendant's expert witnesses contested this
theory by emphasizing the violent, high-speed nature of the colli-
litigation, because it makes all product-related accidents presumptively actionable. Epstein,
supra note 44, at 650-52.
220 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
221 Id. at 735. In Huddell, the expert witness, a doctor, testified that the design of the
headrest would allow for an excessive concentration of force on the head. In his opinion,
therefore, the headrest was defective. Additionally, the expert proposed a curved structure
which would contour to the head and distribute the force. Id. Recognizing the limitations of
opinion evidence, the Huddell court nevertheless concluded that when the issue involved is
the product's design, only an expert could establish defectiveness. Id. at 735-36.
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sion. A second key factor stressed by the defense was that the head
restraint metal was not deformed. There was, however, deforma-
tion near the rear window header of the accident vehicle that cor-
responded to a dummy's skull imprint achieved in rear crash tests.
The defendant suggested that this deformation indicated that the
decedent received his fatal blow not on the head restraint, as
claimed, but by contact with the rear portion of the vehicle. Al-
though the Third Circuit was troubled by the plaintiff's inability to
explain this point,222 it viewed the conflicting theories as sufficient
to present a factual dispute.
The court then analyzed the nature of the crashworthiness or
second collision case and observed that, unlike "orthodox" prod-
ucts liability litigation, a crashworthiness claim impugns the design
of an automobile and requires a "highly refined" and almost invar-
iably difficult presentation of three elements of proof. First, "in es-
tablishing that the design in question was defective, the plaintiff
must offer proof of an alternative, safer design, practicable under
the circumstances. ' 2 3 Second, the claimant in an enhanced injury
case must prove that the defective design caused injuries over and
above those which otherwise would have been sustained, must
demonstrate the degree of "enhancement," and "must offer proof
of what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternative,
safer design been used."224 Third, the plaintiff must offer "some
method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable
to the defective design. '225 By way of explanation, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that the first aspect of proof relates directly to the de-
sign issue while the second and third items relate, respectively, to
proximate cause and to the extent of the enhanced injuries. The
Huddell court found that the plaintiff satisfied the first require-
ment, proof of an alternative design, because the claimant's expert
witness not only explained how the restraint in question could
have been made safer but also introduced into evidence head re-
straints manufactured by others which he asserted were "better
222 537 F.2d at 737.
22 Id. at 737.
224 Id. In Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-62 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979), the court adopted the three-part test enunciated in Huddell. In
Jeng, a lower court holding for the defendant automobile manufacturer was upheld because
the plaintiff failed to submit adequate evidence on which a jury could have decided what
injuries would have resulted had a safer design been used. Id. at 1362.
222 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
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designed." '226 The court, however, reversed the judgment because
there was insufficient evidence of the second and third required
elements of proof.
Not all alternative designs will pass muster, however. For ex-
ample, in Dreisonstok,227 the proof of an alternative design totally
"missed the mark." In Dreisonstok, the claimant's expert witness
compared the "crash space" of a van with that of a "standard
American passenger car." The experts had measured the car and
concluded that the passenger car's front compartment would not
have been invaded in a 40-mile-per-hour impact. The appellate
court discounted this methodology because no tests had been made
by the experts to confirm their conclusions.2 Moreover, the court
observed that the experts neglected to consider the "special pur-
pose and character of the particular type of vehicle [involved],"
noting that "a microbus is no more to be compared with a stan-
dard 1966 passenger type car than the convertible instanced in
Dyson is to be compared with a standard hard-top passenger
car. '229 In shQrt, the court found that the plaintiff's proof of a safer
alternative design was neither realistic nor practicable and, there-
fore, was legally insufficient.
The alternative design requirement also was considered in
Baker v. Chrysler Corp.28 0 In Baker, the plaintiff was struck by a
car travelling at 20 to 25 miles per hour. It was claimed that the
plaintiff's leg injury was enhanced by an allegedly uncrashworthy
exterior design. The appellate court affirmed a jury verdict in favor
of the manufacturer. Notwithstanding that the question presented
to the jury was "whether an alternative design of the front end of
the . . . automobile would have mitigated or eliminated the inju-
226 Id. at 732. Similar proof of an alternative design was presented in Dawson v.
Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). In Daw-
son, the claimants' experts testified that the side frame used in the accident vehicle could
have been replaced by an alternative side structure which was "known in the industry well
before the accident and had been tested by a number of independent testing centers." Id.
The experts also introduced test reports on side collisions of cars having frame improve-
ments similar to those proposed. The study concluded that the improvements demonstrated
a "dramatic increase in occupant protection." Id. This evidence was deemed sufficient.
227 See notes 152-166 and accompanying text supra.
228 Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1075 (4th Cir. 1974).
229 Id. at 1076. The requirement to consider a particular vehicle's class or intrinsic char-
acteristics is also reflected in the Safety Act. See note 162 supra. In large measure this
requirement stems from logic and considerations of reasonableness or practicability.
230 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1976).
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ries suffered by appellant,"2 3 ' the court emphasized that the mere
possibility of an alternative design was not the governing test. The
reasonableness of an alternative design depends upon several fac-
tors, such as whether the design can be produced, the availability
of materials,2"2 and the cost of implementing that design. The
court noted that these factors must be considered in determining
whether a design "can be characterized as defective.1213  Clearly,
however, requiring evidence of practicable alternative designs does
not enlarge the plaintiff's burden of proof. Indeed, "an injured
plaintiff has always had the burden to prove the existence of the
defect. The reasonableness of alternative designs . . . is part of
that burden. '23 4
The requirement of proving a practical alternative design
sometimes is linked to the utility or functional characteristics of
the product. Thus, if the alternative proposal would impair the
product's functional characteristics or impart a new danger to
users, the required proof of defective design has not been
presented.2 35 In Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co., 256 for example,
the claimant alleged that an industrial saw equipped with a remov-
able safety device was defective in design because permanently at-
tached guards were safer and were available at the time the saw
was made. The appellate court, however, ruled that a directed ver-
.31 Id. at 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49.
13 Id. at 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 749. See note 229 supra.
233 55 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
23 Id. But see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978); note 22 supra. The Barker court determined that because of
evidentiary matters relevant to the determination of alternative designs, the burden of proof
that the product was not defective should shift to the defendant once the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing of proximate cause. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
237. This result has justifiably been criticized. See note 219 supra.
" See Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 764-66 (D.N.D. 1972). The
plaintiff in Olson alleged that a snowmobile was defective because it failed to provide ade-
quate shielding from the track and sprocket. Additionally, no handholds were provided for
passengers. Id. at 763. Evidence produced by the defendant demonstrated that more shield-
ing around the track would make the machine sink in snow, thereby preventing the expul-
sion of foreign objects that might enter the track. Id. at 765. The defendant's expert testi-
fied that flexible handholds were not available when the snowmobile was designed and rigid
handholds would increase the risk that the rider would become entangled. Id. at 766. The
evidence tended to show, therefore, that the manufacturer had attempted to make the
snowmobile safe. Id. at 765; cf. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 836
(Wyo. 1974) (counts of negligent design dismissed against distributor and manufacturers of
tractor and trailer because additional safety device was not available at the time the unit
was manufactured and there was no evidence of feasibility).
236 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
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dict should have been granted the manufacturer because the pro-
posed design would have impaired the functionality of the saw.
The court stated that "[t]he evidence is overwhelming that perma-
nent attachment of the blade guard assembly would seriously im-
pair the usefulness of the defendant's product. Texas law does not
require a manufacturer to destroy the utility of his product in or-
der to make it safe. '23 7 The court noted that safety concerns about
a particular product must be balanced against "the realities of a
competitive market place. 238
Occasionally, even the existence of a feasible alternative safer
design will be insufficient to justify liability. One such case arises
when a consumer is aware of the particular condition but is intent
upon purchasing the less safe product. In Curtis v. General Motors
Corp.,2 39 the plaintiff had purchased a four-wheel drive vehicle
that Was equipped with a removable fiberglass top. Other body
styles of the same vehicle were available, including one with a steel
top. While in operation, the vehicle rolled over and skidded, crack-
ing and separating the fiberglass roof. The plaintiff claimed that
his injuries Were enhanced by an inadequate roof design and could
have been avoided by the installation of a rollbar or other roof sup-
ports. The manufacturer conceded that the fiberglass roof was not
expected to withstand a severe rollover and that a rollbar would
have been a feasible alternative or accessory.240 These concessions,
however, were not held to compel liability. Indeed, the court stated
that the plaintiff could not recover "merely because a feasible al-
ternative would have rendered the product safer" since he had de-
liberately chosen a product which was not "as safe as others on the
market."' 241 Observing that the vehicle had been purchased as a
convertible, the court felt that the plaintiff could not subsequently
assert that his vehicle should have contained the rollover protec-
tion available in a standard car.242 Moreover, the court remarked
that since the product was a "special purpose vehicle" and was to
be marketed with different tops, design compromise was necessary.
The court reasoned that "[i]f there be no compromise and only the
237 Id. at 101.
238 Id. Market realities may also include the factor of price. See Note, Liability for
Negligent Automobile Design, 52 IowA L. REv. 953, 972 (1967).
239 649 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1981).
2,0 Id. at 810.
241 Id. at 811.
242 Id. (citing Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d at 1075).
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very safest can be marketed, there obviously would be no choice
for the buyer as the less safe options would be eliminated."24 The
court stated, therefore, that the concept of reasonableness includes
the relative ability of the user to participate in decisions concern-
ing how much safety he is willing to purchase and thereby places
limits on the manufacturer's liability. The court stressed that be-
cause all choices cannot provide the same degree of safety, the ap-
plication of the reasonableness standard must entail consideration
of the special purpose of the vehicle. Since the jury in Curtis had
not been properly instructed regarding this element, the verdict for
plaintiff was set aside. 44
The need to prove a practicable alternative design was ad-
vanced forcefully by the Oregon Supreme Court in Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.,245 a suit involving the crash of a small airplane
equipped with a carbureted engine. The plaintiffs' theory was that
the carburetor was susceptible to ice formation, a condition which
could cause engine failure. A fuel-injected engine, however, does
not have this vulnerability. The plaintiffs offered evidence that the
probable cause of the crash was an engine failure caused by carbu-
retor icing. The defense retorted by emphasizing the plane's com-
pliance with FAA safety standards and that agency's issuance of an
airworthiness certificate. The defense also introduced evidence
demonstrating that eighty to ninety percent of comparable aircraft
were manufactured with carbureted rather than fuel-injected en-
gines. The jury, however, found a defect and awarded the plaintiffs
a substantial verdict.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon focused upon the
showing required of a plaintiff in a design defect case. A prima
facie case, the court noted, requires a claimant to prove the availa-
bility of an "alternative, safer design, practicable under the cir-
cumstances. 2 46 According to the court, the burden of proving
practicable feasibility involves a showing that "in terms of cost,
practicality and technological possibility, the alternative design
... 649 F.2d at 811.
244 Id. at 812-13. When a buyer elects to purchase an inexpensive used car lacking mod-
ern safety features found in newer but more costly models, he, like the plaintiff in Curtis,
makes a decision about how much safety he is willing to purchase and, thereby places limits
on the manufacturer's liability.
"' 282 Or. 61, 67-68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978).
24. Id. at 67, 577. P.2d at 1326 (citing Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir.
1976)).
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was feasible-mere 'technical possibility' is insufficient."2 7 The
court, therefore, must determine whether risk-utility balancing
shows the alternative design to be practicable. 4" The court noted
that in complex cases, the question of practicability cannot prop-
erly be weighed by jurors "solely on the basis of inference and
common knowledge." 249 Rather, the court must be "satisfied" that
there is evidence from which the jury could find the proposed al-
ternatives are not only feasible "but also practicable in terms of
cost and the over-all design and operation of the product. '250 Since
the Wilson plaintiffs only showed possible feasibility of the alter-
native fuel injection engine, the court felt that they did not prove
the actual practicability of an alternative design. Indeed, there was
no evidence "about what effect the substitution of a fuel injected
engine in this airplane's design would have had upon the airplane's
cost, economy of operation, maintenance requirements, over-all
performance, or safety in respects other than susceptibility to ic-
ing."25 Because the requisite proof of practicability of an alterna-
tive design was insufficient, the court reversed the verdict.252
47 282 Or. at 67, 577 P.2d at 1326 (citing Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744
(7th Cir. 1974)). The Lolie court stated that the plaintiff must demonstrate: "1) the product
as designed is incapable of preventing the injury complained of; 2) there existed an alterna-
tive design which would have prevented the injury; and 3) in terms of cost, practicality and
technological possibility, the alternative design was feasible." Id.
2'48 Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978).
240 577 P.2d at 1327.
250 Id.
221 Id. The plaintiff's own expert testified that the carbureted engine was highly satis-
factory and dependable except for its susceptibility to icing. Id.
202 Significantly, the Wilson court noted the influence of the airplane's compliance with
FAA standards:
We also think it is significant that both in 1966, when this airplane was manu-
factured, and at the present time the FAA safety standards disclose that the
agency was aware of the carburetor icing problems and provided for them in its
regulations and yet determined that the use of carbureted engines was not unduly
dangerous. Although we have held that compliance. . . does not preclude the pos-
sibility of liability for a design defect, we nevertheless believe that in a field as
closely regulated as aircraft design and manufacture, it is proper to take into con-
sideration, in determining whether plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence of
defect to go to the jury, the fact that the regulatory agency has approved the very
design of which they complain after considering the dangers involved.
Id. at 70-71, 577 P.2d at 1327-28 (footnote omitted). See also notes 221-225 and accompany-
ing text supra. The position of the concurring judge on the effect of compliance with the
FAA standards was perhaps more deferential to the standards. When the design of a prod-
uct is subject to prescribed performance standards as well as government supervised testing
and safety approval, "no further balance whether the product design is 'unreasonably dan-
gerous'. . . needs to be struck by a court or a jury unless" the safety standard is less inclu-
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The cases discussed above do not impose new burdens upon
litigants. They simply require that claimants offer sufficient proof
of a defective design. Given the vagaries and shifting interpreta-
tions of strict tort liability, the emerging requirement to place
"flesh on the strict liability skeleton" before a case may be submit-
ted to a jury is a healthy step in the right direction.
Proof of Injury "Enhancement"
Another element to be proved in a crashworthiness case is
whether the alleged design defect proximately caused the plain-
tiff's enhanced injuries, since crashworthiness liability encompasses
only those injuries sustained over and above what would have oc-
curred absent a defective design.53 In other words, there must be a
nexus between the design defect and injuries incurred.25 4 Gener-
ally, the existence of such a nexus is proved through a showing
that if a different design had been used, enhanced injuries would
not have occurred.255
A number of significant cases demonstrate this proposition. In
Huddell,21" for instance, it was alleged that a defectively designed
sive than products law or the agency did not address the allegedly defective element. 577
P.2d at 1334-35 (Linde, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). In Wilson, the FAA regula-
tions and approval seemed likely to be equivalent to the demands of the common law.
2' Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). See notes 1-3
supra. Because the "normal risk of driving must be accepted by the user," enhanced injury
liability refers only to the "unreasonable risk of injury due to negligence in design." Id. at
505.
25. See note 3 supra.
'5' See notes 220-223 and accompanying text supra.
256 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976). Huddell states that a manufac-
turer will be liable only for those injuries which are over and above what would have oc-
curred absent the defective design. This premise necessarily contemplates a showing of (1)
the proposed, safer alternative, and (2) the damages that would have been eliminated by the
design alternative. Thus, the Huddell formulation imposes neither a rigorous addition to
normal proof burdens nor a mechanical approach to proof at trial. On the contrary, the
requirements of proof postulated by the Huddell court merely describe in logical terms the
practical showing that must be made in any design case scaled down proportionally to fit
the peculiar nature of this liability. To illustrate, if a claimant alleged that a seatbelt design
was defective he must show sufficiently how and why that was so. This entails a showing of
what alternative restraint design or device should have been employed in place of the criti-
cized seatbelt. For example, it might be proposed that airbags should have been used in the
place of conventional restraints. Assuming a sufficient showing of practicable feasibility of
this alternative, thereby warranting submission of the defective design issue to the jury, the
claimant must still prove the elements of proximate causation and damages. How does he
prove the causation of injuries over and above those occurring absent the design defect and
the extent of such increase? Obviously, the claimant must show what actually did occur as
well as what would have occurred using the airbag alternative. With a sufficient showing on
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head restraint failed to provide sufficient protection in a rear end
collision. Although the court decided that sufficient evidence of a
practical, safer alternative design had been proffered,257 it never-
theless held that the plaintiff's proof on the "enhancement causa-
tion" issue was legally insufficient 2 8 because of a failure to estab-
lish "what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternative,
safer design been used." '259 The court noted that the plaintiff's ex-
pert witnesses had testified merely that the accident would have
been survivable without indicating the specific meaning of the
term and without offering testimony "as to the extent of injuries, if
any, which would have resulted in a survivable crash. ' 260 As the
court stated, "[i]t was not established whether the hypothetical
victim of the survivable crash would have sustained no injuries,
temporary injuries, permanent but insignificant injuries, extensive
and permanent injuries, or, possibly, paraplegia or quad-
riplegia.' ' 26 1 The court concluded that the plaintiff, by failing to
establish what injuries would have resulted had a nondefective
head restraint been used, "could not and did not establish what
[additional] injuries resulted from the alleged defect in the head
restraint. 26 2
The requirement of proving enhancement also is discussed in
Yetter v. Rajeski.26s In Yetter, a 1965 subcompact driven by the
plaintiff's decedent crashed at high speed into the rear of a 1964
luxury car. The plaintiff's experts theorized that the front end of
the subcompact should have had different dimensions, different
these points the factfinder would then have some rational basis on which to decide the en-
hancement claim. Thus, the Huddell court's formulation of three elements of proof, id. at
737-38, cogently describes, in understandable language, the basic elements of the cause of
action. The three requirements do not burden the plaintiff, but do advise him how to prove
his case beyond speculation. Id.
257 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976); see note 233 and accompanying
text supra.
2158 537 F.2d at 737.
259 Id.
210 Id. at 738. Some authority exists for distinguishing the enhancement burden in
death cases to allow mere proof of general enhancement plus "survivability" with the alter-
native design. Such rationales, however, appear to erroneously confuse the difficulty of ap-
portionment of injury causation in death cases among tortfeasors-between the first colli-
sion and the second collision-with the more appropriate concept of enhancement, which
simply involves a determination of the injuries over and above what would have occurred
without the defect. See note 292 infra.
268 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
262 Id.
263 364 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.N.J. 1973).
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structures, a different engine location, and a "collapsible steering
column. ' 26 4 Although no 1965 car had such a steering mechanism,
the experts testified that the device was known in the industry.
The court considered both duty and proximate causation issues
and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Regard-
ing the question of enhancement the court observed:
[I]t is absolutely necessary that the jury be presented with some
evidence as to the extent of injuries, if any, which would have
been suffered by [the decedent] had the plaintiff's hypothetical
design been installed in the [vehicle]. The jury, without such tes-
timony, is left only to speculate as to the injuries [the decedent]
would have suffered if the energy-absorbing steering column had,
in fact, been installed, and this could only have been established
by competent medical testimony as to the forces which the
human body could withstand without injury, or without injury to
the extent suffered by [the decedent].26 5
Because the plaintiff's evidence, even assuming defective design,
was insufficient to prove how and to what extent the alternative
design would have mitigated the injury, consideration of the issue
by the jury would have been speculative. The result reached by the
court is neither surprising nor illogical. Since the unreasonableness
of the design was in issue, it was both logical and fair to require
the plaintiff to offer sufficient proof regarding how and to what
extent his injuries would have been minimized without the alleg-
edly unreasonable feature. This element of proof inheres in the
cause of action itself.
In Jeng v. Witters, s6 passengers were thrown from an auto-
mobile which had collided with another car. The plaintiffs alleged
that, due to a defective door latch design, the latch plate broke and
allowed occupant ejection. The defense contended that the break-
age of the latch plate did not reflect a defect because of the over-
284 Id. at 108. In Yetter, the subcompact's driver was taken to a hospital where he was
treated for several days. The treating physician testified in his deposition that there was no
clinical indication of crushing or lacerating injuries. After several days of treatment, how-
ever, the driver suddenly expired in the hospital. The post-mortem examination revealed
fractured ribs and hemothorax but confirmed that no vital organs were crushed or lacerated.
Id. at 107.
2 5 Id. at 109. The failure in proof went to the essence of the claim. There was "no
testimony from a medical standpoint that, given the installation of the plaintiff's hypotheti-
cal steering wheel design," the decedent's chest "would have been able to withstand the
injuries actually sustained, or that the injuries would have been substantially reduced." Id.
28 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978), afl'd mem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979).
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whelming forces exerted in the accident.6 7 The severity of an acci-
dent, observed the court, is an important factor in defining liability
in crashworthiness cases. The court noted, for example, that if a
car door opens "due to a violent collision" then the proximate
cause of the injury is not the door latch.268 Indeed, the court re-
marked that when the degree of accident severity is close enough
to warrant jury consideration, the need to prove enhancement be-
comes especially important. The court felt that without such proof,
a jury conclusion that enhancement actually occurred would be un-
justified because the injuries sustained might have been attributa-
ble to the severity of the impact. Upon stating these evidentiary
principles the court in Jeng scrutinized the proof respecting en-
hancement and found it to be "negligible. '269 The court stressed
that the plaintiffs' engineering expert testified merely about the
general dangers of ejection while their medical expert "could not
say for sure whether the same or similar injuries would have oc-
curred had the occupants remained in the car."270 Under these cir-
cumstances, the court concluded that there was no basis upon
which the jury could find enhancement.
A similar failure of proof occurred in Curtis v. General Motors
Corp. 1 In Curtis, the cause of the plaintiff's back injury was not
shown. The plaintiff's medical witness "could not ascertain the
cause of the disc injury with any degree of medical certainty" and
conceded that "you could be killed, you know, turning a car over
with a good roll bar. 2 72 Reasoning that "[t]he jury could not ex-
press a lay opinion as to the cause of the injury when the medical
witness was unable to express an expert opinion, 273 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the evidence was legally insufficient. Expert medical
testimony consisting of opinions such as "might have," "may
have," or "could have" is not sufficient to submit the case to the
117 452 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
"I Id. at 1358 (citing Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1976) (em-
phasis in original)).
"1 452 F. Supp. at 1361.
270 Id. at 1361-62.
271 649 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1971); see notes 238-244 and accompanying text supra.
272 Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1971). The trial judge
in Curtis stated, during post-trial hearings, that "[n]obody knows from this record, from
any expert as to what caused which injury." Id. at 813. Indeed, the circuit court elaborated
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jury because "such testimony leaves the issue in the field of conjec-
ture and permits the jury to speculate or guess. '27 4 Definitive ex-
pert opinion is an absolute requirement.
In some instances, allegations of multiple crashworthiness de-
fects complicate the complainant's burden of proof on the en-
hancement issue. The overall picture also may become more com-
plex if the claimant had failed to wear a seat belt since the device
mitigates second collision injuries.2 75 Both of these factors are illus-
trated in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.276 In Caiazzo, the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the plaintiffs' judgment due to insufficient
proof and ordered a new trial on the issue of enhancement. The
plaintiffs were the driver and passenger of a van struck in the rear
by another car at high speed. The impact caused the van to turn
over and eject the occupants. They sued the manufacturer for un-
crashworthy seat design, alleging that this condition severely ag-
gravated the driver's injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that a de-
fective door latch assembly caused the ejection-related enhanced
injuries. The jury found no defect in the seat design but rendered a
substantial enhancement verdict on the door latch issue, reducing
the award by twenty-five percent because the occupants failed to
wear seatbelts.2 "
On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs'
failure to wear seat belts was highly significant because both par-
ties' experts agreed that ejection would not have occurred if the
belts had been used.278 The court observed, therefore, that if the
enhanced injuries resulted from ejection, prevention of the ejection
271 Id. (quoting Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 186 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 1951)).
276 Evidence of failure to wear a seatbelt is admissible to show the availability of com-
pensating safety devices and the nondefectiveness of the vehicle as an integrated whole. See
Binion v. General Motors Corp., No. 80-1998 (5th Cir. April 8, 1981); Wilson v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 746, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 392-93 (1978). Failure to wear a
seatbelt also is admissible evidence with respect to mitigation of second collision injuries,
see Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 252 (2d Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1978), misuse and assumption of risk,
see Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 799-800 (8th Cir. 1976); General Motors Corp. v.
Walden, 406 F.2d 606, 609 (10th Cir. 1969); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305,
309 (1978), and proximate cause, see Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 955 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). For a recent discussion of legal issues affecting
seatbelts, see Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 217, 246-73 (1980).
276 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
277 Id. at 244.
278 Id. at 248-49.
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itself would have averted the enhancement. Under these circum-
stances, the court reasoned, the jury's finding that nonuse of the
seatbelts merited only a twenty-five percent reduction in damages
simply did "not make sense. ' 27 9 Moreover, the Second Circuit
noted that because the most serious of the driver's injuries were
proven to have occurred inside the van, the verdict for ejection-
related enhancement was too laden with inconsistencies to be up-
held. 80 The court stated that "the plaintiff should be required to
prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defec-
tive design" and that such evidence "will generally, perhaps even
necessarily, be in the form of expert testimony."2 The court de-
clared that it is legally insufficient to establish merely a general
"fact of enhancement" without showing the actual nature and ex-
tent of the injuries aggravated. Indeed, the court commented that
such a vague showing would permit jurors "to engage in undue
speculation as to the causes of various injuries" and gives the jury
"dangerous latitude in assigning responsibility to the defendant
who appears most able to pay a plaintiff's award." 28 2 The court
recognized that the claimant's burden to offer evidence "of what
injuries would have resulted absent the alleged defect" would
sometimes be "heavy" and occasionally "impossible." 283 Nonethe-
less, the court felt that "the theoretical underpinnings of the sec-
ond collision doctrine" require this burden to avoid speculation,2 84
since a failure of proof simply accentuates the probability that the
279 Id. at 249.
280 Id. The plaintiff-driver contended that the most serious of her injuries was caused
by a seat design defect. Id. at 244 n.5. Thus, when the jury rejected the seat design claim, it
had no rational basis for awarding damages since those injuries could not be attributed to
the ejection. Moreover, the plaintiff's claims based on her ejection-related injuries were vul-
nerable because her own experts conceded that the seatbelts would have prevented ejection.
Id. at 248-49. These factors were viewed as creating fundamental "inconsistencies in the
jury verdict" which could not stand. Id. at 249. For the breakdown of damages awarded and
reduced, see id. at 244.
281 Id. at 250. The Second Circuit's requirement that a claimant prove the extent to
which second collision injuries are attributable to defective design seems particutarly appro-
priate in Caiazzo, since the use of seatbelts "would have eliminated most, if not all, of the
enhanced injuries." Id.
12 Id. at 250-51. The Caiazzo court illustrated the problem with an analysis of the
"thin" evidence on enhancement which barely survived a directed verdict. Id. at 251. "With-
out evidence as to what injuries would have resulted had the Caiazzos not been ejected, the
jury had to speculate and hypothesize as to which injuries resulted from the defective door
design. The disharmony between the jury's verdict and the evidence ...exemplifies the
problem with this approach." Id.
218 Id. at 251.
2" Id. at 246.
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design did not cause the enhancement:
Where [proof] is impossible, however, the plaintiff has merely
failed to establish his prima facie case, i.e., that it is more proba-
ble than not that the alleged defect aggravated or enhanced the
injuries resulting from the initial collision. Moreover, in those in-
stances in which the plaintiff cannot offer any evidence as to what
would have occurred but for the alleged defect, the plaintiff has
not established the fact of enhancement at all.285
In some cases, expert medical testimony may sufficiently prove
the nature of the injuries incurred, but contradict the plaintiff's
theory regarding the causal relationships between the defect and
the alleged enhancement. Under such circumstances, because the
claimant has not proved causation, a directed verdict is in order. In
Soileau v. Ford Motor Co., 286 the Fifth Circuit, affirming a jury's
verdict for the defendant, noted that a directed verdict would have
been appropriate because of the plaintiff's failure to offer sufficient
proof of causation. In Soileau, the plaintiff's car went out of con-
trol, spun around and crashed rearwards at high speed into a con-
crete culvert. The plaintiff alleged that because of a design defect,
his seat collapsed upon impact and he was thrust into the back
seat of the car. The plaintiff testified that he had struck his head
after being thrown into the back seat, and suffered a broken neck
and damaged spinal cord. The plaintiff's description of the occur-
rence was consistent with a "hyperflexation injury" mechanism
wherein the head is pushed down to the chest. The plaintiff's
treating neurosurgeon, however, testified that the claimant suf-
fered a hyperextension injury in which the head is pushed back-
wards toward the spinal column. The plaintiff's expert conceded
that such an injury "could have resulted simply from the impact of
a car travelling backwards and colliding with a fixed object. 2 87
The defense medical expert testified that the injury was an axial
loading fracture caused by a blow to the top of the head that forces
the head downwards on the spine. This supported the defense the-
ory that the plaintiff struck his head on the roof of the car. Thus,
the testimony of both physicians "contradicted plaintiff's recollec-
tion of how his injury occurred. 2 8 After an adverse jury verdict,
28 Id. at 251.
286 639 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1981).




the plaintiff appealed, contending that various rulings by the trial
court were erroneous. The Fifth Circuit, however, found no need to
address these issues because it had "little doubt about the insuffi-
ciency of [the plaintiff's] proof that the alleged defect caused his
injuries. '289 The evidence on causation was so insufficient, the
court noted, that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for
the defendant.29 °
The False Burden of Proof Issue
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority that the burden
289 Id. at 215. Similar skepticism about the claimant's theory is reflected in the Huddell
case. In Huddell, the court expressed uneasiness about the plaintiff's inability to explain the
lack of deformation on the metal of the head restraint and the existence of a head imprint
mark in the rear window compartment area. See notes 214 & 215 and accompanying text
supra.
290 639 F.2d at 216. The degree of enhancement proof necessary to show evidentiary
sufficiency varies with the facts and the circumstances of a given case. In fire upon impact
cases, where the damages sought are only for burn injuries, the relationship between the
alleged defect (fuel system) and the plaintiff's enhanced injuries (burns) is apparent. E.g.,
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 267 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) (the
court found substantial evidence that all proven injuries occurred as a result of fire);
Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 54, 374 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1978) (parties stipulated plaintiff's
injuries caused entirely by burns); Oberman v. Alexander's Rent-A-Car, 56 App. Div. 2d 814,
814, 392 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (1st Dep't 1977). The plaintiff ordinarily claims that the burn
injuries would not have occurred absent the fuel system defect. Even in burn injury cases,
however, enhancement issues play a key role because the severity of burn injuries may have
resulted, for example, from a claimant's failure to wear a seatbelt. Indeed, a car occupant
who fails to wear a seatbelt may sustain "second collision" trauma rendering him uncon-
scious. This will cause him to fail to exit the vehicle or make efforts to extricate him more
difficult. In such cases, although the fire resulting from fuel system leakage may be responsi-
ble for bum injuries, the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries is the failure to use the
seatbelt.
When the plaintiff's expert evidence demonstrates that there would have been little or
no injury absent the defect, the claimant's evidentiary burden is ameliorated. This is be-
cause the plaintiff, in effect, is claiming that all the injuries were caused by the defect. See
Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 589-90, 398 A.2d 490, 498-99, 501
(1979), rev'd on other grounds, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980) (plaintiff's expert testi-
fied that, absent the defect, plaintiff would not have suffered any injuries and court treated
plaintiff's evidence as "all or nothing" effort); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 199-
200, 205 N.W.2d 104, 106 (1973) (plaintiff's expert testified that if seatbelt webbing re-
mained intact and decedent would not have been ejected, the injuries in the rollover would
have been minor). A major and practical hurdle in alleging that, absent the defect, no other
injury would have occurred is the incredibility of such a position. Indeed, most jurors will
discern that serious injuries are likely to be incurred in any relatively severe collision. Addi-
tionally, when it is shown that the plaintiff had not been wearing a seatbelt, it should be
relatively easy for the defendant to prove that the plaintiff could not have escaped injury.
Thus, a claimant jeopardizes the credibility of his claim when he offers expert testimony
that no other injury would have occurred.
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of sufficiently proving enhancement is upon the plaintiff, 9' claim-
ants occasionally argue that the burden should be upon the defen-
dant to prove that an injury was not enhanced. These arguments
justifiably have been rejected.2 92 In Endicott v. Nissan Motor
291 Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981); Seese v. Volks-
wagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1981); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 960 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 798 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1363 (1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d
151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978) (burden on plaintiff to establish the extent of the injury he would
have suffered had the vehicle been properly designed); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.,
540 F.2d 762, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976);
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 256, 267 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976)
(plaintiffs must prove that the defects caused them to sustain damages that they would not
otherwise have sustained); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 182 (1st Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff must prove that defect was "the actual and proximate cause of injuries beyond
those caused by the collision itself"); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066,
1076 (4th Cir. 1974); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-62 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd
mem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270, 1281 (S.D.
Ohio 1975) (plaintiff's burden to prove that a defect caused enhanced injuries); Yetter v.
Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.N.J. 1973); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp.
1064, 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 366-67, 551 P.2d
398, 401, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81 (1976); Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917,
926-28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100-01 (1977); Buccery v. General Motor§ Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d
533, 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 (1976); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.
2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 576 (1981) (plaintiff must prove that enhancement of injuries was
proximately caused by an unreasonably dangerous defective product); Engberg v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 201, 205 N.W.2d 104, 106 (1973); Baumgardner v. American Motors
Corp., 83 Wash. 2d. 751, 758, 522 P.2d 829, 833 (1974) ("plaintiff has usual burdens of proof
... including proof of the nature and extent of the injuries proximately caused or
enhanced").
292 E.g., Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976); Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d
917, 926-28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100-02 (1977). See generally Foland, supra note 4, at 613-16;
note 291 supra.
In Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978), the court, with one judge
dissenting, recognized a responsibility on the part of the plaintiff to prove enhanced dam-
ages. Id. at 787. This duty, part of the plaintiff's general obligation to prove proximate
cause, serves to limit the manufacturer's liability to those injuries proximately caused by a
design defect. The court, however, proceeded to distinguish cases involving death, a
nondivisible injury. Id. While the Tenth Circuit in Fox accepted the principle that the
plaintiff must prove enhancement, a majority of the panel deemed evidence of survivability
sufficient in a death claim. This approach is similar to that taken by the concurring judge in
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 745 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn, J., concurring), who also was
influenced by the "indivisibility" of death, If the judges in Fox and the concurring judge in
Huddell had reasoned that death cases are different because death is, in effect, the "ulti-
mate" enhanced injury, they might have been on stronger ground. Instead, they appear to
have used the indivisibility of death rationale to reason that a jury could not apportion the
injuries between the first collision and the second collision. This is simply not the issue. The
premise of apportionment is a basic conceptual error inasmuch as there is no apportionment
between the tortfeasors' responsibility for injuries between the first and second collisions.
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Corp.,29 3 for example, a car went out of control on an icy road,
struck an embankment in a violent head-on impact and rolled
over. The plaintiff claimed that he suffered enhanced injuries be-
cause his allegedly defective seatbelt ruptured upon impact. Al-
though the plaintiff testified that he had been involved in a previ-
ous crash in which the belt had held, permitting him to walk away
uninjured, he could not produce any expert testimony proving that
his present injury would not have occurred absent the seatbelt rup-
ture. After a trial in which the plaintiff's allegations were contested
vigorously, the jury returned a verdict for the defense. On appeal,
it was contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
that the plaintiff was required to prove enhancement. The plaintiff
asserted that the burden was upon the defendant to prove that the
seatbelt rupture did not enhance his injuries. The appellate court
rejected this position:
No witness, including plaintiff's medical experts, could say with
any degree of certainty that plaintiff would not have sustained
severe and disabling injuries if the belt had not ruptured, and
plaintiff's medical expert even conceded the possibility that the
very back injury that plaintiff suffered could have so occurred.
What is more, the experts had great difficulty in reconstructing
the probable sequence of events in the accident, particularly with
reference to the exact point at which the belt ruptured. These
facts wholly preclude any demonstration of substantial prob-
ability of causal link between design of seat belt, and enhance-
ment of plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly the circumstances suffi-
cient to justify a shift in the burden of proof never arose.294
Moreover, the court stated that "no general rule exists in the field
of products liability requiring the manufacturer to prove a nega-
The tortfeasor who caused the crash is responsible for all the injuries and the manufacturer
is responsible only for the enhanced injuries. The conceptual underpinning in this area is
enhancement, viz., the extent to which injuries were aggravated over and above what would
have occurred absent the claimed defect. This requires a showing and finding of what would
have occurred in the way of injury mitigation if the plaintiff's proposed design alternative
had been used. It has absolutely nothing to do with apportioning liability between a negli-
gent tortfeasor and a manufacturer. See text accompanying notes 295-314 infra. Thus, even
in a death case, a showing of enhancement is no more taxing than in other cases. It is
understandable that the judges found apportionment of death between the first and second
collision difficult since such apportionment was never in issue in the first place. Evidence of
enhancement remains the key inquiry and has nothing to do with apportionment or divisi-
bility of the injury.
23 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1977).
I9 Id. at 927, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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tive-his non-causation of plaintiff's injuries." '
In Huddell v. Levin,296 the appellate court observed that the
essence of enhancement liability precludes a shifting of the burden
of proof to the manufacturer. The court explained that without
proving the injuries that would have resulted if a nondefective
head restraint had been used, a plaintiff cannot establish the en-
hanced injuries which actually resulted from the use of a defective
restraint. The Third Circuit deduced that without such proof a
jury cannot accurately assess the manufacturer's responsibility for
the injury over and above what would have occurred without the
claimed defect.2 7 In a cautionary statement the court stressed that
the "theoretical underpinnings" of crashworthiness liability make
the manufacturer liable only for "enhanced injuries," and that the
tortfeasor who caused the accident may be held liable for all inju-
ries, irrespective of the plaintiff's failure to prove enhancement. In-
deed, the court noted, tortfeasors and manufacturers are not tradi-
tional joint or concurrent tortfeasors. 29 s According to the court,
each has a separately cognizable responsibility flowing to the
claimant. Thus, the court remarked that should a plaintiff fail to
prove enhancement injuries, "the brute fact is that the negligent
driver would not escape liability on the same ground" because the
defendant-driver is liable for all the injuries sustained in the acci-
dent.2'9 Moreover, the Third Circuit commented that limited sec-
ond collision enhanced injury liability may not be converted into
"plenary liability for the entire consequences of an accident which
the automobile manufacturer played no part in precipitating."3 00
In addition to the foregoing doctrinal considerations, some
295 Id. at 928, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The court also noted that the evidence was so weak
that the plaintiff had failed to show the product to be defective. Id.
29 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
297 Id.
299 Id. at 738-39.
299 Id. The concurring judge in Huddell favored a shifting of the burden in death cases
even though he recognized that the negligent driver and the manufacturer "are not joint
tortfeasors." Id. at 744 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Death, according to this view, precluded
apportionment of the injuries among the tortfeasors. The conceptual error implicit in this
approach is discussed in note 292 supra & notes 300-314 and accompanying text infra.
If mere proof of survivability were sufficient in a death case to establish the manufac-
turer's liability for the death, then presumably the negligent defendants causing the acci-
dent in the first place "may be in a position to contend that they are not liable at all be-
cause, by plaintiff's own proof," their negligence "was survivable." 537 F.2d at 739. This
argument, commented the Huddell majority, "boggles the mind." Id.
300 537 F.2d at 739.
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very practical reasons exist which militate against shifting the bur-
den of proof from plaintiffs to defective design manufacturers.
These were forcefully advanced by the Second Circuit in
Caiazzo,301 wherein the court asserted that a burden upon the
manufacturer to prove nonenhancement is "too heavy a burden"
and "contradicts the theoretical underpinnings of the second colli-
sion doctrine." The court noted that such a shift in burdens would
force the manufacturer to prove part of the plaintiff's case.302
Moreover, the court reasoned that allowing claimants to prove only
the general "fact of enhancement" without requiring sufficient
proof about the nature and extent of the enhanced injuries would
permit "undue jury speculation" and "dangerous latitude" in
fixing responsibility on the basis of ability to pay an award.30 3
Actually, the arguments in favor of imposing the enhancement
burden of proof upon the manufacturer rely upon conceptually
flawed notions of dividing up indivisible injuries and upon princi-
ples of apportionment applicable only to joint or concurrent
tortfeasors 4 Proponents of a burden shift typically note that
when two or more tortfeasors combine to injure a plaintiff the bur-
den of proving apportionment is upon the defendant seeking such
an allocation.30 5 This rule is embodied in section 433B(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.308 It is, however, inapplicable to
the crashworthiness "enhancement" situation.
In the enhanced injury case, the claimant does not apportion
201 647 F.2d 241, 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981).
32 Id. at 246.
" Id. at 250-51. The court acknowledged that requiring the plaintiff to prove general
enhancement and to offer evidence of what injuries would have resulted absent the alleged
defect sometimes may be a heavy or perhaps impossible burden. Id. at 251.
I0" E.g., Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1977); Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 745-46 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn, J., concurring).
205 537 F.2d at 745 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
306 Section 433B provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that the tor-
tious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the
plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on
the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of
proof as to the apportionment is upon each actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncer-
tainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove
that he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B) (1965).
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the total injuries sustained in the collision between the negligent
driver causing the accident and the manufacturer whose design ag-
gravated the injury. Similarly, the plaintiff is not required to di-
vide up an indivisible injury whether by percentages or otherwise.
The plain fact is that the tortfeasor who precipitated the accident
is liable for all of the plaintiff's injuries.0 7 Principles of apportion-
ment, therefore, are inapposite. Indeed, the claim against the man-
ufacturer is not based upon apportionment of responsibility for the
plaintiff's injuries but upon the theory that the injuries incurred
were greater than those that would have been sustained had there
been no defect.308 The claimant proves this aspect of damages by
showing what probably would have occurred had a safer alterna-
tive design been used. This required showing against the manufac-
turer has absolutely nothing to do with apportionment between
tortfeasors, apportionment between the so-called first collision and
second collision, or "dividing" up an "indivisible" injury. Rather, it
involves proof of what probably would have occurred had the man-
ufacturer used an alternative design.309
When viewed in this elemental form, the plaintiff's enhance-
ment burden of proof is nothing more than a requirement to prove
that which he is claiming: that "fewer" or "lesser" injuries would
have occurred with a different design. The plaintiff's burden,
therefore, is not one of apportioning harms or dividing up injuries,
a burden which section 433B(2) of the Restatement might shift to
the defendant.310 The Restatement merely speaks of a battle
307 Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738-39 (3d Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529
F.2d 259, 268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
308 E.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor
Co., 529 F.2d 259, 268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 522-
23 (Tenn. 1973); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 751, 758, 522 P.2d 829,
833 (1974).
309 See note 291 supra.
"' Section 433B(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[e]xcept as
stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defen-
dant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff." Subsections (2) and (3) are
inapplicable to the defendant manufacturer because it, like the plaintiff, does not apportion
the injuries between itself and the tortfeasor causing the accident. See note 291 supra. Simi-
larly, the manufacturer does not divide up indivisible injuries. Since the essence of the claim
against the manufacturer is only the injury over and above what would have occurred with a
nondefective design, enhancement is not ascertained by apportionment of actual injuries
but by evidence of what would otherwise have occurred. See note 302 and accompanying
text supra. Since the negligent driver causing the accident is responsible for all the injuries,
the manufacturer does not "seek to limit his liability on the ground the harm is capable of
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among multiple tortfeasors to apportion the total harm among
themselves.1 It does not relate to the plaintiff's burden of proving
enhanced injuries. If such proof cannot be set forth, the plaintiff
merely has failed to show that the defect aggravated or enhanced
the injuries. 1 2 When the claimant cannot offer any evidence as to
what would have occurred but for the defect, "the plaintiff has not
established the fact of enhancement at all. '31 3
If, indeed, any burden of proof respecting enhanced injury lia-
bility were to be shifted to the manufacturer, presumably, it would
be the burden of proving that the plaintiff's alternative design
would not have reduced his injuries. Such a burden, however, is
illogical and cannot practicably be discharged. To impose liability,
the jury needs definitive proof that enhancement occurred as well
as the extent and the degree thereof. The defendant's proof of the
negative obviously cannot supply such evidence. Since the manu-
facturer takes the position that there was no defect, it does not
offer proof of a safer alternative design. Therefore, the manufac-
apportionment among them." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965). The man-
ufacturer defends against the proof of enhancement by refuting the claimed defect or the
injury-minimizing qualities of the plaintiff's hypothetical design alternative or by showing
that the accident was so violent or severe that a different design would have made no differ-
ence. The latter defense is equivalent to asserting that there was no defect. The actual inju-
ries, however, are not divided or apportioned. Thus, subsection 2 is inapplicable. Subsection
3 similarly is of no influence in the enhancement claim because it deals with a harm caused
by only one of the tortfeasors while the identity of the culpable defendant is uncertain. The
negligent driver who causes the accident and who is responsible for all the injuries is readily
identifiable. The manufacturer, on the other hand, is not responsible for all the injuries but
only for those injuries over and above those that would have occurred without the defect.
The manufacturer, therefore, cannot be the "only one" who caused the entire harm, as re-
ferred to in subsection 3, unless the plaintiff claimed that the alternative design would have
caused no injuries. In such a case, the plaintiff is not claiming enhanced or aggravated inju-
ries and, therefore, does not have to prove enhancement. He does, however, still have to
prove the proximate cause of all injuries. What then remains of section 433B? The answer is
subsection 1, which imposes nothing more or less than the traditional burden of proof upon
a claimant to prove that the tortious conduct caused the harm.
311 One commentator refers to a court's use of section 433B(2) to shift the burden to
the manufacturer as a mistaken abdication of responsibility. See Foland, supra note 4, at
615. The author states that:
[t]he Restatement requires a defendant to go forward with proof of apportion-
ment because he is the one who seeks to rely on it to relieve himself of liability for
all or a portion of the damages. However, in a second collision-crashworthy case,
the defendant has no liability absent proof of enhanced injury. Therefore the
plaintiff is the one who relies on proof of apportionment to establish his cause of
action.
Id. at 615.
311 Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir. 1981).
31 Id.
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turer cannot and does not show what would have occurred with the
"safer" alternative. Moreover, the defendant's legal interest in
proving that the actual design did not enhance injuries only be-
comes manifest after the claimant cogently shows the extent of in-
jury reduction attributable to his proposed design. Until that
point, there is no enhancement to disprove. The liability theory is
wholly the plaintiff's and the manufacturer cannot possibly supply
the missing ingredient in the plaintiff's case: that absent the defect
less serious injuries would have been sustained. Any proposal to
shift the enhancement burden must be recognized as an attempt to
force manufacturers to go forward with an inconsistent and highly
prejudicial defense. Accordingly, the burden of proving enhance-
ment is placed logically and fairly upon the plaintiff, the only liti-
gant who has the motive, inclination, and ability to prove a defect
that unreasonably enhanced his injuries. Thus, the manufacturer is
not required to prove a negative-his noncausation of the plain-
tiff's injuries. 14
In summary, the burden of proof controversy is a false issue.
The language of apportionment found in some decisions is both
unfortunate and misleading. Confusion can be avoided if the con-
ceptual premise behind enhancement liability is kept clearly in
mind. The plaintiff must prove that his injuries were enhanced
over and above those injuries that would have been sustained if a
safer, practicable alternative design had been used. Viewed in this
light, it is apparent that the burden of proving enhancement rests
exactly where it must: upon the plaintiff in whose case proof of
enhancement is an essential element for recovery.
LINGERING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In Dawson,3 15 the Third Circuit highlighted tensions of constitu-
tional dimension when it perceived a "troubling public policy di-
lemma" in permitting individual juries "to establish national auto-
mobile safety standards" '16 and to impose upon manufacturers
"the responsibility of insuring vast numbers of persons involved in
automobile accidents. 31 7 The constitutional implications, however,
"' See note 295 and accompanying text supra. See also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976).
315 Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959
(1981). For a discussion of the Dawson case, see text accompanying notes 50-64 supra.
316 630 F.2d at 953, 962; see text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
311 630 F.2d at 962.
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were not addressed by the panel.318 Surprisingly, no court appears
to have addressed the lingering constitutional issues inherent in
jury-formulated crash safety standards via ad hoc adjudications.
Ultimately, however, the potential constitutional impediments to
jury-establishment of crash design standards must be confronted
by the courts. They certainly deserve scrutiny. The following dis-
cussion deals with three such issues: preemption, burden upon in-
terstate commerce, and due process. 19
Preemption
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
explicitly provides that states are proscribed from adopting safety
standards "not identical" to the federal standards regulating the
"same aspect of performance. '320 Thus, a major and novel preemp-
tion question is posed by the potential for conflict between official
state activity through ad hoc adjudications and federally mandated
safety standards. Moreover, jury-formulated design criteria may
adversely affect nationally desirable or mandated safety and en-
ergy objectives. 32
The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy
311 Id. at 953; see note 62 supra.
319 An exhaustive discussion analyzing each of these complex constitutional subjects is
beyond the scope of this article. The purpose of this section is to identify the significant
themes which may pose potential constitutional impediments to the present system and to
suggest avenues of possible correction. Because varying cases may present different factual
settings in which one constitutional issue may be more significant than others, it would be
difficult to analyze incisively all aspects bearing upon a particular problem. For a discussion
of some constitutional questions in the crashworthiness area, see Hoenig & Goetz, supra
note 2, at 59-65.
.20 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1976). Section 1392(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this sub-
chapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not
identical to the Federal standard.
Id. This section, however, does permit federal and state governments to establish higher
standards of performance for vehicles or equipment procured for their own use. 15 U.S.C. §
1392(d) (1976). In other words, the prohibition against establishing standards inconsistent
with the federal standards does not apply to vehicles purchased by the states for govern-
ment use.
2 Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 953, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981).
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clause of article VI of the United States Constitution. 22 Once it is
determined that the federal government has power to regulate in a
given area, the primary preemption question is whether Congress
has exercised its legislative power in such a manner as to exclude
the states from asserting concurrent jurisdiction over the same
subject matter. 28 The Supreme Court has indicated that the legal
precedents do not provide a "rigid formula" or "exclusive constitu-
tional yardstick" for deciding preemption cases.3 24 Rather, the
Court has observed that the determination "turns upon the pecu-
liarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in
question ' 2 and the extent to which the challenged state action
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress. "326
State activity raising federal preemption questions most often
takes the form of traditional lawmaking-state statutes, regula-
tions, or municipal ordinances.2 7 Nevertheless, state activity in the
form of the imposition of tort or common law liability may also
violate the Constitution. For example, in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,328 the Supreme Court clearly indicated
that an award of damages may "conflict with the active assertion
of federal authority in the same way as a statute, injunction or
regulation":3
29
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be
free from state regulation if national policy is to be left un-
322 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
I 23 E.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
"' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
325 Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
M' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see L. TRIE, AMEaRICAN CONsTrruTIoNAx
LAW § 6-23, at 376-77 (1978).
E.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (Washington statutes
and regulations regarding the design, size and movement of oil tankers in waterway); Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977) (California weight labeling statute and
regulations); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (City ordi-
nance forbidding jet aircraft from taking off during night hours).
228 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
319 Id. at 247.
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hampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through
an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief.
'The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.
Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant
compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activi-
ties that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme.3 0
'Thus, the Garmon Court held that since Congress had entrusted
the administration of national labor policy to the National Labor
Relations Board, preemption precluded a state tort action for dam-
ages occasioned by a union's organizational picketing.
Despite the relative infrequency of preemption challenges to a
state's imposition of tort or common-law liability, it is clear that
the imposition of such liability by the state involves the exercise of
law-making authority. Garmon teaches not only that damage
awards may be a "potent method of governing conduct and con-
trolling policy," but also that the means used to express the state
remedy is not the determining factor." 1
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court held imper-
missible a state's "use of its law of unfair competition to prevent
the copying of an article. . . which federal law has said belongs to
the public. '332 The Court noted that Congress implemented the
patent system "to promote invention while at the same time pre-
serving free competition. '333 Thus, it concluded that a state may
330 Id. at 246-47 (citation omitted).
33' Id. at 247.
32 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 980
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 121 (1981); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Cf. Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)(copyright laws preclude state common-law copyrights).
'31 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964). Just as a uniform
scheme was envisioned with respect to patents, a declared congressional purpose of the
Safety Act is uniformity of national safety standards: "the centralized, mass production,
high volume character of the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in the United States
requires that motor vehicle safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced,
but that they be uniform throughout the country." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2709, 2720; see H.R. REP. No. 1776,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966) ("uniformity of standards" intended so that public and in-
dustry are guided "by one set of criteria rather than a multiplicity of diverse standards").
Similarly, Congress intended that the Safety Act should preserve free competition in the
industry and should encourage individual research to make safer vehicles: "[t]his legislation
reflects the faith that the restrained and responsible exercise of Federal authority can chan-
nel the creative energies and vast technology of the automobile industry into a vigorous and
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not interfere with the delicate balance achieved by Congress by ex-
tending the life of a patent beyond its expiration, either directly by
legislation or indirectly by common-law remedies.334 Similarly, in
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,335 the Court considered the
clash between a civil action for libel under state law and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in
the NLRB over labor disputes. After analyzing the regulatory in-
tent and balancing the state's "overriding" interest in protecting
its citizens from malicious libels, the Court concluded that a total
bar of defamation claims was not necessary because the potential
for interference with the federal scheme was insufficient to coun-
terbalance the state's legitimate interest. Thus, the state's tort
remedies were only partially curtailed. Although the Court held
that an action could be maintained for malicious defamation,3 3 6 it
further asserted that punitive damages were not available to suc-
cessful plaintiffs. 3 Moreover, the Court reserved the power, under
preemption principles, to limit or exclude the state's damage reme-
dies altogether:
[I]f experience shows that a greater curtailment, even a total one,
should be necessary to prevent impairment of that policy, the
Court will be free to reconsider today's holding. We deal here not
with a constitutional issue but solely with the degree to which
state remedies have been pre-empted by the Act.338
It is evident, therefore, that a supremacy clause clash between a
state's strict tort liability remedies and federal policy expressed in
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act may be
presented even though the state activity is manifested through ad-
judications rather than statutes, regulations or ordinances.
competitive effort to improve the safety of vehicles." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2709. See also id. at 2712 ("[v]igorous
competition in the development and marketing of safety improvements must be
maintained").
334 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). The Stiffel Court
stated: "[j]ust as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot
under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind
that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws." Id.
:35 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
336 Id. at 65-67. The Court adopted the standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), to effectuate the statutory design concerning preemp-
tion. 383 U.S. at 65.
337 383 U.S. at 65-66.
" Id. at 66-67. The Linn Court also prescribed the requirements of proof in these
cases and declared that the trial judge has a duty to reduce excessive awards. Id. at 65-66.
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Moreover, federal exclusion of state law is mandated when
jury-established standards create a "physical impossibility" of
compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) promulgated under the Safety Act.33 9 In Gray v. General
Motors Corp.,340 for example, the plaintiff, claiming that her colli-
sion-related injuries were aggravated when she was thrust into the
window of a vehicle, sued the manufacturer for failing to install a
"pop out" windshield. Under FMVSS 212, however, the windshield
mounting is required to be retained in a 30 miles per hour forward
crash into a rigid concrete barrier. 4 ' If the theory in Gray were
accepted, it would be physically impossible to comply with both
the federal directive and the jury's ad hoc standard for that claim.
A further complication is posed by a recent adjudication represent-
ing still another jury-formulated view. In Seese v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., the jury decided that a vehicle's windows should not be
dislodged during a high-speed rollover, even when the occupants
are unrestrained by seatbelts. 42 In implementing design choices
with respect to windows, therefore, the automobile manufacturer is
faced with irreconcilable conflict. The plaintiff in Gray wanted the
windshield to "pop out"; the unrestrained claimant in the violent
rollover case wanted windshields and windows to be unyielding
even at high speeds; and the federal safety standard requires
windshields to be retained, but only up to a certain point under
seatbelted-occupant conditions. Moreover, if the manufacturer
complies with the federal standard but chooses to make the win-
dows incapable of dislodgement well above the crash performance
speed prescribed in the standard, might he not then be increasing
the danger to unrestrained occupants in other accidents who strike
the windows at high speed? Under these conditions, it is a physical
impossibility to comply with the federal requirement and with the
ad hoc crash standards advanced by all potential claimants in all
accidents. 4 3
339 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (federal
exclusion of state law is. "inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design
where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one
engaged in interstate commerce"). For the text of the elaborate Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards ("FMVSS") that have been promulgated, see 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1980).
340 434 F.2d 110, 111 (8th Cir. 1970).
341 Id. at 111; see Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.212 (1980).
342 See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844 (3d Cir. 1981).
33 Similar problems, of course, may be presented in other contexts. For example, a
claimant in one case might allege that a door latch mechanism should not give way when
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Physical impossibility also can exist because of the intrinsic
design characteristics of particular automobiles or their component
parts. For example in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,344 the
plaintiff's experts claimed that a snub-nosed, multipurpose van
with rear cargo capacity should have been built like a passenger
sedan with a protruding engine in the front. Of course, adoption of
such a standard would influence manufacturers to eliminate novel
and utilitarian vehicle designs, leaving few choices for the purchas-
ing public. Notably, Congress intended that this should not result
from standards set by the agency. 45 Thus, it seems that the legis-
subjected to severe collision forces. See notes 266-270 and accompanying text supra. The
federal safety standards dealing with door latch resistance require latches to withstand a
certain load under specified test conditions. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.206 (1980). If the manufac-
turer complied with the regulations and incorporated such "anti-burst" or "anti-opening"
features into the latch so that it did not open even under violent collision forces, would the
manufacturer be liable to a claimant who cannot exit or be extricated from a burning vehi-
cle? Another illustration is suggested by Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181, 1183
(8th Cir. 1977), wherein the claimants' experts testified that the seatbelt angle should have
been 90'. The federal standard, however, specified an allowable range between 200 and 75*.
Id.; see notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra.
311 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
115 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2709, 2714:
In determining whether any proposed standard is 'appropriate'... the committee
intends that the Secretary will consider the desirability of affording consumers
continued wide range of choices in the selection of motor vehicles. Thus it is not
intended that standards will be set which will eliminate or necessarily be the same
for small cars or such widely accepted models as convertibles and sports cars, so
long as all motor vehicles meet basic minimum standards.
Id. Similarly, physical impossibility might arise from conflicting jury-established standards
as to the same subject matter. Indeed, in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Talbert, [1970-1973]
PROD. LiAR. REP. (CCH) 6550 (Wash. 1970) and Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp.,
83 Wash. 2d 751, 752, 522 P.2d 829, 830 (1974), vehicles were claimed to be uncrashworthy
because, among other things, the seats remained rigidly anchored during the collision and
failed to yield. On the other hand, in Volkswagenwerk of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201, 321 A.2d 737, 739 (1974) and Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568, 570 (Miss.
1969), the claim was that the design was uncrashworthy because the seats gave way in the
collision. Under FMVSS 207, seats must withstand a certain force under prescribed test
conditons. 49 C.F.R. § 571.207 (1980). Thus, it is evident that it is a physical impossibility to
meet one claimant's preferred standard that the seat give way and another claimant's stan-
dard that it should not as well as the federal standard.
If the solution to this problem is that there must be a design compromise between the
extremes, why not use the federal safety standard as such a judgmental compromise? Why
should it not receive deference? Whenever it is contended that a state's products liability
rules require more than the federal standard itself requires, there is a danger that the safety
agency's decision to set a limit upon the required level of performance in the interests of an
overall safety compromise will be thwarted. For example, the federal standard's allowance of
seat yielding, after a prescribed force load requirement is exceeded, may represent a safety
judgment that other, more serious injuries might be sustained if the seat were made not to
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lature could not have intended this situation to result from ad hoc
adjudications of tort claims.
Additionally, physical impossibility or its functional equi-
valent, prohibitive cost, might arise when compliance with a jury-
imposed standard conflicts with a FMVSS or increases the dam-
ages likely to be sustained by persons involved in other kinds of
accidents .3 4 To illustrate, although rigid bumpers may offer some
protection against intrusion, they are dangerous to pedestrians.
High seatback head restraints may offer some protection against
"whiplash," but may compromise rearward visibility. Brighter or
higher intensity lamps may improve visibility at night, but may
also blind oncoming drivers. Rigid seats may prevent an occupant
from moving rearwards in a rear-end crash, but may increase the
injuries of rear seat occupants who strike them during a frontal
collision. These and many other engineering conflicts may make it
physically impossible to comply with both a federal standard and a
jury-imposed standard.
Even if physical impossibility is not present, the federal
scheme of regulation may create a preemptive effect. Indeed, if
Congress has manifested an intent "to displace coincident state
regulation in a given area," the state activity may be excluded.
47
In section 1392(d) of the Safety Act, Congress stated that no state
may establish "any safety standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not
identical to the Federal standard. 3 48 If a state proceeded to vio-
late section 1392(d) by creating standards not "identical" to the
federal standards, there would be no question that the state re-
yield to forces exceeding the prescribed level.
a" See, e.g., text accompanying notes 340-342 supra (pop-out windshields). A plaintiff
may claim, for example, that a fuel tank could have been better positioned to provide
greater safety in a particular kind of accident, although such design choice would make it
difficult to comply with the FMVSS that requires fuel tank integrity to be maintained in
multiple test collisions from the front, rear, and side. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.301 (1980). Simi-
larly, a jury standard that a seat belt angle should be 900 would violate the FMVSS requir-
ing an angle between 200 and 75* . See the discussion of Hurt v. General Motors Corp. in
note 343 supra. In addition, a claim that the body structure of a vehicle should be made
more rigid to prevent intrusion into the passenger compartment necessarily disregards the
possibility that added rigidity would increase accelerations upon the body, decrease energy
absorption, and create an automobile more hostile to other vehicles. Such an issue was
presented in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 959 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981).
"' Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
8" 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1976); see note 320 supra.
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quirement could not stand. Surely, the state may not accomplish
indirectly through adjudication of tort claims that which it may
not accomplish directly by legislation. A state's judicial activities
are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny and limitations as
are its traditional legislative enactments.3 49
When Congress has not expressly prohibited dual regulation
or unequivocally declared its exclusive authority over a particular
subject, federal preemption nevertheless may be implied. Key fac-
tors in such a determination are said to be (1) the aim and intent
of Congress as revealed by the statute and legislative history; (2)
the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as reflected in
the legislation and as carried into effect by the agency; (3) the na-
ture of the subject matter regulated and whether it demands "ex-
clusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to
national interests;" and (4) whether state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 3 50 Even if the congressional intent in the
Safety Act were not as clear as section 1392(d) manifests, a good
case can be made to justify a conclusion of implied preemption on
the basis of the four key factors enumerated above. First, both the
statute and legislative history make it clear that uniform, national
safety standards were Congress' goal.35 Second, the pervasiveness
of the federal regulatory scheme is reflected in the scope and
breadth of the Safety Act and the safety standards promulgated
thereunder.3 5 2 Moreover, the agency carrying out the regulatory
scheme spends millions of dollars annually to conduct research,
testing, compliance, enforcement, and recall activities. 53 Third,
the subject matter is certainly one which demands "exclusive fed-
eral regulation in order to achieve the uniformity vital to national
interests. 3 54 Finally, if jury-established standards vary from case
349 See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
"I Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
351 See note 333 supra.
s See 49 C.F.R. § 571.101-80 (1980) (federal motor vehicle standards).
"' For fiscal year 1981, the National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration re-
quested over $355 million from Congress of which $52.3 million was for traffic and motor
vehicle safety programs. See [1980] PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 110 (Feb. 1, 1980).
"I Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959); see S. REP. No. 1301,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 2709, 2712, 2720.
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to case and conflict with national safety and energy policies or fed-
eral safety requirements,3 55 then the state laws stand as obstacles
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of .Con-
gress.3 56 Thus, regardless of whether the preemptive effect is
deemed express or manifest under section 1392(d) or implied
under established constitutional analysis, the result would appear
to be the same-the proscribed state activity should be curtailed
either in whole or in part.
The conclusion that the Safety Act and its FMVSS preempt
inconsistent jury-established standards is not impeded by section
1397(c) of the Act which provides: "[c]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does
not exempt any person from any liability under common law.
3 5 7
The plain reach of this provision is simply to declare that com-
mon-law liability is not excused merely because of compliance with
a safety standard. Stated simply, compliance is not a defense viti-
ating liability as a matter of law. This subsection, however, does
not mean that states can act unconstitutionally, via common-law
doctrines, to frustrate the national policy promoting uniform per-
formance standards. To reason otherwise would require a conclu-
sion that the legislature's express prohibition in section 1392(d)
could be undone by section 1397(c). Moreover, the prohibition in
section 1392(d) is a fundamental rule vital to the very purpose of
the Safety Act itself while section 1397(c) is merely a general state-
ment of no per se defense. Any conflict between the two arguably
would have to be resolved in favor of the fundamental rule which
effectuates the purpose of the Safety Act.
The legislative history of the Safety Act does not reveal any
sanctity attached to common-law remedies sufficiently strong to ei-
ther question or nullify an express congressional intent to have
uniform federal standards preempt non-identical state standards.
On the contrary, the legislative history reveals section 1397(c)'s
limited breadth. The Senate Report states that the federal safety
standards "need not be interpreted as restricting State common
law standards of care. Compliance with such standards would thus
not necessarily shield any person from product liability at com-
"I" See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d at 962-63; notes 50-71 and accompanying
text supra.
"I See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976).
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mon law." ' The House Report states that compliance "is not to
be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under com-
mon law particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort
liability." '59 The tenor of these pronouncements is that section
1397(c) was intended solely to preclude an automatic defense s"
and not to sanction unconstitutional state activity in the form of
judgments. Moreover, when the Safety Act was enacted in 1966,
Congress could not have intended section 1397(c) to allow com-
mon-law crashworthiness liability based upon nonidentical jury
crash standards since such actions had not at that time been per-
mitted by the courts."' Therefore, Congress obviously was intent
upon preserving the common-law remedies which then existed, not
upon creating new legal theories of liability.36 2 In any event, sub-
sections 1392(d) and 1397(c) are not mutually exclusive and do not
cancel each other out; rather, they must be construed in pari
318 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2709, 2720 (emphasis added).
319 H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).
30 See Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1978) (sec-
tion 1397(c) prevents exemption from negligence because of compliance with standards);
Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978) (standards are "statutory min-
ima" and not conclusive as to manufacturer's liability). Cases considering the threshold
question whether there is a common-law duty to provide a crashworthy vehicle have re-
ferred to 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) as an indication that regulation under the Safety Act was
intended to supplement the common law of products liability and that courts, therefore,
were not powerless to act or impose such a legal duty upon manufacturers. E.g., Knippen v.
Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Young, 272 Md. 201, 218, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 562,
225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975). These pronouncements simply state that courts may declare
legal doctrines notwithstanding legislative activity under the Safety Act. They do not stand
for the proposition that courts or juries may adopt, establish, or impose performance stan-
dards which are not identical to the federal standards. State court activity to that effect
would fare no better than state legislative activity because of the prohibition contained in 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d).
"0I Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). Evans
was overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). The Safety Act
was passed just a few months after the Evans case was decided and well before the Larsen
case.
302 Consider the statement of Rep. Dingell on the Floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives:
Second, we have preserved every single common-law remedy that exists against a
manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle purchaser. This means that all of
the warranties and all of the other devices of common law which are afforded to
the purchaser, remain in the buyer, and they can be exercised against the
manufacturer.
112 CONG. REc. 19663 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Dingell)(emphasis added).
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materia.
Although sufficient precedent exists to justify a total curtail-
ment of state tort awards because of federal preemption,33 courts
scrutinizing the constitutional issues might also consider the op-
tion of imposing a "partial" curtailment in order to effectuate fed-
eral policy.3 64 One approach to harmonizing Safety Act objectives
with the maintenance of products liability suits would be to limit
crashworthiness claims to those based upon negligence as opposed
to strict tort liability.36 5 Another form of partial curtailment would
involve a requirement that courts give effective weight to a manu-
facturer's compliance with federal standards.366 This recognition
311 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-33 (1964); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-48 (1959).
:11 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 67 (1966). A majority of the Linn
Court held that partial curtailment could limit libel suits to those based upon malice. Id. at
61-62. Four dissenting justices, however, urged total curtailment of state-allowed lawsuits.
Id. at 67-74. Thus, the dividing line between total and partial curtailment may indeed be
fine.
365 For a discussion of the desirability of negligence theory over strict liability in the
crashworthiness design area, see notes 92-118 and accompanying text supra. An argument
favoring partial curtailment or preemption of strict liability might proceed as follows. In
negligence cases, the jury's inquiry is focused upon the conduct of the manufacturer-was
there an exercise of reasonable care? In strict liability, however, the jury's focus is upon the
product itself and not upon the manufacturer's conduct. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 33.
Indeed, under doctrinal strict liability theory, the manufacturer may be held liable even if
he "has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Such an instruction to juries invites them to look beyond
the federal standard regarding the same aspect of performance and to establish their own
non-identical standard, thereby directly conflicting with 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). Under the
Safety Act, the safety standards are "performance standards," specifying the required per-
formance of the vehicle and not the manner in which the manufacturer achieves the speci-
fied performance. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2709, 2713-14. The Senate Report illustrates: "[t]he Secretary would
thus be concerned with the measurable performance of a braking system, but not its design
details." Id. at 2714; see 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (1976) (defining "motor vehicle safety stan-
dard" in terms of performance). Strict tort liability, focusing as its does upon the end per-
formance of the product and not upon the manufacturer's conduct, can more easily offend
the prohibition of 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) if a performance standard is established that is not
identical to the federal standard in the particular aspect of performance. In negligence the-
ory, however, where the focus of the inquiry is upon the manufacturer's conduct, the ques-
tion does not necessarily involve "the same aspect of performance." In a negligence case, a
jury's consideration of a non-identical standard would not as easily amount to the imposi-
tion of a performance criterion but merely would constitute an evidentiary factor in the
overall question of the manufacturer's conduct rather than the product's performance. Such
an approach would arguably implement the appropriate preemptive effect and, at the same
time, permit negligence suits which allege a lack of crashworthiness.
' See notes 191-218 and accompanying text supra. While 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) pre-
cludes compliance as an automatic defense, such compliance is a relevant factor for con-
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would encourage compliance with federal standards and better
implement, at the state court level, the congressional goal of uni-
formity. Still another form of partial curtailment would be a prohi-
bition against punitive damage awards when compliance with the
federal standard is shown. Since the Safety Act mandates the pro-
mulgation of standards designed to eliminate or minimize unrea-
sonable risk of injury and death, s7 compliance with such a stan-
dard should preclude submission of a punitive damage claim
regarding the subject matter or aspect of the performance regu-
lated. Moreover, one case strongly reflects the view that partial
curtailment of tort remedies through the denial of punitive dam-
ages may be necessary.36
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the preemption
question, whether it involves total or partial curtailment, is a via-
ble constitutional issue of considerable importance. Surprisingly, it
has not been addressed or developed by courts in the crashworthi-
ness area. Given the continued proliferation of crashworthiness
cases, however, it may not be long before the preemption question
is considered.
Burden on Commerce
As indicated in the preceding section, state authority, whether
sideration by the court and jury in ascertaining whether reasonable care was exercised. See
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d at 156-57.
367 See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1976).
388 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. at 66. In a recent crashworthiness
case, a Fifth Circuit panel seems to have applied a functionally analogous approach regard-
ing the imposition of punitive damages when there has been compliance with federal stan-
dards. Although the court stated that compliance was not a defense, it upheld the punitive
award primarily on aspects of performance not covered by the standards. Dorsey v. Honda
Motor Co., [1981] PROD. & SAFETY LiAB. REP. (BNA) 723 (Sept. 18, 1981). In Dorsey a
subcompact automobile was struck by a full size car. The occupant of the smaller vehicle
sustained serious injuries, sued the manufacturer and prevailed. The jury awarded compen-
satory damages as well as $5,000,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, one major issue was
the viability of the punitive award in the face of the subject vehicle's compliance with the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. In justifying the award of punitive damages, the
appellate court observed that the standards complied with "are unrelated to several of the
design deficiences developed by plaintiff's evidence." Id. at 728. While the regulations gov-
erning seat belts were relevant, "none of the regulations. . . governed the strength of the A
pillar or the overall ability of the passenger compartment to protect occupants in a crash."
Thus, for the issues in this case, the applicable regulations were deemed "far from compre-
hensive." Id. The court's approach seems somewhat strict in light of FMVSS 208 which
governs occupant crash protection. The court explains, however, that standard 208 did not
apply to the subject vehicle. Id. at 728 n.7.
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manifested through the legislature or the courts, is subject to the
limits which the United States Constitution places upon state ac-
tion. Indeed, a state cannot exceed its power through an award of
damages.36 9 Thus, strict tort liability remedies based on ad hoc,
non-uniform standards may substantially burden interstate com-
merce in violation of article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitu-
tion.3 70 The burden imposed upon commerce may be twofold: first,
foreign and interstate commerce may be materially affected in an
area where uniformity is indispensable; second, an undue financial
burden may be placed upon interstate commerce.
It is well settled that states have no authority to regulate those
phases of national commerce which, because of a need for national
uniformity, demand that their regulation be prescribed by a single
authority.3 71 Indeed, Professor Tribe has noted that "[state regula-
tory schemes] that individually seem only local in impact can col-
lectively burden multistate enterprises to such a degree that all
will be barred by the negative implications of the commerce
clause. ' ' 7 12 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that even when the
state acts in ihe interests of safety, the commerce clause may pro-
scribe the state regulatory activity.3 73
3'9 See text accompanying notes 325-338 supra. In Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373,
379 (1945), the Court acknowledged that a final court order may be an invalid burden on
interstate commerce. In Georgia v. Chattanooga, 406 F.2d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 1969), the court
observed that a writ of attachment may be an invalid burden upon commerce.
370 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Imposition of state liability by an invalid regulation of
interstate commerce is constitutionally impermissible. See Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm'n v.
Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577 (1925) (statute imposing strict liability of common carrier upon
private carrier burdened commerce); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547
(1914) (statute authorizing suits for mental anguish for failure to deliver telegraph messages
is invalid).
"' See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (state regu-
lations restricting lengths of trailer trucks operating on state highways are invalid); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959) (state requirement that trucks be
equipped with contour mudguards held invalid); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
767 (1945) (length of a train not subject to state regulation). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 326, § 6-11, at 338.
3 L. TRIBE, supra note 326, § 6-11, at 338.
373 A challenge to state regulations which were enacted to promote highway safety must
overcome the "strong presumption of [the] validity" of such state regulations. Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959). In Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 (1978), the Court held that the appellants overcame this strong
presumption by producing "a massive array of evidence to disprove the State's assertion
that the regulations make some contribution to highway safety." Id. Clearly, since ad hoc
crashworthiness adjudications are compensatory in nature, they do not carry the same pre-
sumption of validity.
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In reports accompanying the Safety Act, Congress unequivo-
cally declared national uniformity to be indispensable."7 4 As
promulgated, federal standards are to apply nationally, thereby
forbidding non-identical state standards in the same aspect of
performance.37 5 Indeed, unlike those situations in which a need
for uniformity must be implied from circumstances, in the
crashworthiness area one encounters the explicit recognition that
uniformity is indispensable.
As to the financial burden factor, if the fiscal restraint on com-
merce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits," it is an undue burden and, therefore, invalid.-76 The primary
local benefit derived from the application of a state's tort remedies
is compensation for injuries wrongfully sustained. Although this
state benefit is not inherently inconsistent with Congress' intent to
provide uniform standards and to prohibit "non-identical" stan-
dards in the "same aspect of performance," the manner in which
crashworthiness cases are resolved demonstrates the possibility of
an impermissible financial burden on commerce.
The federal standards are statutorily required to "meet the
need for motor vehicle safety.3 7 7 Motor vehicle safety is statuto-
rily defined as that performance of the vehicle or equipment which
provides the public with protection against the "unreasonable risk
of accidents" and, in the event of accidents, against the "unreason-
able risk of death or injury. 37 8 Thus, compliance with federal
standards in a particular aspect of performance satisfies at least
the minimally-prescribed requisites of protecting against unreason-
able risk. When a jury is instructed, however, that it may virtually
"establish" its own standard as to the same aspect of performance
by imposing liability despite the manufacturer's "exercise of all
possible care, 37 9 the burden placed upon the manufacturer
reaches a level that cannot be discharged practicably regardless of
the expenditure.
The financial burden of satisfying every conceivable jury-es-
tablished standard that differs from a federal standard on a partic-
374 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2709, 2720; H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966). For textual
excerpts, see note 351 supra.
37 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1976).
311 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
... 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976).
.7. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1976).
319 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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ular aspect of performance is prohibitive, if not impossible. It is,
for example, impossible to satisfy two different standards when a
jury says a windshield should "pop out" and a federal standard
says it should not "pop out" upon a collision.38 0 The manufacturer
bears the financial and legal burden of complying with one per-
formance criterion, only to be penalized by a huge verdict when he
cannot comply with the other. Thus, strict liability based solely
upon a jury's view of what the performance standard should be will
destroy the uniformity deemed so indispensable by Congress. At
the same time, the "incoherence in the safety requirements set by
disparate juries" 81 imposes an intolerable burden upon interstate
commerce in financial terms and conflicts with other national poli-
cies.382 Thus, the local benefit of compensating a wrongfully in-
jured party is clearly exceeded by the burden of liability imposed
upon the manufacturer despite his exercise of all possible care.
The Third Circuit in Dawson recognized that the responsibil-
ity imposed upon automobile manufacturers was one "of insuring
vast numbers of persons involved in automobile accidents" because
it "would be difficult for members of the industry to alter their
design and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such
cases," especially when a particular response "might well be at va-
riance with what some other jury decides is a defective design."383
When verdicts for crashworthiness liability soar into the multimil-
lion dollar range,38' a clear signal is emitted which demonstrates
that the cumulative financial burden is potentially enormous. Such
individual verdicts, coupled with the frequency of injurious acci-
dents potentially giving rise to crashworthiness claims, present an
exposure that is astronomical. The cost of this potential liability,
whether borne through insurance premiums, the price mechanism,
or directly from a company's funds, is an economic consequence of
'80 Compare Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110, 111 (8th Cir. 1970) with 49
C.F.R. § 571.212 (1980).
"I Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 953 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981).
3a2 630 F.2d at 953.
-3 Id. at 962.
38, See note 5 supra. In Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., [19811 PROD. & SAFETY LiAB. REP.
(BNA) 723 (Sept. 18, 1981), the court affirmed an award of compensatory damages and
reinstated a punitive damage award so that the total liability in one accident was $5,825,000.
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349 (1981), the
court upheld a judgment exceeding $6,000,000.
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such magnitude that commerce clause scrutiny is justified.' 5
Therefore, the twin pillars of undue commerce clause bur-
dens-commerce materially affected where uniformity is indispen-
sable and an undue financial burden-might well justify some con-
stitutional interdiction in the area of crashworthiness litigation,
especially that based upon strict liability.
Due Process
Procedural due process requires that "deprivation of life, lib-
erty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the cases." ' 8
Moreover, due process obviously contemplates that the right to no-
tice and a hearing be granted at a time "when the deprivation can
still be prevented. '3 7
In the congressional scheme of promulgating FMVSS under
the Safety Act, procedural due process is safeguarded very care-
fully. Indeed, standards may be established only to "meet the need
for motor vehicle safety." The standards must be "practicable"
and "stated in objective terms."88 Moreover, the agency is explic-
itly directed to consider a number of enumerated factors including
the reasonableness and appropriateness of the proposed standard,
its effect upon preexisting interrelated standards, and the practica-
bility of the prescribed standard for the particular vehicle."8 Sig-
nificantly, the industry, the public, and interested persons are per-
mitted input in the standard-setting process. Finally, the agency
is required to specify an effective date for orders 9" establishing
safety standards so that meaningful judicial review may be ob-
311 Liability costs attributable to jury-established non-identical standards are only one
form of an undue financial burden. Each year, manufacturers must conduct expensive re-
search, development, testing, and quality control to meet or exceed federal performance
standards. If manufacturers are required to comply with newly-minted jury standards, the
costs of compliance would be unpredictably and substantially magnified. See Dawson v.
Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
'I Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
187 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972).
"s 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976).
389 Id. § 1392(f)(3). The Secretary must "consider relevant available motor vehicle
safety data," id. § 1392 (f)(1), "consult with the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission, and
...state or interstate agencies . . . he deems appropriate," id. § 1392(f)(2), and "consider
the extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this chap-
ter," id. § 1392(f)(4).
-1- Id. § 1394.
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tained. 91 Thus, it is evident that the congressional scheme, besides
assuring procedural due process, proceeds in an orderly and ra-
tional fashion. 92
The Safety Act's legislative history indicates that the require-
ment of a practicable standard "would require consideration of all
relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the goal
of a particular standard as well as consideration of economic fac-
tors." 3  The requirement of objectivity 4 was prescribed "[i]n or-
der to insure that the question of whether there is compliance with
the standard can be answered by objective measurements and
without recourse to any subjective determination. '" 395 Test proce-
dures must be adequately specified and performance goals must be
clearly delineated. 396 Study of a particular technological problem
like the need for "airbags" and the pertinent advantages and dis-
advantages of such devices must be thorough.3 9 7
It is obvious that if automobile manufacturers are to be
charged with an obligation to design cars from the standpoint of
collision performance, they need to know in advance of manufac-
ture just what must be built into such vehicles. To become legally
responsible for compliance with a particular safety standard, the
manufacturer must first be advised as to what that standard re-
quires. In the federal standard-setting process involving crash-
worthiness of automobiles, 3 8 the manufacturer receives adequate
391 Id. § 1392(c) (1976).
392 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 676 (6th Cir. 1972).
111 H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).
'9' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2), 1392(a) (1976).
" H.R. REP. No. 1776, supra note 393, at 16.
" Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 678 (6th Cir. 1972).
117 E.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1344-46
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472
F.2d 659, 678-80 (6th Cir. 1972). See Raleigh, supra note 25, at 258-61.
The high quality of the standard-setting process and the standards promulgated
thereunder are unique to automobile regulation. In the Safety Act, Congress set forth defini-
tive requirements regarding what standards manufacturers must achieve, how they must be
developed, the criteria by which they are to be measured and judged, and how they are to be
implemented, enforced, and reviewed by the courts. Congress did not simply charge the
agency with a task to make standards. It directed that "safety shall be the overriding con-
sideration in the issuance of standards." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted
in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2709, 2714. Standards must be "strong and ade-
quately enforced." Id. at 2720. The manufacturer is forbidden, under penalty, to sell non-
complying vehicles or equipment. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1397, 1398 (1976). If a vehicle fails to comply,
the manufacturer must take immediate remedial steps. Id. § 1400 (1976). Vehicles contain-
ing defects related to motor vehicle safety must be recalled. Id. §§ 1411, 1414 (1976). More
importantly, the standards governing the safety performance of automobiles are stated in
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notice of what is required of him and an opportunity to be heard
on the subject, either through administrative procedures or judicial
review. More importantly, perhaps, he has a definitive and objec-
tive criterion by which his legal responsibilities are to be measured.
No such due process factors govern when a jury establishes
and imposes, through hindsight, a newly minted standard not
identical to the federal standard. Instead, the jury is given wide
latitude to decide what it feels is appropriate under the particular
circumstances. A retrospective, case-by-case jury approach cannot
be truly objective, from the standpoint of national interests, be-
cause the jury is specifically charged to focus only upon the facts in
the case before it. The broader design picture cannot be fully ap-
preciated because of the very nature of the proceeding. Moreover,
the sympathy factor, the concept of a target defendant, the suspi-
cion of insurance lurking in the background, and jurors' emotions
are all factors which militate against a jury's truly objective consid-
eration of crash design standards. An administrative agency, on the
other hand, can research and evaluate an aspect of crash design for
months and perhaps years in order to assess "the tradeoffs be-
tween the expected benefits and the potential dangers" of a partic-
ular safety device. 9
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Third Circuit in Daw-
son expressed uneasiness and concern about the fairness and effi-
ciency of the present arrangement which permits jury-imposed
standards in a given case to militate against national safety stan-
dards and policy goals. It simply may be unfair to require a manu-
facturer, under threat of penalty, 400 to comply at great expense
with carefully evolved standards and later to subject him to sub-
objective terms and capable of measurement to ascertain compliance. Such standards, when
referred to in litigation, provide a specific frame of reference for the jury. When unpredict-
able, jury-imposed standards become the predicate for liability, however, due process is im-
plicated because there has been no notice of or opportunity to be heard on the promulgation
of such ad hoc standards.
311 See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1347 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979). The situation involving airbags is illustrative. This
controversy involved years of intensive and comprehensive review at the agency level and
even in Congress itself. Rulemaking activities began in 1969 and the Safety Agency con-
ducted more than 2,000 crash tests of airbags. Id. at 1344. Ultimately, the proposed stan-
dard was submitted to Congress. Id. at 1342. Despite this intensive study, juries nonetheless
may establish their own airbag standards by imposing liability upon manufacturers who
failed to retrofit their older cars. It is indeed questionable whether such a form of standard
setting complies with due process requirements.
-00 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976).
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stantial liability for failure to comply with a different jury-imposed
standard. Such unfairness is magnified in light of the express pro-
hibition against non-"identical" state standards contained in the
Safety Act.401
Although the Dawson court did not express its uneasiness in
constitutional terms, the court's instinctive references to fairness
and efficiency of the current litigation system appear to signal the
kind of considerations inherent in due process criteria.0 2
The various constitutional tensions discussed above should be
evaluated thoroughly by the courts to ascertain whether, and to
what extent, conflicting federal and state policies can be harmo-
nized within the present system. It may be that such scrutiny will
serve as the vehicle or catalyst by which reasonable changes are
made or, at least, suggested. If the courts fail to act, it may be that
Congress will have to do so. In any event, these constitutional is-
sues should not be ignored.
CONCLUSION
Crashworthiness design claims represent a significant expan-
sion of products liability frontiers. In such cases, the focus shifts
from design defects that allegedly cause accidents to those that
purportedly fail to minimize injuries. This shift in focus magnifies
the already complex question, "how much design safety is
enough?," and creates a far more open-ended scheme of design
claim resolution with very serious policy implications. In determin-
ing such cases, courts and juries are thrust into the role of formu-
lating crash safety standards on the basis of ad hoc adjudications
which may result in incoherent safety requirements which conflict
with important national policies.
The problem is further exacerbated by the preference of many
courts to allow resolution of crashworthiness design claims under
the theory of strict tort liability, a doctrine which promotes uncer-
401 Id. § 1392(d) (1976). See notes 350-367 and accompanying text supra.
402 In considering the clash between federal and state policies, it is interesting to note
that the first judicial opinions to favor a common-law crashworthiness liability did so prior
to the implementation of extensive federal standards. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) (common-law standard of reasonable care can serve soci-
ety's needs "until the legislature imposes higher standards"); Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 1966) (Kiley, J., dissenting) (the "possibility of future
adequate legislative standards" did not remove the present necessity of a common-law
action). Arguably, the vigorously enforced federal standards effective today obviate the need
for expanded common-law remedies which encourage conflicting jury requirements.
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tainty and obscures the fact that reasonableness criteria must inev-
itably govern such design claims. Nevertheless, negligence criteria
are discernible in many decisions based on strict liability. In any
event, if courts are to continue to employ strict liability in the
crashworthiness design area, they must recognize that reasonable-
ness is the basic standard of responsibility and they must reject
that form of strict liability which holds a manufacturer liable de-
spite his exercise of all possible care. Use of such a legal standard
would improperly impose upon the automobile industry the obliga-
tions of an insurer. In addition, such a strict form of liability would
operate to destroy a manufacturer's incentive to exercise reasona-
ble care, a result that is patently undesirable. In short, it is unwise
to penalize reasonableness.
Perhaps in recognition of the serious policy problems posed by
crashworthiness design litigation, courts recently have developed
several essential requirements of proof. One requisite is the claim-
ant's obligation to prove an alternative safer design which was
practicable under the circumstances. "Practicability," however,
does not mean mere technical possibility. Therefore, to forestall a
dismissal of his claim, a plaintiff must offer sufficient and proba-
tive evidence of practicability. A second element to be proved in a
crashworthiness case is the nexus between an alleged design defect
and the plaintiff's enhanced injuries. To discharge this burden, the
plaintiff must prove, without speculation or conjecture, the inju-
ries, if any, which would have resulted had the proposed alterna-
tive design been used. A failure to prove the nature and extent of
enhancement justifies dismissal of the claim.
Crashworthiness design litigation also creates tensions of con-
stitutional dimension. The open-ended ability of juries to establish
crash design standards appears to conflict with the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which forbids the states from
establishing safety standards that are not identical to the federal
standards. Because a state's award of damages pursuant to com-
mon-law tort remedies is a form of state activity that must comply
with constitutional requirements, the conflict between ad hoc jury-
created standards and uniform federal safety standards presents
classical questions of preemption, burden upon commerce, and due
process. These lingering constitutional problems are significant and
eventually must be addressed by the courts.
The significant increase in crashworthiness design litigation,
with its attendant multimillion dollar exposure for individual acci-
- [Vol. 55:633
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dents, has created enormous policy pressures that the courts no
longer can ignore. If the courts are to continue to play a construc-
tive role in the resolution of crashworthiness claims, they must re-
lieve the mounting pressures by halting the trend towards estab-
lishment of yet another compensation scheme and must harmonize
conflicting federal and state policies. If the courts fail to act defini-
tively, legislative relief will be necessary.
